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ABSTRACT
This thesis deals with the theory of Punishment in 
Islamic law. It is divided into four ch pters. In the 
first chapter I deal with the fixed punishments or Mal 
hududrl; four punishments are discussed: the punishments for 
theft, armed robbery, adultery and slanderous allegations 
of unchastity. The other two punishments which are usually 
classified as "hudud11, i.e. the punishments for wine-drinking 
and apostasy are dealt with in the second chapter. The 
idea that they are not punishments of "hudud11 is fully ex- 
plained. Neither of these two punishments was fixed in 
definite terms in the Qurfan or the Sunna? therefore the 
traditional classification of both of then cannot be accepted.
The third chapter discusses the punishment for homi­
cide and injury. It is usually said that homicide is treated 
under Islamic law rather as a tort than a crime, and an 
attempt is made to explain and elucidate this.
The fourth chapter deals with the discretionary pun­
ishments or ?lal-ta1 zir11, ?nd the fifth chapter deals with 
the law of evidence in criminal cases.
In this thesis I have tried to explain the philosophy 
underlying the theory of punishment in Islamic law, so a 
survey in which Islamic law is examined in the light of 
modern penologists1 ideas has been added to each of the 
first four chapters.
The conclusion is devoted to a discussion of the poss-
ibility of applying tht Islamic Penal System in present 
Muslim societies. I have tried to explain that unless 
Islamic law is accepted and enforced as a complete and 
comprehensive system, the Islamic penal system cannot be
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INTRODUCTION
All penal systems are concerned, in the first place, 
with the punishment of the offender. The study of the 
theory of punishment, therefore, is an essential step 
towards the understanding of any penal system. At the 
same time, one cannot justify the application of a 
particular penal system unless it has become clear that 
its theory of punishment can successfully achieve the 
required ends and objectives. In Western penal systems, 
broadly speaking, the theories of punishment are based 
on, and justified by, considerations of social utility, 
while in Islamic law, the theory of punishment is said 
to be based on divine revelation contained in the Qut'an 
and the Sunna*
The fact is that the Qur'an and the Sunna contain 
very little theorisation, if any at all. The Qur'an 
and the Sunna contain only some basic rules and commands 
usually expressed in a very broad way and usually capable 
of varying interpretations. There are also some specific 
injunctions and prohibitions but they are very few and 
concern a variety of subjects. The formation of theories 
in Islamic law started at a comparatively later stage 
when the schools of Islamic law emerged in the second 
century after the nHigran and in subsequent centuries.
The writings of the scholars of each school contain
10.
volumes dealing with the criminal section of the Islamic 
legal system. Different interpretations of the Qur’an 
and the Sunna, and different views about what is good 
and what is evil, as well as different social, economic, 
and political circumstances led to the formation of 
various legal theories on almost all the legal provisions, 
including, of course, the penal system.
In the last fifty years, lawyers educated and trained 
according to modern trends in legal education, have started 
to be attracted by the study of the Islamic penal system. 
Thus a lot of research work has been published concerning 
one topic or another. Also in some European languages, 
writers have dealt with various aspects of the subject.
In many cases the Islamic penal system was either com­
pletely rejected, or strongly defended on grounds of 
wide generalities or deep misunderstanding. So it appears 
necessary for a carefu}. study t6‘ analyse and illustrate 
the underlying philosophy of the theory of punishment in 
Islamic law in the light of the modern approach to the 
subject. This research was undertaken to this end.
In dealing with the subject I have divided this 
thesis into five chapters. The first one is devoted
to a discussion of the punishments known as nhududt! or
«
fixed punishments. Classical treatises classify the 
punishments of six offences as uhaddu punishments*
11.
However, it seems to me that only four out of these six
offences appear to have been correctly described as
Ifhaddn offences. Accordingly the second chapter is
concerned with the remaining two offences. Here I must
refer to the fact that some jurists add to the ,!haddn
offences $ seventh one, i.e. the so-called offence of
,,baghyM , or armed resistance to the political authority
in Muslim states. This offence, if it can be rightly
so called, as known to Islamic law, is understood to be
committed by a group of Muslim opponents who do not agree
with the political authority on certain matters and
justify their attitude,though erroneously, by their
dogmatic conviction. If they do not fight the authority,
or rather, the Muslim community, they are not to be
attacked; and if they do, only the defence necessary to
defeat them is legitimate. Therefore I consider the
treatment of the t!bughattf to come under the doctrine of
legitimate defence or rldaf1 al-sa1 il" , with which this
.
research is not concerned. Consequently no reference 
has been made to the treatment of the "bughat11: a brief 
account of it, however, may be found in the Encyclopaedia 
of Islam (II, p.828).
The third chapter deals with the Islamic approach 
to the punishments for homicide and injury. In dealing 
with this topic it is mentioned that the place given to
12.
the personal rights of the victim or his relatives, is
the main feature in the Islamic concept of retaliation
or nqisas!l. So an attempt was made to clarify this 
• •
point, especially with reference to the relatives1 
right to waive the punishment.
The fourth chapter deals with the doctrine of l,talzirfl 
or discretionary punishments. As the Islamic penal system 
recognizes only four, or, according to the classical 
authorities, six offences for which a fixed punishment is 
prescribed, discretionary punishments have a very import­
ant place. The philosophy underlying this doctrine and 
its general principles, has not been treated with as 
much attention as it probably deserves. Recent works 
on the subject have enabled me to deal more specifically 
with it, particularly in the context of the place of the 
doctrine in the general theory of penal law, and its 
part in protecting and enforcing the moral values of 
Islam.
Throughout my research, I have felt the need to say 
something about the methods of proof in criminal cases 
according to Islamic law. So I have devoted the fifth 
and last chapter to explaining, though briefly, the law 
of evidence in criminal cases.
In writing about any Islamic topic one must over­
come many difficulties, two of which are worth mentioning.
13.
The first is the collection of the relevant material
from the enormous available sources for each school of
law, particularly as the jurists* method of writing
requires a good deal of orientation and familiarity
with the expressions and possible headings under which
they may deal with one problem or another.
In the main, I have concentrated on the four Sunni
schools, i.e. the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi* i and Hanbali*
The views of the Sahiri school are often mentioned, but
I have omitted the Shi1is, except in some cases where
the ZaydTs views have been referred to. However, it
must be mentioned that as far as the theory of punishment
is concerned, all schools agree as to the main principles
and the philosophy underlying them. The differences of
opinion appear only in details of their application and
interpretation.
The second difficulty is that of the translation
from Arabic into English, especially where the Qur'an
or the !lHadith,! are concerned. For the Qur'an many 
• 1
translations have been consulted, but on a few occasions
necessary changes have been made. Yet, it $ust be
remembered, to quote Professor Arberry, that "the
Qur'an (like all other literary masterpieces) is
untranslatable". As for the "Hadith" the translation
.
of Mishkat al-Masabih, by FazlTll Karim, was very helpful,
• .
but many amendments were unavoidable.
Bearing in mind the fact that Muslims, when they 
write about the Islamic penal system, are generally 
either apologists or opponents, I have tried my best 
to be objective in dealing with the various topics 
contained in this thesis. The views expressed here may 
not all be agreed upon, but I have always tried to 
support what I thought to be harmonious with the spirit 
of Islam*
Finally, in discussing punishment, and especially 
the Islamic theory of it, one may quote Professor 
Balnshard who said that "punishment is unpleasant to 
inflict and not particularly pleasant to discuss. But 
we clearly need to discuss it".
15.
CHAPTER I 
THE FIXED PUNISHMENTS "AL-EUDUD"
According to the classical manuals of Islamic law,
Islamic criminal law contains six major offences, each
of which has a penalty prescribed in fixed terms in the
"Qur'an11 or the "Sunna11. These offences are known to
1
Muslim jurists as offences of "hudud".
«
1. Definition:-
The word "hadd" pi. "hudud" in the Islamic legal 
• •
sense means a punishment defined by God, in the revealed
text of the Qur'an or the Sunna, and due to Him, or "haqq
Allah11. In Islamic law all duties and obligations are
divided into two categories; one is known as "haqq Allah11
^ 2 •
and the other is known as Mhaqq Adami11. In the penal.
context, where a punishment is classified as !,haqq Allah11
.
this indicates three features. The first is that this 
punishment is prescribed in the public interest; the 
second is that it cannot be reduced or made heavier;
1. The word "hudud" s. "hadd" in Arabic has many different 
meanings. .The limit of something e.g. place, or a piece 
of land is its "hadd". The man who carried out the 
punishment is called ^haddad", which derives from the 
same word. See: Subki.and *Abd al-Hamid, mukhtar al- 
Sihah, Cairo, 1953? A.H. pp.9^: Ibn Hajar, Fath al- 
Bari, vol. XII, Cairo, 1939, p.**7-8..
2, Qarafi, Furuq, vol.I, Cairo, 13^, A.H. p.l^O-l^.
16.
the third is that, after being reported to the judge, it 
is not to be pardoned by him, the political authority, 
or the victim of the offence. The unchangeability of 
the "hadd" punishment is supported by the interpretation 
of the Qur*anic verse "These are the limits of Allah.
Do not transgress them". The third feature of the "hadd" 
punishment is based on a Prophetic report related by 
"Bukhari" and "Muslim", to which reference will be made
“  5
shortly.
II. Classification:-
The six offences generally recognized as offences
of "hudud" are: wine-drinking, theft, armed robbery,
illicit sexual relations, slanderous allegation of
unchastity, and apostasy. Apart from retaliation or
"qisas" which is the punishment for homicide and injury 
• *
all other offences, under the Islamic penal system, are 
punishable by discretionary punishments or "ta'zir".
However, to classify an offence as a "hadd" offence, it 
must be established that the punishment for it is determined
3* Kasani, Baddi1, vol.VII, Cairo, 1910, pp.33«56»? *Uda, 
al-Tashri* al-Jina1i al-Islami, vol.I. Cairo, 1959? 
p.79«> Abu Zahra, al-Jarimah, Cairo (n.d.) p.5o.
b* Qur][an, Surah II, Verse 229; See: Ibn Taymiyya, al- 
Siyasa1 al-shar!iya‘, Cairo, 1951? P P .69-70? 12^.
5. Below, the punishment for theft.
17.
in fixed terms in the Qur'an or the Sunna. Although 
the majority of the jurists agree as to the classific­
ation of the afore-mentioned offences, some authorities
hold a different view either by adding to these six
6
offences or reducing their number. Taking into consid­
eration that a "hadd11 punishment is a punishment defined 
by God in the Qur'an or the Sunna, it appears to me that 
only four of the six mentioned offences can be classified 
as offences of Mhududn. The remaining two, namely apostasy 
and wine-drinking, cannot be so classified as neither 
of them warrants a strictly defined punishment in the 
words of the Qur'an or the Sunna. Accordingly, this
chapter will be devoted to discussing the four "hadd"
.
punishments for theft, armed robbery, illicit sexual
relations, and slanderous allegation of unchastity.
Though this thesis is concerned, in the first place,
with the philosophy underlying the Islamic theory of
punishment, the jurists* traditional pattern in dealing
with those punishments will be followed in order to
illustrate the kind of punishment prescribed for each
offence, and what conduct constitutes this offence.
Then a survey of the "hadd” punishments as a whole will
*
deal with its purposes and underlying philosophy.
6 . Ibn Hajar, op.cit. p.^7.; Ibn Taymiyya, pp.66-126.; 
Shu1 rani Mizan, vol.II, Cairo, 1318 A.H. p.l3*+*
18.
Ill* The Punishment for Theft >tal-Sariqatt: -
The punishment for theft is prescribed in the Qur*an
,!As for thieves, both male and female, cut off their
hands. It is the reward of their own deeds, an exemplary
7
punishment from Allah.. .**. (Surah V, verse 38.).
This punishment was practised by the Prophet himself,
as is related in Bukhari and Muslim. The Prophet cut
off the thief*s hand, and ordered that a female thief1s
8
hand be cut off. In the same tradition the Prophet
_ _ 9
prohibited any mediation in executing the f,hududM. From 
this last Prophetic report the jurists deduced the rule 
that no uhadd!l punishment is remissible, a rule which 
characterizes this category of punishment and disting­
uishes it from both ntafzirM or discretionary punishments 
which cover the largest part of the offences under the
Islamic penal system and !,qisasn or retaliation, the
* •
punishment for homicide and injury. Both ntafzirn and
l!qisas,! are remissible even after being reported to the 
. • 
judge.
7. Unless otherwise stated, the translation of the 
Qur!anic verses quoted in this thesis is that of
Pickthall, M.M., Pub. by Taj Company Ltd., Karachi, 
(n.d.).
8 . Bukhari, op.cit. vol. 12, p.90; Muslim, vol.V, 
pp. 11^-5.
9. Ibn Taymiyya, op.cit. pp.6^-70, 12?.
19.
However, the jurists defined theft ass "taking somebody
10
else's property by stealth". This definition is
subject to almost complete agreement among the jurists,
but they are not so unanimous about the value of the
stolen property, how the hand should be cut off, and
the question of the places from which property is stolen,
i*e. the problem of custody.
These are the main controversial points regarding
the offence of theft which we will deal with here.
HI. 1. The Value of the Stolen Property "Nisab 
al-Sariqa11;- ~
According to the majority the value of the stolen
property should exceed, or at least be worth, a minimum
fixed by the law. The punishment for theft is not to
be inflicted where the value of the stolen property
is less than this minimum. The schools of Islamic law
hold different views about the determination of this
minimum.
According to the Hanafi school, the punishment for 
theft cannot be inflicted unless the value of the stolen 
property is ten dirhams or more. They support this view 
on one hand, by the alleged Prophetic report: "No amputation
10. Kasani, Badai1, vol.Ill, Cairo, p.6 Ibn al-Humam,
vol.IV, Cairo, 1316 A.H., p.218.; Sivaghi, al-K&wd 
al-Nadir^ vol.IV, Beirut, 1968, p.511.; Ibn Qudami, 
al-Mughni, vol.IX, Cairo, 1969, p.l0*t.
20*
is due unless for ten dirhams’1. On the other hand,
they claim that the consensus ”Ijmairl is that for ten
dirhams the punishment should be inflicted, but for
less than ten dirhams there are different opinions.
So there is doubt about the justification of inflicting
the punishment‘for such value, and in cases of doubt,
11
the !lhaddlf punishment cannot be inflicted.
• __
According to the Maliki school, the punishment can 
be inflicted for stealing property worth three dirhams 
or one fourth of a dinar. That is, they claim, the 
value for which the Prophet inflicted the punishment for
I2
theft and so did Osman b. 'Affan, the third caliph.
/
At the same time Malik draw/a parallel between the minimum/
amount of dower and the minimum value of the stolen 
property. It is reported that he said ”1 do not think 
that a woman should be married for a dower of less than 
one-fourth of a dinar5 and this is the minimum value for 
which the hand is to be amputated”. So, by way of 
analogy ’’qiyas”, Malik fixed the minimum value at one-
13
fourth of a dinar.
11. KasanT, Badai1, vol.VII, p.77.; Ibn *Abdin, al-Hashiya, 
vol.V, Cairo, 1966, p.83.; Ibn al-Humam, op.citJp.221.
12. Malik b.Anas, al-Muwatta1, Kttab al-Sha’b Pub., 
with the comment of ’Ated el-BaqT M.F., Cairo, 1951? 
p.519.
13. Ibid., p.327, 520.
21.
The Hanbali school hold the same view as the
Malik!, but they justify it on grounds of Prophetic
l*f
reports and not by way of analogy.
According to the Shafi1i school the minimum value 
of the stolen property should be one quarter of a dinar, 
and they declared that a dinar was twelve dirhams in the 
Prophet1s time, so three dirhams are equal to a quarter
15 _ _ _ _
of a dinar. So the three schools, Maliki, Shafi1i
and Hanbali hold the same view about the minimum value 
.
of the stolen property, while the Hanafi school raised
it to ten dirhams. With the Hanafi school is the
16.
Shi1i school of the Zaydis.
On the other hand the Zahiri school, represented
by Ibn Hazm in his book "al-Muhalla11, holds a view 
• . 
according to which there is no fixed minimum value for
stolen property, but for gold, the minimum value is
17
one quarter of a dinar , and for everything else the 
punishment should be inflicted when the value of the
l*f. al-Mughni. vol.VIII. pp.2if2-*+if.; Abu Yafla, al- 
Ahkam al-Sultaniya, Cairo^. 1357 A.H., p.250.;
'Uda, al-Tashri1 al-Jina'i al-Islami, vol.II, 
Cairo, i960, pp.581-82.
15. Shafi1!, al-Umm, vol.VI, Kitab al-Sha1b. Cairo, 
1968, p.13^.
16. SivaghT. op.cit. vol.IV, p.5l*+*
17* Ibn Hazm, al-ltfuhalla, vol.XI, Beirut (n.d.) p.352.
22.
property is equal to the value of a shield "tura" as
this was the value for which the Prophet inflicted
18
the punishment for theft. But Ibn Hazm did not fix 
the value of the "turs" and it is clear that it should 
be fixed according to custom of l!,urf,f.
The above discussion about the minimum value of the 
stolen property has a definite purpose, that is to avoid 
the infliction of the severe punishment for theft unless 
the stolen property is of considerable value. So all 
the schools agree that if the stolen property is worth­
less the punishment should not be inflicted. Of course 
the culprit will be liable to a Mta!zir!1 punishment,
but not to the Mhaddn prescribed for the crime of 
19
,!sariqan.
It is noteworthy that all these discussions are 
only of historical value today. This seems obvious, 
when we take into account the changeability of the value 
of money, and the sum which is considered worthless in 
given circumstances, e.g. from one society to another, 
from one time to another, etc.
Consequently, no rule can be imported from any of 
the Islamic law schools, and applied today. It is the 
lawmakers1 duty in each country to decide what should 
be the minimum value for which the punishment can be
18. Ibid., p.353.
19. The above mentioned reference esp. al-Muhalla, p.352.
23.
inflicted.
Some may argue that this does not accord with what
the Prophet determined as the minimum value of the
stolen property, and therefore it cannot be accepted
within Islamic law. In reply to such an argument, one
can say that this tradition was based upon what suited
the prophetic community. Indeed, it may have been
suitable too, for one or two centuries after the prophet's
time, but not today. There are countless examples of
changing what does not serve a particular aim after
it was done or said by the Prophet or even by the Qur'an.
Generally, any verdict which is based on grounds of the
20
public interest "maslaha" is changeable according to. . 21
the change in circumstances , as is firmly established
among the Muslim jurists of the origins of Islamic law
22
"Usui al-Fiqh".
20. A verdict based on "Maslaha" is a verdict which pro­
vides the best solution of a particular problem to 
meet the community's need and protect its interest. 
Some of the Qur'anic and Prophetic veridfits are of 
this kind, as well as a great deal of the jurists' 
reasoning. See below. F.N.21.
21. Shalabi M.M., al-Fiqh al-Islami Bayn al-Mithaliya 
Wal-Waqi'ya, Alexandria University press I960, pp. 
110-112, 165-177. See for details his book, Ta'lil 
al-Ahkam, al-Azhar University^ Pub.Cairo 19*+9j esp. 
PP.307-322,: al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, vol.IV,
Cairo (n.d.;, p.l59’et seq.
22. al-Shatibi, ibid, and in many pages of this four 
vol. book.; ShalabT, ibid. throughout the study.
2b.
With regard to this particular aspect, Ibn al- 
Qayyim stated that the philosophy of considering one 
quarter of a dinar as the minimum value here, is that 
this value was sufficient for the average man, for his
23
daily maintenance. If this is true, and it was true, 
it is clear that the determination of one quarter of a 
dinar as the minimum value of the stolen property was 
based on grounds of social circumstances which are 
certainly variable. Therefore, this determination may 
be reviewed in the light of contemporary social circum­
stances, On the other hand, this minimum value was 
fixed according to the value of the golden money which 
was in use at the Prophet’s time, but it is no longer 
used. This reason also justifies the need to review 
the minimum value,
III, 2. How the Hand should be Cut Off MMakan al-Qat?IT:~
Concerning this aspect there are three main views
among the jurists. In fact nearly all the jurists agree
that for the first theft, the thief1s right hand should
2b
be cut off from the wrist. But they £old different 
opinions about the next theft (or thefts). According 
to the four StEnnl: schools in the second theft the thief’s
left foot should be cut off. The Hanafi’s hold that for
23. I’lam al-Muwaqqi* in, vol.II, Cairo, 1955? p.6*+. 
2b • Shu’ranT, op.cit., vol.II, p,l*+2*
2$.
further offences nothing can be cut off and that the only
way to punish the offender is by "ta’zir".
On the other hand, the Malikis, the Shafi’Ts and
Ahmad b. Hanbal, held the view that for the third theft 
• •
the left hand should be cut off; and in the fourth, the 
26
right foot.
The third view was expressed by Ibn Hazm in al- — ,
Muhalla. He claimed that the Qur’anic verse previously
mentioned allowed nothing to be cut off, but the thief’s
hands. So according to this verse, as Ibn Hazm under-
stood it, in the second theft the left hand should be
cut off. But for further crimes none of the thief's
27
organs should be amputated.
The Zaydi school held the same view as the Hanafi
school, so did Ibn Qudamah of the Hanbali school.
At the same time it is related that Ibn 'Abbas and
"Ata11 allowed the thief’s right hand to be cut off for 
,
the first theft; and nothing but "ta'zir” for any theft
25* Kasani, op.cit, vol.VII, p.86.; Shu1rani, ibid,
26. For MalikI school see: Ibn Juza'iy, Qwanin, Beirut, _
1968, p.390. For b, JHanbal see: Ibn Qudama, al-Mughni. 
vol. VIII, Manar Edr*Cairo 1367 A.H. £.264-.; For 
Shafi’i see: al-MuzanT, Mukhtasar al-Umm, Pub. on the 
margin of al-Umm, Kitab al-Sha’b, vol.Vj Cairo, 1968 p.171*
27. al-Muhalla, vol.XI, pp.356-7.
* mmm wmm mm,
28. For the Zaydi school, see al-Siyaghi, op.cit., p.52^; 
see also Mughni, op.cit. p.2595 265.
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after it. When someone asked '"Ata" about the second 
theft he insisted that no further "hadd" punishment 
could be inflicted after the cutting off of the right
hand for the first theft. "’Ata" supported his view__ .
by quoting the Qur’anic verse “and your Lord was never 
30
forgetful" , i.e. if God had wanted anything else to
be cut off he would have mentioned it.
This latter view, I think, is the nearest one to
the spirit of Islamic law. As one of the contemporary
scholars stated "the aim behind this sanction is to
retribute (or to deter); and that can be easily achieved
31
by indicating that it is applicable..." • By adding
to this what Ibn Hazm said about the original illegality
of cutting off someone’s hand ..., and that we should
not go beyond what is prescribed in the Qur’an and
32
Sunna about this punishment , one can say that the "hadd" 
punishment for theft is the cutting off of the thief's 
right hand for the first theft. By committing another 
theft, he becomes liable to a "ta'zir" punishment as 
will be explained later.
29. al-Muhalla, op.cit. pp#335-5»; SiyaghT, op.cit. p,525*.
30. Qur’an, Surah XIX, verse 65.
3 1. Shalabi, op.cit. p.207.
32. al-Muhalla, op.cit. p.357*
27.
This can be supported by the well known rule 11 every 
wrong for which there is no hadd, makes its doer liable
33
to ta'zir".
Moreover, there is nothing that can be annexed to 
the retributive or deterrent function of the punishment 
by applying the majority's views and cutting off further 
organs.
Finally, it is important to mention the Maliki view
31
that the thief* s hand should be cut off from the elbow. 
But this view is unacceptable to all the other jurists; 
and it cannot find any support, either in the practice 
of the Prophet and his followers, or in the usage of
35
the word hand •yad11 as it is understood in the Arabic.
III. 3. The Problem of Custody t!al-Hirzn:-
Stolen property is property taken illegally from
its owner. Owners usually keep their goods in a proper
place in which they are safe. The storage place, or
the custody of the goods is known to Muslim jurists as
"hirz". The dispute concerning this topic centres on 
.
the question of whether or not the taking of property
33* For the application of this rule with regard to 
theft, see 'Amer, A., al-Ta'zir Fil Shari1a al- 
Islamiya, 3rd Ed., Cairo, 1957* pp.l5*+-195.
3^. Ibn Juza1iy, op.cit. p*390»> and compare with 
Shu1 rani, op.cit. p.lU-2.
35* For fuller discussion, see al-Muhalla, op.cit., 
pp.357-358. Siyaghl, op.cit., pp.525-o.
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which was not, at the time of its taking, in its proper
place may be classified as theft. The four Sunni schools
and the Zaydi, are unanimous that to classify the taking
of somebody else's property as a theft, it must be
proved that this property was being kept in its proper
36
place "hirz Mithlih11.
•
The Zahiri school, on the other hand, disagree with 
this view and holds that the taking of property belonging 
to other people is a theft even if this property was
37
not being kept in its proper place.
The majority view is supported by a Prophetic
report in which the Prophet allowed no "hadd” punishment.
to be inflicted unless the stolen goods were taken from 
their "hirz11. This report is held to be authentic in 
the view of the majority, while the Zahiri school con­
sider it false. The debate is, therefore, centred on 
the classification of that report as false or otherwise. 
It was related by Malik in al-Muwatta1, and classified as.. 38
authentic by the scholars of "hadith". Accordingly, 
the view of the majority is the one to be supported.
36. Ibn al-Humam, op.cit. p . 2385 Malik, op.cit. p.519; 
Shafi'T, Tfaun, vol.VI, p.135-6; MHghnT, vol.VIII,
p.2lf8; Siyaghi, op.cit., pp.5l6-22.
37. Muhalla, vol.XI, pp.319-27.
• ^
38. Tabriz!. Mishkat al-Masabih, with the commentary
of Alban! vol.II, Damascus.Ed., 1961, p.297, 301.
29.
It must be mentioned, however, that what is con­
sidered as a "hirz", or proper place for keeping some- 
thing, is determined according to the custom of n 'urf". 
Consequently, it is changeable from one locality to
39
another, and from one time to another. With regard 
to this, the jurists have had debates on the classifi­
cation of : stealing from the puhlic treasury "bayt al- 
maln, embezzlement "ikhtilas", stealing from a mosque 
or a public bathroom etc., all these debates were raised 
because the custom in one locality or a given time was 
unlike the custom in another locality or time. So 
these matters should be discussed with reference to the 
circumstances at the time, and nothing should be imported 
from juristic writing.
To sum up: the amputation of the thief's hand as
the "hadd" punishment for theft is to be inflicted where 
.
the stolen property reaches a minimum value, and has been
taken from its proper custody or "hirz11. Where one of.
these two conditions is lacking, no "hadd" punishment 
is to be inflicted, but the offender may be liable to 
a "ta'zir" punishment.
39. Umm, op.cit., p.135-6; Ibn Juza'iy, op.cit. p.389; 
Mughni, op.cit. p.2M3-9. For the changeability of 
all customary rules in Islamic law see a scholarly 
chapter in Shalabi, al-Fiqh al-Islami, ibid., 
pp.61-9^.
IV* Armed Robbery "al-Hiraba11:
This crime has three names, Mal-Hiraba", or Armed
«
Robbery, "al-Sariqa al-Kubra", or the Great Theft, and
"Qat* al-Tariq", or Highway Robbery. The three names 
• •
are used interchangeably by the jurists and in the books 
1+0
of Fiqh. The first name, ^al-Hiraba11, is the prefer-
able one in my view as it expresses the spirit of the
crime contained in the Qurfanic verses concerned.
It is noteworthy, in passing, that the difference
between the crime of theft and the crime of armed
robbery appears in the basic element of each crime. In
theft the basic element, as was mentioned before, is the
taking of somebody elsefs property by stealth. But in
armed robbery, the basic element is the intention to
steal the property by force. Accordingly, the culprit
in the latter is liable to punishment even without having
committed the complete crime, e.g. theft, killing of
1+1
passers-by, etc. In other words it is a complete 
crime in itself to wait on the travellers1 road in order 
to commit the crime.
1+0. SarakhsT, al-Mabstrt, vol.IX, Cairo, 1321+ A.H., p. 195.
Sahnun, al-Mud^wwanah, vol.XV, Cairo, 1323> A.H.p.98* 
Ibn Rushd, Bidayat al-Mujtahid, vol.II, Cairo, 1966, 
p. 1+93• Ibn fAbdin, op.cit., vol.IV, p.113.
1+1. Sahnun, al-Mudawwanah, Ibid. fUda, al-Tashri;1 al- 
Jina'T al-Islami, op.cit., vol.II, p.638.
31.
There are many definitions in the books of Fiqh of 
this crime; but the fullest one is "Waiting by the way 
(or highway) to steal travellers1 property bv force,
t+2
and thereby obstructing travel on this roadV
The punishment of this crime is a "hadd" punishment
•— —  *
and it is stated in the Qur*an that "The only reward for
those who make war upon Allah and his messenger and 
strive after corruption in the land will be that they 
will be killed, or crucified, or have their hands and 
feet on alternate sides cut off, or will be expelled 
out of the land. After theirs will be an awful doom* 
Save these who repent before you overpower them. For 
know that Allah is forgiving and merciful." Surah V, 
Verses 33-3*+*
In the Prophet1s time, it is related, a group from 
the tribe of TUkal or fUrayana came to al'-Madina; then 
they became ill. The Prophet advised them to go to the 
place where the camels were grazing •.. after their 
recovery, they killed the camel*s protector and took 
the camels. The Prophet sent some of his companions 
after them, and they were arrested. Then he punished 
them by cutting off their hands and feet, and gouging
■^2. Kasani,_op.cit. vol.VII, p.90. Mawardi, al-Ahkam 
al-Sultaniya, Cairo (n.d.), p.62. •
32.
out their eyes, exactly as they had done to the camel1s
>+3
guard.
There are two views about the link between this 
case and the above Qur*anic verses. First, some comment­
ators on the Qur!an claim that this case was dealt with 
solely according to the Prophet*s decision; and then 
the Qur*anic verses were revealed to show him his fault
^ if
in punishing by more than what is stated therein.
Secondly, there is the view held by the majority of 
the Jurists i.e. that these verses were revealed after 
the punishment of the above mentioned group, to indicate 
that this punishment was the right one. Other punish­
ments which are not mentioned in the Qur*anic verses were 
executed according to some general rules of the QurTan 
itself e.g. "... and one who attacks you, attack him in 
the same manner as he attacked you.” Surah II, Verse 19**,
"The guerdon of an ill-deed is an ill the like thereof."
k6
Surah XLII, Verse H-0.
k-3. Bukhari, op.cit. vol.XII, p.91-9*+« Muslim, op.cit., 
Vol.V, pp.101-102.
kk*. See for this view: al-Tabari, Tafsir, vol^VI, Cairo 
Ed. p.119. and against'it, Ibn_Hazm, al-Muhalla, 
vol.XI, pp.310-312. see also ’Uda, op.cit.‘vol.I,
pp.267-8.
k5. Ibn Hazm, ibid.. —
k*6. For this view see: !Uda, ibid.
33.
However, it is interesting to note that some jurists 
and even some Western writers understood the punishment 
of ,!al-hirabal! which is mentioned in the Verses and 
which was executed in the case of the people of *Ukal 
and fUrayna by the Prophet, to be the punishment for 
apostasy. This view will be discussed later. But it 
is necessary to indicate, in passing, that the prefer­
able view, if not the only accepted view among the 
jurists, is that this punishment is applicable only in 
cases of "hiraba11.
The jurists hold different views about some aspects
concerning the crime of "hiraba". We will limit our
«
study to three of the controversial points only, i.e.
the possibility of committing the crime in a town or 
*+8
a village , the problem of the carrying out of the 
punishment, and the execution of the punishment of 
banishment "nafy"•
*+7. Ibn Hajar, his commentary_on al-Bukhari, vol.Ill, 
Cairo, 1379 A.H., p.78. Umm, vol.VI, pp.l39-l*+0.
4-8. The word village in Qur'anic or rather generally 
Islamic law terminology does not have the same 
sense as it does in ordinary usage today; it 
means an inhabitated place, or contrary to what 
is called sahra1 (desert) or anjminhabitated 
place. See !Aisha *Abd al-Hahman, al-Qur*an 
Wal-Tafsir al-'Asri, Cairo, 1970, pp.51-52.
3*f.
IV• 1. Where "Hiraba" can be Committed': -
According to Abd Hanifa, the founder of the Hanafi
• * 
school, armed robbery cannot be committed except on the
highway "al-tariq", or in other words, the crime cannot
be committed in a town or a village where the victims
can be helped*
Sarakhsi, in supporting this view, claimed that
the name of the crime "qat1 al-Tarik" indicates this
• •
condition, so the punishment cannot be inflicted unless
*+9
the crime is committed in an uninhabited place.
But according to the Maliki, Shafi1i. Zahiri, Zaydi
and Imami schools, the "hadd" punishment is applicable
• 50
wherever the criminal act is committed. In the
Hanbali school there are two views, like the two men- 
•
tioned above. The reason for this was that Ahmad b.
Hanbalgave no answer when he was asked about this point. 
* —
So, some of the Hahbali jurists hold a view similar to
*
the view of Abu Hanifa, and some hold the contrary view.
■^9. Sarakhsi. al-Mabsut, op.cit. vol.IX, p.195 «t seq.
.
50. Ibn Rushd, Bidayat al-Mugtahid, vol.II, p.^93* 
Ghazali, Wajiz, vol.II, Cairo, (n.d.) p.179* 
Muhalla, vol.XI, pp.302-7« Hasani, Tatimat al-Rawd 
al-Nadir, vol.V, Riyad, 1968, pp.30-31. Hilli, 
Shara'i1 al-Islam, vol.II, Beirut (n.d.)*p.257*
51. Mardawi, al-Imsaf, vol.X, Cairo, 1957> pp.291-2.
Some of the jurists put this condition in other
words, i.e. they consider that it is a crime of "hiraba11
.
when the victims of the criminal act cannot be helped
52
if they ask for help. It seems that they were led to 
this by what they thought to be the nature of the 
crime. But to evaluate this view one can see that this 
crime has a basic element which separates it from an 
ordinary theft. That is to say that it can only be 
committed with disregard of the public order and the
53
security of the community. This element can be found 
both in the committing of a crime on the travellers1 way, 
or far from a place in which help can reach the victims, 
as well as in the committing of it in a town or village, 
or where help can be found.
A very similar statement was made by Shafi1i in his 
book "al-Umm" concerning the committing of this crime in
5 h
a town. As for the possibility of helping the victims,
it is sufficient to note that the first case in which
the punishment for "hiraba" was inflicted, was a case.
where help could have reached the victims. So, there is
55
no room for such a condition. Therefore it can be
52. Ghazali. ibid. Ramli, Nihayat al-Muhtaj ila1 Sharli al- 
Minhaj, a Shafi1T text, vol.VIII, Cairo, 1938, p.2.
53. Abu Zahra, Falsafat al-'Uquba, Cairo, 1966, p.6.
TJmm, vol.VI, p. 1^ +0.
55* Hasani, op.cit. vol.V, p.31*
said that one should not give any special consideration
with regard to the place where the crime is committed
and if the culprit who commits his crime in a town is
not of more dangerous character than the one who commits
it elsewhere, he certainly cannot be considered less 
56
dangerous.
IV. 2. The Carrying out of the Punishments "Tanfidh 
al- 1 Uqubat1 1 ________________________________
The above mentioned Qur'anic verse prescribed four 
punishments for the crime of ,fhirabaM i.e. death, cruci- 
fixion, cutting off the opposite hands and feet (the 
right hand and the left foot or vice versa) and banish­
ment Tfnafyn.
The jurists hold different views about the infliction 
of this punishment. Banishment will be discussed later in 
further detail; but now we will discuss their views about 
the other three punishments.
There is almost complete agreement among the jurists
57
that the death penalty should be inflicted by sword.
But this way of killing should be discussed too. It 
may be argued that any other way of killing would not be 
accepted with regard to consensus or MIjmafM. But this 
argument is faulty, simply because this agreement expressed
56. Shafi!i, Umm, vol.VI, p.lM-O.
57• Muhalla, vol.XI, p.318*
37.
basically that the jurists considered the common method
of execution in their time to be the relevant way of
inflicting capital punishment. When this common method
goes out of use it should not be insisted upon, as the
only way of executing the punishment. It is again a
question of changing the verdict in accordance with the
58
change in what it was based upon. It has been said 
before that any verdict which was based upon public 
interest "maslaha'1 or custom n,urfn should be changed
59
when circumstances change.
As for crucifixion there are two views among the
Sunni schools. The first is that the culprit should be
crucified alive and then be thrust by a Ravelin. This
view is held by the Hanafi school and Ibn al-Qasim of
60.
the Maliki school.
The second view is that the culprit should be killed
first in the ordinary way, and then crucified for three
days to be a deterrent to others. This view is held by
the Shafi*i and the Hanbali schools, and some of the 
~  61 .
Maliki jurists.
58. See above, F.N. 22 and 23*
59. For fuller discussion see Shalabi, op.cit. pp.81-86.
60. Zayla*i, his commentary on Kanz al-Daqai!q,vol.Ill, 
Cairo, 1^13 A.H., p.237._for the view^of b. al-Qasim 
see al-Mudawanah al-Kubra, vol.XV, Cairo, 1323 A.H.
p.99.
61. Nihayat al^Muhtaj , jop.cit. p.5. al-Insaf, op.cit. vol.X, 
p.293. Bidayat al-Mujtahid op.cit. vollll, p.*+9^ .
38.
According to Ibn Hazm, crucifixion is a separate
punishment which should not be inflicted in conjunction
with any other punishment whether before or after it*
So, if the judge chooses to execute this punishment the
criminal should be crucified alive, left till he dies
62
and then taken down and buried.
The main element in prescribing crucifixion as I 
see it, is to prevent the committing of this grave crime 
by the threat of this unusual punishment. In addition 
to that the Qur*anic verse, as b. Hazm stated, does not 
mention that crucifixion should be used after or with 
the death penalty. Thirdly, if the deterrent or prevent­
ative element is, as I think, the fundamental element, 
there is no point in adding the death penalty to cruci­
fixion while it is sufficient to attain this fundamental 
end.
With regard to these three points, I should say that 
this punishment is a completely separate one. Moreover, 
it is noteworthy that Malik, when he was asked about it, 
did not reply, but said UI have never heard about anyone 
who was crucified except a man called al-Harith who was 
cuucified in the time of Abd al-Malik b. Marawan after
63
claiming to be a Prophet. 11
62. Muhalla, vol.XI, p.317-318.
63. al-Mudawwanah, op.cit. vol.XV, p.99*
39.
This reply of Malik gives me the impression that 
this punishment is prescribed solely to threaten the 
criminal. I get this impression also from the fact 
that although this punishment is the most severe one, 
the Prophet did not inflict it upon the people of *Ukal 
and fUrayna. In a contemporary text, the writer compared 
this puhishment with death by shooting under the military 
law of some countries; claiming that they are nearly 
the same punishment. But this view is far from reality 
because the differences between the two sorts of pun- 
ishment are/very clear that they cannot be compared.
r
Finally, in the texts of Islamic law, there are 
long discussions about the priority of inflicting the 
punishments prescribed by the Qur*anic verses previously 
mentioned. To summarize these discussions, one can 
divide the jurists into two groups. The Maliki and 
Zahiri schools hold the view that the judge has the 
right to choose which punishment is suitable in each
65
case and inflict it. To explain this freedom of choice
al-Qarafi, stated that the judge had to do his best to
find out what is most beneficial to the community and 
66
to do it.
6*+. 1 Uda, op.cit. vol.I, p.657.
65. Muhalla, vol.XI, p.317. Mudawwanah, vol.XV, pp.98-105..
66. Qarafi, f'uruq, vol.Ill, Cairo, 13^6 A.H. p.l8 .
>+0.
On the other hand the Hanafi, Shaft1i and Hanbali
• .
schools denied this authority to the judge, and held
that this crime has more than one punishment, according 
to the ways in which the criminal act can be committed.
So if the criminal killed his victim he should be sen­
tenced to death; if he stole his money he should have 
his right hand and left foot cut off; if he threatened 
the passengers he should be liable to banishment. In 
other words, the administration of the punishments should 
differ according to the crime, but not according to the
6 7
personal character of the criminal.
This last statement shows that the two views are 
the outcome of different approaches. The jurists who 
hold the first view differentiate between the punish­
ments in accordance with the personal character of the 
68
criminal , while the other jurists justify the appli­
cation of one punishment or the other in accordance with 
the offence committed.
IV. 3. Banishment flal-Nafyt!
There are three views among the Sunni school about 
this punishment. The HanafT school1s view is that banish-
. 6 9
ment means imprisonment. The Maliki school understand
67* Shafi1i. Umm, vol.VI, p.l^ fO. Zaylafi, Tabyeen al-Ha^ai'q, 
op.cit. vol.Ill, pp.235-7. Mardawi, al-Insaf, op.cit. 
p.292-5.
68. Qarafi, ibid.
69. Zayla*i, op.cit. p.235«
to.
it as imprisonment in another country, not in the
70 _
criminal's own country. The Shafi'i and Hanbali schools
claim that the meaning of the word nnafyM is the pursuing
71
of the criminal from country to country if he escapes.
Now to review the situation, one can say that the 
view of the Shafi*i and Hanbali schools has no evidence 
to back it up, while the Hanafi school has the most 
acceptable view on the subject. The Malikis, by adding 
to the imprisonment the condition that it should be 
out of the criminal*s country try to apply both senses 
of the word ,fnafyn but there is no need to do so as 
imprisonment is a separate punishment which is known 
independently of the Qur*anic usage. Here the Qur'an 
uses the word banishment "nafy" and not imprisonment 
"habs".
Anyhow, the punishment of banishment "nafy" is to
be inflicted upon the culprit until he displays a better
character, and does not seem likely to commit another
crime, or in the jurists* words, until his repentance 
72
is proved.
70. Mudawwanah, vol.XV, pp.99-100.
71. GhazalT, Wajiz, vol.II, p.179* Mardawi, Insaf, 
vol.X, p.298. •
72. See the references mentioned before, and *Uda, op. 
cit. vol.I, p.660-661.
*f2.
This principle can be compared to some extent with 
the law of corrective training introduced in England
73
by the Criminal Justice Act, 19*+8.
Moreover, there are two questions which remain 
unanswered. The first is the common argument that it 
is hard to conceive that a religious Prophet could pre­
scribe such savage punishment.
This argument was answered by one of the most dis­
tinguished defenders of Islamic law, the late Egyptian 
Judge 1 Uda. In his book, previously referred to, he 
answered it by comparing the punishment for "hiraba11 
with the punishment of imprisonment in modern penal 
systems, *Uda used the well-known fact that most of 
the prisoners who come out of prison are more dangerous 
and more expert in methods of committing crime without 
being prosecuted; then he asked who can claim that a 
man without one of his two hands and with one foot only 
can be of any danger to society. As the aim of this 
punishment is solely to retribute the offender, he 
continued, this is the best punishment to serve such
7*+
an aim.
73* See for this law, Cross and Jones, "Introduction 
to Criminal Law", 6th Ed., London, 1968, p.352-353* 
however corrective training has been abolished under 
the Criminal Justice Act, 19&7*
71*. *Uda, op.cit. vol.I, p.659-660.
^3.
But a contemporary scholar of Islamic law used 
another approach to reject this argument; Abu Zahra, 
in his afore-mentioned book explains that Islamic law, 
like the sacred Jewish law of the Torah, are both aiming 
to achieve public security and peace for the rest of 
the community, as well as the retribution of the criminal 
minority. Therefore the necessary means to achieve this
_ _ 75
last end were allowed in both the Torah and the Qur*an.
The second question is concerned with the law of
pardoning the offenders who repent, and whether the
punishment for “hiraba11 should be considered as a dead
»
letter because of this law.
To answer this question, one should again bear in
mind that this punishment and all the "hudud11 punish-
*
ments in the Islamic penal system are prescribed mainly 
to protect society from crime. In order to achieve 
this purpose Islamic law prescribed punishments, and 
then made it possible for criminals to be pardoned when 
they realized that they were doing evil conduct which 
they would like to give up.
This does not contradict what was quoted before 
from Abu Zahra. It is only the punishment which will 
not be executed, while all the wrongs and damages the
75. See the introduction to his book, al-Jarima wal- 
tUquba, op.cit., pp.6-11.
i X
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criminal has done against individuals will be subject 
7 6
to remedies. So the society has not lost anything#
On the contrary, it has gained a new member who* if he 
had not been given the chance to repent, would have 
been considered forever as an outsider#
V. Illicit Sexual Relations “Zina11!-
In modern penal laws, generally speaking, voluntary 
sexual relationships outside marriage are not considered 
as crimes. Such a sexual freedom is completely unknown 
to all the sacred laws; the Jewish law, the Biblical 
law, and the Islamic law all forbid, and make punish­
able, all sorts of sexual relationships outside marriage. 
The differences between these laws appear in what 
is considered unlawful and punishable sexual relations, 
and the punishments prescribed for the prohibited 
practices. In this section we will try to compare these 
laws as far as possible.
As for Islamic law the definition of the crime is 
different from one school to another. The best definition 
is the one given by the Hanafi school: "sexual intercourse 
between a man and a woman, without legal right or without 
the semblance of legal right (al-Milk or Shttbhat al-Milk)"•
76. MirghinanT, Hidaya, vol.IV, Cairo, 13l6 A.H. p.272. 
Chazali, Wajiz, op.cit. p.1Z9* Ibn Juza(iy, op.cit. 
p.392 et seq. Mardawi, Insaf, op.cit. vol.X, p#299#
•
77« KasanT*. op.cit. vol.VII, p.33* for other definitions 
see: *Uda, op.cit., vol.II, p.3^9*
In spite of all the differences in defining the
crime of "Zina" among the Islamic law schools, all
jurists agree that the main element in this crime is
unlawful intercourse.
Accordingly, any sexual relationship beWeen a man
and a woman which does not contain intercourse cannot
be punishable by the "hadd" punishment. These relations
cannot be considered legal "mubah"; on the contrary they
^  «
are prohibited "haram", but their punishment is a "Ta’zir"
_ 78
one and not the "hadd" for "zind".
• __
However the punishment of the crime of "zina" is
prescribed in the Qur*an "The adulterer and the adulter­
ess, scourge ye each one of them (with) a hundred stripes, 
and let not pity for the twain withhold you from obed­
ience to Allah ... And let a party of believers witness 
their punishment." Surah XXIV, Verse 2.
This is the last verse to be revealed concerning 
the crime of "zina". Before this verse there were the 
two verses in Surah V, i.e. "As for those of your women 
who are guilty of lewdness, call to witness four of you 
against them. And if they testify (to the truth of the 
allegation) then confine them to their houses until death
take them or (until) Allah appoint for them a way (through
78. Fath al-Qadir, op.cit. vol.V, p.l^O. fUda, ibid.
if 6.
new legislation). And as for the two of you who are
79
guilty thereof, punish them both ...".
According to these verses the punishment for an
adulteress was that she was to be imprisoned in her
family’s house until she died or until another piece of
legislation came into force. For a man who committed
80
the same crime, the punishment was to do him harm.
But soon afterwards another piece of legislation came
in the verses of Surah XXIV, determining one hundred
lashes for both the unmarried male and female who commit
adultery, together with the punishment prescribed by the
Sunna for the married male or female, i.e. stoning to
death. After the new legislation, the first one was
81
cancelled according to the view of the majority. But
according to Mujahid, a companion of Ibn 'Abbas, it is
82
applicable only in cases of homosexuality.
However, it is clear that the punishment for adultery 
was at first a sort of "ta’zir", and later it became a
79« Verses 15-16.
80. Ibn Kathir, Tafsir_.al-2.urfan, vol. Ij. Cairo (n.d.), 
p.*+62. Ibn al-Jawzi, Zad al-Masir Fi 1Ilm al-Tafsir, 
vol.II, Damascus, 1965* P*33-36. Sayed Qutb, Fi 
Zilal al-Qur'an, vol.XVIII, 5th Ed. Kuwait, 1967?
P*57-58.
81. Suyuty Itqan, vol.II, Cairo, 1951* P*23..
82. Ibn Kathir. ibid*
11 hadd11 punishment and the nhaddn varies according to the 
• • 
marital status of the culprit.
This is agreed upon by all the Muslim jurists except
the "Khari.ii11 group of "al-Azariqa11 who denied stoning to
83
death to be the punishment for married adulterers. The
above agreement was always respected until comparatively
recently when some writers denied stoning to death to be
an applicable punishment and claimed that it had been
cancelled by the revelation of the above-mentioned verses
8*f
of Surah XXIV. The evidence on which they relied
needs to be discussed. So we will discuss this view
first, then explain the nature of this punishment in its
two aspects, and then the distinction between a married
culprit nmuhsann and an unmarried one ff,ghir muhsan11.
•. • •
V. 1. Stoning as a Punishment "al-Ra.jm11
According to the majority, the punishment of stoning
is prescribed by the Sunna. But it is related that a
Qur*anic verse was revealed prescribing this punishment.
According to the majority too, the formulation of this
83. See, 'Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdadi, al-Farq Bayn al- 
Firaq, Cairo, 1965* P*8h*7
81*. Darwazat, al-Dustur al-Qur*ani, Cairo, 1956.* £.193 
et seq. The same view was related by al-Albani in 
his commentary on Mukhtasar Sahih Musli#, vol. II, 
Kuwait, 1969, p.36. F.N.3, but’he did not mention 
who holds it.
verse, was abrogated but its verdict continued to be
85
applied*
It is also related that the Prophet ordered this
punishment to be carried out in four cases, in one of
which the criminals were a male and female of the Jewish
86
community of al-Madina. It is controversial, however, 
whether the Prophet ordered the two Jews to be stoned
according to their own law or according to Islamic
87
law* But for the other cases, it is clear that there 
was no reason to apply the Jewish law as all the criminals 
were Muslims.
Those who deny the^gunishment of stoning support 
their view as follows:-
i. The abrogation of the words of a Qurfanic verse and 
the continuity of its verdict is a controversial point, 
so it cannot be of any help to claim that the Qurfan 
prescribed stoning as a punishment.
ii. It is possible that the Prophet stoned the Jews 
according to their law; and then he inflicted the same
85. Bukhari, op.cit*. vol.XII, pp.119-124-. Suyuty, Itqan, 
vol.II, p.25. Muhalla, vol.XI, pp.232-237.’
86. Bukhari, op.cit. vol.XII, pp.101, 108, 115-119.
Muslim, op.cit. vol.V, pp.1179120-122. Mishkat al- 
Masabih, op.cit. vol.II, pp.287-293*
• •
8 7. Bukhari, ibid. pp. l1+0-llf5-
8 8. This is summarized from: Darwazat, op.cit. pp.193-197*
^9.
punishment upon the Muslims as there were no revelations 
concerning the offence#
iii. It is possible, too, that this punishment was pre­
scribed by the Qur!an, as is related, but it was abrogated 
afterwards.
iv. al-Bukhari related that someone asked Ibn abi-Awfa, 
a companion of the Prophet, if the Prophet had ordered 
stoning to be carried out after or before the prescrip­
tion of one hundred lashes in Surah XXIV and Ibn abi-Awfa
89
said that he did not know which it had been.
As for the abrogated Qur'anic verse, what they said 
is true; surely also one can add to this that in some 
of the traditions concerning this verse •Umar asked the
Prophet to allow him to write it but the Prophet refused,
90
and this is self-evidence of its abrogation. But
the , point is not that this punishment was prescribed
by the Qur'an only, but that it was prescribed also by
91
the Sunna. Muslim, in his Sahih and the authors of the
• • #
books of sunan "Ashab al-Sunan" i.e. Abu Dawud, Ibn Majah,
al-Nasa'T, al-Tirmidhi, al-Bayhaqi and Ahmad b. Hanbal,. .
all related that the Prophet received the revelation "Wahi" 
and then he told his companions that a new piece of
89. Bukhari, op.cit. pp.1^0.
90. Ibid., p.120. Muhalla, op.cit. p.235*
.
91. Muslim, vol.V, p.II!?.
50.
legislation had been revealed to him, i.e. that a
married male or female should be given one hundred
lashes and then stoned to death, and an unmarried male
or female should be given one hundred lashes and then
92
just expelled for one year. So according to this
Prophetic report all the jurists enforced the punishment
of stoning. It is true that they are not all agreed
about the flogging of the married culprit, or the banish-
93
ment of the unmarried one. But this disagreement exists
because when the Prophet ordered the punishment of stoning
to be carried out he did not order flogging to preceed it.
Nor did the Prophet order banishment with the flogging
except in one case in which banishment claimed to be
9**
based on public interest. This disagreement, however, 
does not affect the main point which is agreed on, i.e. 
the punishment of stoning for the married offender.
Ad for the second and third possibilities, these 
are merely assumptions and there is no evidence to support 
them. Particularly for the third it is hard to say that 
this punishment was abrogated in the ignorance of all
92. Ibn Kathir, op.cit. p.^62. Zad al-Masir, op.cit. 
vol. VI, p.5 F.N.l.
93. Muhalla, op.cit. vol.XI, p.183 et seq. Shu'rani, 
Miz^n, vol. II, p. 135 et seq.
9^ +. Mughni, op.cit. vol. VIII, p. 160 et seq and 166
et seq. Fath al-Qadir, op.cit. vol. IV, p.135 
et seq.
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the companions, simply because this may lead to a claim 
of abrogation for every rule in Islamic law*
As for the tradition of Ibn abi-Awfa, there is no 
evidence in it to support the view of those who denied 
it. All one finds in this tradition is that Ibn abi- 
Awfa did not know if the Prophet1s infliction of the 
punishment in question was before or after the revelation 
of the verses in Surah XXIV. But this does not mean 
that the punishment was abrogated, especially when one 
knows that the Prophet's companions inflicted the same
95
punishment later on*
So one can say that the punishment of stoning to 
death is prescribed by the Sunna and not by the Qur'an. 
Moreover it is the only Mhadd,f punishment, as far as I 
know, which is prescribed by the Sunna.
It is noteworthy that stoning to death was pre­
scribed in the Torah as a punishment for many crimes,
96
among them adultery.
So it may be argued that the Prophet of Islam added 
this punishment to Islamic law by borrowing it from 
Jewish law. But the link between the two systems of 
law can be found rather in the fact that both are
95. Mughni. ibid.
9 6. The Jewish Encyclopaedia, vol.I, London, 1901, 
under fadulteryn , and vol.Ill, under 'capital 
punishment.®
52.
Divine laws. As the source of the two is God's reve­
lation, it is expected that many verdicts would be 
similar. Therefore, this fact of similarity, instead 
of being used as evidence of Muhammad's borrowing from 
Jewish law can be used as evidence of the Divine nature 
of Islamic law. The differences between Jewish and 
Islamic law are undeniable, but that is simply a result 
of the different circumstances in which each law was 
revealed. In other words, in the changeable aspects 
the divine law changed from Moses to Muhammad. But for
97
the unchangeable aspects the law remained the same.
V. 2. The Nature of the Punishment for Adultery:- 
Among surviving penal systems, the Islamic penal 
system is unique in its punishment for adultery. It is 
true that this punishment was prescribed in Jewish law, 
but it is no longer applied nor is there any suggestion 
that it be re-enforced. The only explanation for the 
prescription of such a punishment may be found in the 
fact that Islamic law, or rather, Islam itself, is com­
pletely based on morality. Any moral transgression is 
thus seriously condemned by means of severe punishments.
97. See for the similarity between the two systems, 
Abu-Zahra, al-Jarima wal-'Uquba, op.cit. pp.9-10#
In a legal system where !lall acts and relationships
98
are measured by a scale of moral evaluation11 , it is
natural to find such a deep concern with the enforcement
of sexual morality. It was the same situation under
Jewish law where, to quote the Jewish Encyclopaedia,
"law and morality went hand in hand to prevent the
99
commission of the crime"• The intention to protect
public morality against oorruption by the publicization
of the offence, is the reason behind limiting the methods
of proof to the offender1s confession, and the testimony
of four adult male Muslims who have seen the very act
100
of sexual intercourse.
On the other hand the widest publicity should be
given to the carrying out of the punishments in order to
deter potential offenders. This appears in the rule
that all punishments, especially for adultery, should be
carried out in public, or as the Qurfan commands "and
101
let a party of believers witness their punishment."
The connection between the Islamic penal system 
and the moral values of the community is the factor behind
98. Coulson, N.J., A History of Islamic Law, Edinburgh,
u.p., 1971, P.8 3.
99* The Jewish Encyclopaedia, vol.I, p.217.
100. See below, chapter V, The Law of Evidence in Criminal 
Cases.
101. Surah XXIV, Verse 2, See for juristic application, 
Kasani, Badai1, op.cit,, p.60-6l; and Ibn Farhun, 
Tabsirah, vol.II, Cairo, 1301 A.H. p.lo3#
many punishments and prohibitions in Islam, but its clear­
est effect appears with regard to the punishment for 
"zina". However, more will be said about that in the 
third chapter when we discuss "ta^ir" punishments.
In view of modern ideas about personal freedom, 
and in particular, sexual freedom, the Islamic treatment 
of the offence of "zina" appears very unusual. Here it 
must be remembered that the Islamic concept of personal 
freedom is in no way similar to that of the post-war 
generation in the West. Personal freedom according to 
Islamic concept is granted only outside the area of 
life for which injunctions and prohibitions were laid 
down in the Qur*an and the Sunna - the Divine Will.
Such a limitation by a supreme authority is absolutely 
absent in the contemporary Western image of the relation 
between law, society and the individual. That may 
explain many differences between Islamic and Western 
legal systems.
V. 3. The Distinction between Married "Muhsan11 and
Unmarried "ghir-Muhsan11: -..
It has been said before that the stoning punishment 
which was determined by the Sunna is the punishment for 
a married male or female who has committed the crime of 
"zina11, while the punishment for an unmarried male or 
female, prescribed by the Qur!an, is one hundred lashes. 
This number is agreed upon, but nevertheless there are
55.
two things which are not similarly agreed upon; the 
flogging before stoning for a married culprit; and the 
banishment for one year after flogging for an unmarried 
one.
For the first aspect, the Hanafi, Maliki and Shafi1i
schools allow only the stoning to be inflicted upon the
102
culprit, as the flogging before stoning was abrogated.
The Hanbali, Zahiri and Zaydi , schools hold a view 
*
according to which a married culprit "muhsan" should be
103
flogged first and then stoned to death. These schools
support their view by a Prophetic report related by Muslim
and other collectors of the "hadith", in which the Prophet.
prescribed both punishments for a "muhsan11. But it is
•.
clear enough from what was stated by Shafi1i in his book
"al-Risalah", that this prescription of two punishments
10b
was afterwards abrogated by the Prophet himself.
As for the second aspect, all the schools except
the Hanafi school consider the punishment for an unmarried .
culprit "ghirmuhsan" to have two parts, i.e. one hundred
102. Badai1 al-Sanai1, vol.VII, p.39; Ibn Juzaiy, op.fcit. 
p• 38^ + 5 UmmJ^  op.cit., Vol.VI, p.119. And for details 
see al-Risalah, with the commentary of Shakir. A.M., 
Cairo, 19^0 , p.130 et seq. and 2^5 et seq.
103. Mughni. op.cit., p.l60 et seq. Muhalla, op.cit. 
vol.XI, p.23*+. al-Rawd al-Nadir, op.cit.vol.IV,
p. 1+81.
10V. al-Risalah, op.cit. pp. 130 et seq. and 21+5 et seq.
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lashes, and one year's banishment "taghrib". There are 
long discussions in the books of "Fiqh" about this
105
banishment. But for us it is enough to say that the
majority view is the preferable one as its evidence is
more acceptable than the evidence used by the Hanafi 
106
school. The only point which should be added to the
majority view is that "taghrib” here,as "nafy" in "hiraba"
could be imprisonment and not necessarily banishment as
107
the word literally implies.
However, the distinction between "muhsan" and ghir-
. •
muhsan" is based on the fact that the married person has 
.. — 
no reason to commit "zina" as he could enjoy lawful sexual
relations with his wife (or a woman with her husband).
This is an opportunity which is not available to the
unmarried; so their punishment should be lighter than
108
the punishment of the married.
105. al-Risalah, ibid., and al-Muhalla, op.cit. vol.XI,
pp.l8lrl88 and pp.232-233.  ^ v
106. Badai' al-Sanai', op.cit., vol.VII, p.39. Fath 
al Qadir, op.cit. pp.13^-137. •
107. See Anderson, J.N.D., Islamic Law in Africa, H.M.S.O. 
London, 195*+> p. 196 for replacing banishment with 
imprisonment in Northern Nigeria.
108. See Ibn al-Qayyim, I'lam al-Muwaqqifn, op.cit. 
vol.II, p.107 et seq.
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In other words, the punishment of adultery, like
all other punishments, is based on moral grounds, and
as it cannot be claimed that the immorality of this
act when committed by a married person is the same as
when committed by unmarried one. , the punishment is
109
different in each case.
This distinction can be rationally understood.
One cannot understand, however, the continuity of the
status of Mihsant! after the dissolution of the marriage. 
• •
If the reason behind imposing a severe punishment upon
a married person is that he can enjoy sexual relations
lawfully with his wife, this condition of nihsanM should
. •
be considered to exist if, and only if, the culprit has
committed adultery during a valid marriage. But if the
reason behind this punishment is that the person has had
lawful sexual relations at one time then what was said
about the continuity of the status of "ihsan2 could be
110.
right, but still beyond understanding.
109. It is noteworthy that nmuhsantT in this respect is 
one who has ever enjoyed*sexual intercourse in
a valid marriage. See: Sa'di Jelbi, his Hashiya 
on al-Inaya, Pub. in margin of Fath al-Qadir, 
op.cit. vol.IV, p.130, and Anderson, ibid, F.N.(2).
110. The conditions of ,fIhsanM are not subject to 
agreement among the jurists, but we need not go 
beyond marriage as the most—fundamental and import­
ant one. See_for details Mughni, op.cit. p.l6l
et seq. and 'Uda, op.cit. vol.II, p.389 ®t seq.
However, it is related that the well-known Egyptian
jurist and reformer Muhammad ’Abduh, holds that the
punishment prescribed by the Prophetic words and practice
for the ’’muhsan” adulterer, is exclusively applicable in 
• «
cases of offenders who, at the time of committing the
offence, are enjoying a valid marital relationship. The
punishment for the offender, ’Abduh says, who had been
married, but no longer is, should be lighter or at most
111
equal to that of the unmarried offender.
Finally, it is worth concluding by quoting a con­
temporary scholar’s view about the punishment for 
adultery; Prof. Shalabi stated, in accordance with the 
above-mentioned requirement of proof, that ’’this punish­
ment is prescribed in fact for those who committed the
crime openly ... with no consideration for the law or
112
for the feeling of the community...”.
No doubt, the commission of the crime in this way
justifies the punishment prescribed for it.
VI. Slanderous Allegations of Unchastity ’’Qadhf’1:-
The fourth crime for which the ”hadd” punishment is.
prescribed in the Qur’an is ’’qadhf”. This offence may be 
defined as an unproved assertion that someone has committed
111. Rida, M.R., Tafsir al-Manar, vol.V, Cairo (n.d.) p.25.
112. Shalabi, al-Fiqh al-Islami, op.cit. p.201.
n 3
"zina". The accused person should be "muhsan” but
—* * * M
"ihsan” here has a different meaning than in ’’zina11,
Ilk
i.e. it means chaste. Jurists of the sunni schools 
hold that, in order to consider such an assertion an 
offence, the accused person must be a sane adult Muslim 
who is known to be a chaste person. In my opinion, the 
preferable view is the Zahiris one which was expressed
H 5
by Ibn Hazm in al-Muhalla. This view can be summarised 
• ,
by saying that "ihsan" in its above meaning, is the only
• •
condition to be required on the accused’s part; as it
is the only condition required by the Qur’an, At the
same time there is nothing to support the other school’s
116
view, in requiring other conditions.
The punishment for slander ’’qadhf” is prescribed 
in Surah XXIV "And those who accuse honourable women 
but bring not four witnesses, scourge them (with) eighty 
stripes and never accept their testimony. They indeed 
are evil-doers. Save those who afterwards repent and 
make amends. 11 verses k-5« It is controversial whether
113. Mughni, op.cit. pp.215-216. Muhalla, vol.XI, p.265 et seq..
11*+. 'Uda, opfcit. vol.II, p*^73 et seq.
115. Muhalla, vol.XI, pp.272 et seq.
• 1_
116. For the other schools’ view see Mughni, op.cit. 
pp.216-17. Khirshi, his commentary on Mukhtasar 
Khalil, a Maliki text, vol.V, Cairo Ed. 1308*A.H. 
p.328 et seq.*. Fath al-Qadirj^op^cit. vol*IV, p. 190 
et seq. Qurtubi. Tafsir al-Qur*an, vol.XII, 2nd 
Ed., Cairo,‘19^2 , p.17^ et seq.
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these verses were revealed because of the false accus­
ation against ’Aisha, the Prophet’s wife, which was
117
mentioned in the same Surah, verses 11-22 or not.
According to those who hold that this punishment
was prescribed because of 1Aisha1s case, the punishment
has a retroactive force; while according to the others
who hold that the verses concerned were revealed before
118
this case, the punishment does not have this force.
However, it is true that the first case in which
this punishment was inflicted was the case of ’Aisha.
In this case three were punished, i.e. Hassan b. Thabit,
120
Mistah b. Athatha, and Himna b. Jahsh.
• . * .
The jurists hold different views concerning some
aspects of the problems raised concerning the punishment
for "qadhf”. In this study we will limit our research
about these controversial points to three, i.e. a) the
question as to whether the accusation must be clear, or
can be merely intimated; b) the categorisation of the
punishment into "haqq adami" or f,haqq Allah”; c) the
• . 
effect of the criminal's repentance.
117. For the two views see, 'TTda, op.cit., vol.I, ,
pp.266-270.
118. Ibid.
119. and 120. Qurtubi, Tafsir, op.cit. vol.XII, pp.201-2.
Ibn-Kathir, Tafsir, vol.V, Beirut, 1966, p . 67 
et seq.
6l.
But before starting to discuss these points, it
is worth saying that the punishment for this crime is
an exception to the rule that every crime should not
result in more than one punishment. As for "qadhfM,
the Qur'anic verses previously mentioned prescribed three
punishments, of which two should be carried out in this
world, i.e. one hundred lashes and the rejection of
121
the criminal's testimony ; and the third merely 
appears in the relation between the culprit and his 
creator, i.e. he will be considered as a sinner. The 
first two punishments are our main concern in this study.
VI. 1. The Clarity or Intimation of the Accusation:-
A clear accusation means that it should be expressed 
in a word which does not have more than one meaning.
That is a word derived from the word adultery "zina" 
or any word with the same meaning. An intimated accus­
ation means that the accuser uses a word which means 
among other things that the accused has committed the 
crime of "zina".
Except for the Maliki school, all jurists agree
that there can be no "hadd” punishment unless the accuser
•  _____________
121. Indeed all "hadd" offences result in a temporary 
rejection of*the offender's testimony, but here 
this is determined as a punishment, while in other 
"hadd" offences it is a juristic view based on the 
fact that the "hadd" offences destroy '"adala", 
which is the primary condition for the acceptance 
of testimony.
122
has used an unambiguous word. But the MalikT school
holds that the intimated accusation does not differ
from the clear one, insofar as the accused person can
understand that the accuser was implying "zina11 and
123
accusing him of having committed it.
In fact it is a linguistic problem, in which one
must find out whether an intimation can be considered,
linguistically, as a clear word or not. As far as the
Arabic language is concerned the Qur'an is the highest
authority for solving any problem of Arabic usage. In
the Qur'an one finds that there are many verses which
12*+
distinguish between intimation and clarity. So one
can say that the majority view is the preferable one.
At the same time when someone uses a word which has
several meanings one of which can be understood as "qadhf"
he may be liable to a "ta'zir" punishment when the "hadd"
125
punishment cannot be applied.
122. Muhalla, vol.XI, pp.276-281. al-Rawd al Nadir, vol.IV, 
PjJ+93 et seq. Fath_al-Qadir, vol.IVj p.l90*e£ seq.. 
Mukhtasar al-Muzani, op.cit. vol.V, p.l68. Mughni, 
vol.VIII, p.222 et seq. It is noteworthy that some 
of the Hanbali jurists hold the Maliki view, but 
Ahmad b.* Hanbal in his latest view preferred the 
opposite.*
123. Khirshi op.cit. vol.V, p.329* Mawwaq, his commentary 
on Mukhtasar Khalil, vol.VI, Cairo, 1329 A.H. p.301.
12*+. e.g. verse 235 Surah II.
125. al-Rawd al-Nadir, vol.IV, p.*+9^ « 'Amer, op.cit. p.l6l.
63.
VI. 2. The Categorisation of the Punishment
There are three views among the jurists about the
categorization of the punishment for "qadhf". The
Hanafi and Zahiri schools hold the view that this puh- 
.
ishment pertains to the public sphere or to use a modern 
expression, is a state punishment, as the punishment is 
prescribed to safeguard the public interest in terms of 
protecting an individuals good repute; so it belongs to 
the part of the criminal law, which is known in Islamic
iz6
terminology as "haqq Allah".
• M M
According to the Shafi1i and Hanbali schools the
punishment for "qadhf" is "haqq adami". So it cannot.
be inflicted unless the accused person or his represent­
ative demands; if he forgives his accuser there is no 
127
punishment.
The MalikT jurists make a distinction between the
case before it is reported to the judge and after it
has been reported. Before it is reported it is "haqq
128
adami" and afterwards it is "haqq Allah".
126. Kasani, Badai1, vol.VII, pp. $6 et seq. Muhalla, 
vol.XI, p.281.
127. For Hanbali school see: al-Mujghni, op.cit. Vol.VIII 
pp.217-8. For Shafi1T school see: al-HaytamT, Tuhfat
al-Muhtaj., vol.IIV, p. 120 with the commentary of 
Shirawani.
128. KhirshT, op.cit. vol.V, p.332 et seq. Mawwaq, op* 
cit. vol.VI, p.305.
6h.
This distinction in fact is applied in all the
punishments of "hudtid", and it is recommended by several
Prophetic reports to forgive the wrong-doers before
they are reported to the judge. But once the crime has
129
been reported, the punishment must be inflicted. 
Nevertheless, this recommendation has nothing to do with 
the categorization of the punishment, so its use by 
the Maliki school in this particular case cannot be 
accepted.
Although Hanafi scholars hold the view that this
punishment is "haqq Allah" they do not consider that it.
should be inflicted unless requested by the accused
130
person or his representative. To justify this view 
one should look at the Qur!anic verses and traditions 
concerned. Neither in the Qur!an nor in the Sunna is 
there any proof that the infliction of this punishment 
should depend on the request of the accused. It is clear 
that the Prophet, when he inflicted the punishment for
131
"qadhf" upon those who committed it against fAisha ,
did not ask her if she wanted the punishment to be in-
132
flicted upon her accusers. So this condition cannot
129. Mishkat al-Masabih? op.cit. vol.II, trad. 3567-8-9-70• 
Bukhari with the commentary of b. Hajar, vol.XII,
p . 72 et seq.
130. Badai* vol.VII, p.52 et seq.
131. Muhalla, op.cit. vol.XI, p.289; see also the refer­
ences mentioned in F.N. 119 ana 120.
132. Muhalla, ibid.
65.
be proved and the Zahiri*s view remains the preferable 
one.
On the other hand the Hanbali and Shafi1! schools
supported their view about the categorization of this
punishment as "haqq adami" by the agreement that they
.
claimed to have existed about the condition of the
accused*s request for punishment. But as this condition
is no longer accepted, their viex* should therefore not 
133
be approved.
To sum up, the punishment for "qadhf1* is a punish­
ment pertaining to the public interest, "haqq Allah".
The infliction of the punishment is not dependent upon 
the request of the accused person but once the crime is 
proved either by testimony or by confession it must be 
punished. The principle of forgiveness before any report 
being made to the judge still applies to the crime of
"qadhf" but without affecting the fact that its punish- 
~  13b
ment must be "haqq Allah"..
VI. 3. The Effect of the Criminal*s Repentances-
It has been mentioned that the Qurfanic verses con­
cerned with "qadhf" indicate "save those who afterwards 
repent ..." verse 5* Surah XXIV, but the effect of this
repentance is controversial.
133. See the references mentioned above in F.N. 127.
13^. This means that I prefer, or rather hold, the view
which Ibn-Hazm expressed in al-Muhalla, vol.XI pp.265-300.
6 6 .
According to the Hanafi school, this repentance 
does not affect the future rejection of the criminal1s
. 4. 1 3 5testimony; his testimony cannot be accepted thereafter.
The Shafi'i, Maliki, Hanbali and ZaydT schools hold a
.
contrary view, according to which the testimony of the
136
criminal can be accepted after his repentance.
The controversy about this among the jurists derives
from their differences of opinion as to the interpretation
of the part of the above-mentioned Qur'anic verse. Those
who think that this exception "save those who afterwards
repent ..." applies merely to the sentence before it
"they indeed are evil-doers" i.e. the jurists of the
Hanafi school hold the view that the criminal's repent- 
•
ance does not affect the rejection of his testimony. On 
the other hand, the jurists who think that this exception
137
applies to the whole verse before it hold the other view.
At the same time all jurists agree that this excep­
tion does not affect the "hadd" punishment, but does affect. 138
the verdict of considering the criminal as an"evil-doer.
135. Sarakhsi, Mabsut, vol.XVI, pp.125-129.
.
136. Shirbinj, commentary on NawawT's Minhtrj al-TalibTn,
vol.IV, Cairo, 1308 A.H. p.*+03 et seq. Mawwaq,
commentary on Mukhtasar Khalil, vol.VI, Cairo, 13299
A.H. p.l6l. Mu&hni, vol.X pp.178-181. al-H&wd al-
Nadir, vol.IV, p.85-87.
.
137. *Uda, op.cit. vol.II, p.*+91-2.
138. Mawdudi, Tafsir Surat al-Nur, translated from 
Urdu, Damascus, 1959> p.97-8.
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This concludes our discussion of the "hadd" punish- 
ment, but we still have to survey it in order to explain 
its underlying philosophy.
VII. A Survey of the "Hadd11 Punishment
The "hadd" punishmeftts in Islamic lav; were prescribed 
by Allah in the Qur'an, except for one offence, i.e. 
adultery committed by a married person where the punish­
ment is prescribed in the Sunna.
Very little has been said about the nature and pur­
pose of this part of Islamic criminal law. The Muslim 
jurists were not interested in explaining very much about 
this as they saw these punishments as the province of 
Allah alone. They are prescribed in specific terms and 
should be inflicted without question. It was therefore 
unnecessary to say much about the purposes they served 
or the reasons for which they were prescribed.
The first Muslim jurist who, as far as I know, spoke 
about these aspects of the "hadd" was Ibn al-Qayyim in
139
his book "I*lam al-Muwaqq1in" and in other works.
But unfortunately, after him the subject returned 
to its former oblivion. It was not until comparatively 
recently that some of the Muslim jurists turned their
139« See: pp.93-111 of vol.II, Cairo, 1955*
attention to this subject and wrote various works on 
IkO
it. At the same time all that has been written is
far from being comparable with Western penology, or
rather far from being more than an explanation of one
aspect or another of Islamic criminal law.
Thus, a survey of the "hadd*1 punishment is not an
easy undertaking especially when one tries to compare
it with Western thought.
In Western penology it is almost universally accepted
that punishment has three principle purposes, retribution,
deterrence and reformation, though sub-divisions may be
14-1
necessary and boundary lines are not always clear.
The belief in the importance of retribution is uni­
versal. In England not only is the public usually adamant 
in demanding retributive punishment for the offender, but 
the doctrihe has a well-established place in British juris­
prudence and philosophy. Even the religious teachers
14-2
give it their support. As G-oodhart stated !,retribution
14-0. e.g. *Uda in his two vols. book, al-Tashri* al-Jina*i 
al-Islami first pub.l$4-7 in Cairo and reprinted five 
times till 1969. Abu Zahra, al-Jarima Wal-!Uquba, 
pub. about 1959* fAmer, al-Ta'zir, pub. 1955 and 
reprinted three times till 1957* Ibrahim, A., al- 
Qisas, pub. 194-4-. AbTI Haif, al-Biya, p*b. 1932.
.  .
14-1. See: Howard Jones, Crime and the Penal System, 3rd
Ed., London 1965? pp. 134— 14-5# Hall Jerome, Sino^and 
Reform in Criminal Law, University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, Philadelphia, April 1952, vol.100, No.6, 
p.794- et seq. Canham, H.A. The Nature of Punishment, 
Ph.D. Thesis, London University, 1966, !unpub.* p.19*
14-2. Jones, ibid. p.136.
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in punishment is an expression of the community1s dis­
approval of crime, and if this retribution is not given 
recognition then the disapproval may also disappear.
A community which is too ready to forgive the wrongdoer
l*+3
may end by condoning crime. 11
Very recently, the retributive theory of punishment 
has been the subject of a wide philosophical debate. It 
was the theory of the great eighteenth century1s philo­
sopher, Immanuel Kant, which has been given more attention
1M+
than any other retributive theory formula. Kant*s 
theory may be summarized in this sentence !l... punishment 
can never be administered merely as a means for promoting 
another Good, either with regard to the criminal himself, 
or to civil society, but must in all cases be imposed 
only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has
1W5
committed a crime. 11 This theory, however, has suffered 
from several misinterpretations. None of these inter­
pretations will be discussed here, but the most sensible
l*+3. Goodhart, A.L., English Law and the Moral Law,
London, 1953, P«93*
l*+lf. For example, see chapter two "Retribution11 of Ted
Honderich!s 1 Punishment - The Supposed Justification1, 
2nd Ed., Pelican, 1971, pp.22-U-7. Michael Lessnoff,
Two Justifications of Punishment, The Philosophical 
Quarterly, April, 1971. and Jeffrie Murphy, Three 
Mistakes about Retributiyism, Analysis, April 1971.
ll*5. Kant, Philosophy of Law, translated by W. Hastie, 
Edinburgh, 1887, PP*195 et seq. quoted in Ted 
Honderich, ibid.
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one is that which has been offered by John Rawls, and
li+6
illustrated by Ted Honderich. They hold that retri- 
butionists do not advocate, as an institution, "legal 
machinery whose essential purpose is to set up and 
preserve a correspondence between moral turpitude and 
suffering". But what they rightly insist upon is "that 
no man can be punished unless he is guilty, that is,
1^+7
unless he has broken the law".
It is not of any use to this study to proceed further 
in a discussion of the arguments for and against the 
theory. Our main concern is to call attention to the 
justification given to the theory in legal and philoso­
phical writing in order to illustrate its application 
in the Islamic penal system. For this, it may be said, 
in short, that "the consequences of punishment, other 
than the immediate deprivation suffered by the criminals 
are irrelevant to its justification.
Finally, retribution has much in common with the 
motive of expiation, to the extent that it is often 
confused with it. Both retribution and expiation are 
concerned with rooting out the criminal’s evil. Having
11*6. Ibid, pp.25-31*-. John Rawls concept in his article 
Two Concepts of Rules, Philosophical Review, 1955*
11*7. Rawls, ibid., p.7*
l*+8. Michael Lessnoff, op.cit., p.Ihl. Honderich, 
ibid, pp.22-51.
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the retributive element in punishment means that sanctions
have been imposed on the criminal for his wrongdoing.
Expiation on the other hand, means that the criminal
has "paid" for his crime and that his account with society
1^9
is then clear.
VII. 1. Retribution and the "hadd" Punishments:-
The retributive purpose of the "hadd" punishment
«
is the purpose that is most commonly discussed by Muslim
jurists (in addition, indeed, to the deterrent purpose
to which we will shortly refer)•
Retribution is mentioned in the Qur'an as the purpose
of punishment in many verses, referring to both punishment
150
in this world and in the hereafter. It is interesting 
to note that the Arabic word for retribution "jaza" in
- _ 151
the Qur'anic usage implies both punishment and reward.
This indicates that both punishment and reward are used
as means for the same end. Hence it can be compared with
the similar function of punishment and reward in modern 
152
philosophy.
l*+9• Howard Jones, op.cit. Goodhart, ibid. also Winferd,
A.E. The English Penal System, Pelican Book, 1957?
P.31-33.
150. e.g. STTrah V, Verses 33 and 38, Surah XII, Verses 25
and 75? Surah XLII, Verse UO, and Surah X, Verse 27.
151. e.g. Surah III, Verse 1^ *5. Surah V, Verse 58, Surah 
LV, Verse 60.
152. Duncasse, C.J. Philosophy 
Reward, in Philosophical 
by Madden and others, New
& Wisdom in Punishment and 
Perspective on Punishment, ed.
York Univ. 1968, p.3-19.
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Retribution appears in the "hadd" punishments pre-
«
scribed in the penal system in two aspects: the severity 
of the punishment, and the prohibition of any mediation, 
or rather the necessity of its infliction, after the 
crime has been proved.
The punishments prescribed in Islamic law for the 
crimes of "hudud" are the most severe punishments known to 
mankind for such crimes. There were more severe punish­
ments prescribed in English law, for instance, in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but they are
153
neither accepted nor do they exist today , while the 
punishments prescribed in Islamic law are still accepted 
by hundreds of millions of people, and are executed in 
some countries e.g. Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the demand 
for their application in other countries becomes stronger
15H
from time to time.
153. Hibbert, The Roots of Evil, 2nd Ed. Penguin Books, 
1966, pp.19-9 *^. Rolph, C.H., Common Sense about 
Crime and Punishment, London, 1961, p.102, et. seq. 
Canham, op.cit. pp.6o, 82-3 .
151** The best representative of this demand are the
writers of 'the Muslim Brotherhood Society* in Arab 
countries, and 'The Islamic Society' in Pakistan.
The same demand was put forward in the Arab Regional 
Conference of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 
Co-sponsored by the U.N. and the L.A.S. held in 
Kuwait W-9th April 1970. See the English copy of the 
final report pp.8-1*+, 18, 23-^ f, 29. The conference 
was attended by delegates, mostly of the legal pro­
fession, representing all the Arab states and Emir­
ates and it was a preparatory conference for the 
*+th U.N.C. on the same subject.
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According to Muhammad Qutb, the severity of the
punishment is based on psychological grounds. In order 
to defeat the criminal1s desire to break the law, Islam 
prescribed severe punishments drawing attention to the 
consequences of the crime, so that people would not
•^■55 ,,
commit it. The same explanation is given by 1 Uda in
156
his book "The Islamic Criminal Legislation".
Severity of punishment is a controversial point.
On one hand, one finds that some philosophers hold the 
view that "treatment" and not punishment is what the
157
criminal needs. On the other hand one finds that some 
judges demand severer punishment, including corporal 
punishment to be reintroduced in Western countries^ as the 
only means to control the increasing crime rate.
155* Manhaj al-Tarbifca al-Islamiya, 3rd ed. Beirut, 1967*
P.231-U-.
156. Op.cit. vol.I, p . 636 et seq.
157* Baylis, Immorality, Crime and Treatment, in Philo­
sophical Perspective on Punishment1 , op.cit. pp.36-1*8. 
cf. Prattfs comments on Ducasse's paper, ibid. p.2h-.
158. Rolph, op.cit. p.128 et seq. where the writer referred
to the view of Lord Parker, the former Chief Justice,
who told the Cadogan Committee that it is desirable to 
"retain the (then) existing power to impose sentences 
of corporal punishment" for certain offences, ftnd 
p.12 F.N.(l) where the writer quoted that Mr. Harlof/ 
Sturge whom he described as "one of the most humane 
of Magistrates". At Old Street Court, 18th June i960, 
he said: "people who say that pain must be taken out 
of all punishment do not seem to understand much".
7^ .
Whatever view one holds about this point, no doubt 
retributive punishment can be nothing but severe punish­
ment. For this reason, I think the Muslim jurists justify
159
the "hadd" punishment as retributive punishment.
Nevertheless the degree of severity is not, and
160
cannot be, agreed upon. The Muslim jurists justify
the severity of the "hadd" punishments because they are
prescribed by "Allah11, so they cannot be objected to,
and are eternally to be considered the most proper punish-
161
ment for the crimes for which they are prescribed.
At the same time they quote the Qurfanic verse "should 
He not know what he created? And He is the subtle, the 
Aware". (Surah LXVII, verse I1*) to illustrate that God 
created people, defined for them what is right and what 
is wrong and determined suitable punishments for wrong­
doers. i
On the other hand to try to justify the "hadd"
*
punishments in secular, or in other words, modern terms, 
would take us beyond the limits of this study, and might 
not reach any point of agreement.
159. Ibn al-Qayyim, Had! al-Arwah, pp.273, and I1lam al 
Muwaqq'in, vol.II, p.100 et’seq.
160. For a philosophical view about the degree of severity, 
see Michael Clark, The Moral Gradation of Punishment, 
The Philosophical Quarterly, April 1971? PP*132-1^0.
161. Ibn al-Qayyim, ibid.
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The second aspect in which "hadd" punishments seem
*
to be retributive is the necessity of their infliction
once the crime has been proved. In a well known Prophetic
report "hadith" the Prophet prohibited any mediation in
executing the "hadd" punishments, and indicated that if
his daughter (Fatimah) had committed a crime of "hadd11
162
he would punish her*
This prohibition of mediation, or the necessity for 
the execution of punishmant, I interpret as a retributive 
feature in "hadd11 punishment. That is to say: if media- 
tion were allowed, or the "hadd" punishments were able to 
be replaced by any other sort of punishment, the retri­
butive effect of them would no longer exist. So the 
severity of the punishment and the necessity of its 
infliction? both give it as much retributive effect as 
possible.
So far, only the role of the retributive theory in 
the general rules concerning "hadd11 punishments, has been 
discussed. But the clearer and more important/ influence 
of it appears in jurists1 approaches and views about 
some more detailed aspects.
One of the aspects concerned is the problem of in­
flicting cumulative sentences against one offender "ta!adud 
al^Uqubat". Sentences may be cumulative where the same
162. Bukhari, vol.XII, p.72 et seq. Muslim, op.cit. vol.
V, p.ll*+-5.
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person has committed various offences before he stands 
trial, or before he has been punished for any one of 
them. Offences committed by the same person may be either 
of the same nature, e.g. theft, highway robbery, and house­
breaking, or of a different nature, e.g. theft, adultery, 
and wine-drinking. In the first case it is agreed that
163
the offender deserves one punishment for all his offences.
In the second case one does not find such an agreement.
The three schools, Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali stand on 
one side, and the Shafi*i school at the other. With its 
non-recognition of the practice of abrogation "jabb11,
(to which we will return later), the Shafifi school
understands the predominant role of retributive theory
\
in this context. Their view is that the offender deserves 
as many sentences as his offences. All the sentences 
deserved are to be carried out, starting with those pro­
nounced for offences classified as f,haqq adami".
If, however, the offender has been aentenced to death 
for homicide (which is ”haqq adami*1), then the penalty 
must be carried out last, i.e. the death penalty must be .
the last punishment, disregarding the classification of
l6*f
the offence for which it has been given. To explain
163. Fath al-Qadir, vol.IV, p.208^ AnsarT, commentary on 
Matn al-Bahj& of Ibn al-Wardi,_v©l.V. Cairo 1900,
D.99. Mughni, vol.IX, p.8l. Mudawwanah, vol.IV,
PP.385, Uo5. 
l6l+. Ansari, ibid. p. 103*
A
this view the Shafi1i scholars give the example of an 
unmarried man who commits adultery, unproved accusation 
of fornication, theft, armed robbery (for which he has 
been sentenced to death) and homicide (for which he has 
also been sentenced to death). In this case, they say, 
the punishments are to be inflicted starting with the 
lightest; so the offender should be punished first for 
the unproved accusation of fornication; second for adult­
ery; third for theft; and then he is to be executed for 
homicide, and his execution works for both homicide
165
and armed robbery.
The ShafI1! view crystalises the strong effect of 
their belief in retribution as the philosophy under­
lying the theory of punishment. The Shafi1is1 view is 
an application of the principle of *Jus talionis* as 
explained by the retributionists, i.e. nA man must be 
punished if he has performed an act for which he deserves
a penalty. Further, he must not be given a lesser
l66
penalty than he deserves for his action.
The retributive theory is also predominant according 
to the view held by the Shafi1i and Hanbali schools on 
the infliction of the punishment on an insane man whose 
guilt has been established by testimony. It assumes,
165. Ibid., and !Uda, vol.I, p*7!?0, where he quoted 
Muhadhdhab, vol.II, p.305>.
166. Honderich, op.cit. p.2W.
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of course , that the offender has committed his offence
while in full possession of his faculties , and that he
was tried and sentenced while he was sane. Then he
became insane, after the passing of the sentence and
before its carrying-out. The Shafi1 is and EanbalTs hold..
that, in such a case, the offender should be punished
as he committed his offence while sane and responsible
167
for his deeds.
One view that is held unanimously is that a sentence
pronounced against a pregnant woman should be suspended
until she has given birth to her child, and recovered
168
from her confinement. This view is based on the
fact that the authority has no right to harm the child
by punishing his mother. The mother deserves punishment,
169
but the child does not. This rule of limiting the
effect of punishment to the person who deserves it, is
170
well established within the retributive doctrine.'
167. For Shafi1i school see Ibn Hajar al-Haytami, Tuhfat 
al-Muhtaj, vols.VIII, and IX, Cairo, Ed., 1238,*A.H. 
pp.i+Oi^andJlS respectively; for the Hanbali school 
see: Mughni, vol.VII, Cairo Ed. 19*+7> A.C. p.665
168. Mughni, vol.IX, Cairo, 1969* p.*+6-7.
169. Ibid., Sivaghi. al-Rawd al-Nadir, vol.IV, p.*+86-7.
• .
170. Honderich, ibid. p.26.
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VII. 2. The Concept of Expiation:-
It has been said that retribution is often confused
with expiation. The expiatory view may be summarized
as “that in suffering his punishment the offender has
purged his guilt, has 'paid for* his crime, and that his
account with society is therefore clear. This is the
attitude for example which lies behind the commonly
expressed reluctance to hold a man*s record against him
171
after hid discharge from prison."
The concept of expiation in Islamic law has a differ­
ent end. It is not to clear the person1s account with 
society, but with God. The Arabic word for expiation is 
"Kaffara" which is mentioned in the Qur'an in relation to 
some deeds such as accidental homicide, swearing a f&lse 
oath, and failing to observe religious duties during
Mhajj" or pilgrimage. But these cases are clearly, except .
for the case of accidental homicide, not connected with 
the penal system of Islam. But they are all concerned 
with man's relation to his creator. Even in the context 
of the "hadd" punishments, when expiation was mentioned, 
it referred to man's relation with God and not with his
fellow citizens or society. It is related that the Prophet 
said "whoever commits a crime of "hadd" and receives its
Quoted from Howard Jones, op.cit. p.13^
172
punishment, this will be its expiation* 11 That is 
to say that the offender who has been punished in this 
world will not be punished in the next world. So it 
is not the legal concept of expiation as known to Western 
lawyers, but a mere religious one, which cannot be con­
sidered as part of the theory of punishment in its legal 
context.
VII* 3« Deterrence and the "Hadd11 Punishments:-
According to Professor Blanchard "whatever else it
may be, punishment is commonly supposed to be a deterrent 
173
of crime." Deterrence is often characterized as a 
justification of punishment which looks to the future, 
i*e. to the prevention of crime. It is contrasted in
this with the retribution theory which is often said to be
a justification of punishment which looks to the past, 
i.e. to the offence as an event isolated from possible 
future events. Retributionists, however, may argue that 
their theory is not thafcta man's punishment is wholly 
justified by an event in the past. "It includes the 
contention that a man's punishment provides satisfaction"
to the victim of his offence and to others. This
172. Mishkat al-Mas3bih, Fazlirl Karim Translation, vol.
II, p.^77. •
173. Blanshard, B., Retribution Revisted, in 'Philoso­
phical Perspective on Punishment*, op.cit. p*59*
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satisfaction, in the deterrence theory, is nof relat­
ively small importance• What is taken to be of supreme 
importance is that punishment prevents offences, ’1
The deterrent effect is known to be double-sided. 
There is the general deterrent, i.e. the preventive 
effect of a penal system (or a particular aspect of it) 
on criminality in the population at large. And the 
particular deterrent, i.e. the inhibitive effect of
175
punishment on an individual. The general deterrent
is to be achieved by giving the punishment, when it is
inflicted, the widest possible publicity. The individual
deterrent comes into play when an offender suffers his 
176
penalty. Individual deterrence involves making the 
offender reluctant to offend again. So it is difficult 
to distinguish it from reformation which is supposed 
to achieve the same end. In some theories a line is 
drawn between moral improvement ar reformation which 
makes the offender repudiate crime on moral grounds, and
17^. Honderich, op.cit.p!?2, where he quoted Jeremy 
Bentham, in "Principles of Penal Law11.
175. See the working paper prepared by the U.N. Secret­
ariat for the 5th U.N.C. on Prevention of Crime 
and Treatment of Offenders, "Organisation of Re­
search for Policy Development in Social Defence" 
U.N. Pub. 1970, p.19* The conference was held in 
Koyoto,Japan, 17-26 August 1970.
176. Rolph, Common Sense, op.cit. p.l5
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prevention which frightens him off. But others regard
this frightening-off process as coming under the heading
177
of deterrence.
However, this is one instance of the unclarity of
the boundary lines between the different theories of
punishment; and it is this question of the ffightening-
off of the individual as a means of protecting society
from crimes, which raises the major criticism against
deterrence. Howard Jones points out that the aim in
deterrent punishment is to instil into the individual
a regard for the law because of his fear of the punishment
which will follow if he transgresses. He also mentioned
the critical question of "whether legally correct behaviour
maintained for such reasons is worth having".
To pose the question in such a way, Jones continued,
"seems to me to be very naive". The element of fear
"does already enter to a very considerable extent into
178
the social training of all of us." This fact was 
pointed out deafly by Archbishop Temple when he said 
"this fear in no way derogates from the value of the 
sentiments we afterwards build on these foundations.
They may begin as rationalizations for our real motives
177. Lord Longford, The Idea of Punishment, op.cit.
p.20-21.
178. Howard Jones, Crime and the Penal System, op.cit#, 
pp.139 et seq.
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of fear, but they develop into sincerely held moral 
principles, to which, when they are matured, we cling
in the face of the most appalling temptations and
179
difficulties."
However, this is only one objection to the deterrent 
theory. Philosophers are engaged in putting forward and 
replying to many other objections. Though it is inter­
esting to participate in some of these arguments, my 
inclination here is to conclude that, in spite of all 
the objections against the deterrence theory, it is
still universally recognized as a valid justification
180
of punishment. Similar, or rather wider and stronger, 
is the recognition of the deterrence theory in the 
Islamic penal system. Here deterrence is recognized as 
the predominant justification for punishments and part­
icularly for "hadd" punishments. MawardT, influenced
.
indeed by the place given to the deterrence theory in 
Islamic legal works, defined the "hudud" as "deterrent 
punishments which Allah established to prevent man from
179. Ethics of Penal Action, 1st Clark Hall lecture,
193^*5 P .2 6 -7 , quoted in Howard Jones, ibid.
180. In addition to the above mentioned references, see 
Harris's Criminal Law, 21st Ed. (Hooper, A. Editor), 
London 1968, p.3. Fitzgerald, Criminal Law and 
Punishment, Oxford, 1962, p.210. Lord Lloyd, The 
Idea of Law, ^th revised Ed., London, 1970, p.6*+ FF. 
A clear summary of the arguments, especially phil­
osophical arguments, for and against deterrence
may be found in Honderich, ibid., pp.52-89#
Qk.
committing what He forbade and from neglecting what He 
181
commanded* 11 If deterrence was to be achieved by
182
means of severe punishments, as it was argued , then 
we need not say much about the deterrence theory as the 
justification of punishment in Islamic law. But the fact 
is that punishment is justified, according to the deterr­
ence theory, because it prevents the commission of further 
offences, both by the offender and by other members of 
the public. The two notions of general and special 
deterrence are known to Muslim jurists and supported
as one of the basic motivations behind the "hadd" nun- 
183
ishments.
The most common example given by contemporary Muslim 
writers as evidence for the deterrent effect of the "hadd" 
punishments is that of the enormous decrease in the crime 
rate in Saudi Arabia since the re-enforcement of "hadd" 
punishments. During the Ottoman administration in the 
Arab Peninsula the "hadd” punishments were not applied.
In the early 1920's when the Saudis took over, they re­
introduced them by ordering the judges to follow the 
teaching of the Hanbali school in all aspects, including
181. al-Ahkam al-Sultaniya, Cairo (n.d.) p.221. cf. Levy,
The Social Structure of Islam, Cambridge U.P. 1969?
P.331.
182. See Honderich, ibid. p.60.
183. Ibn al-Qayyim, Hadi al-Arwah, Cairo, 1938, pp.268, 272, 
279 and his I'15m al-Muvaqq»in, vol.II, p.95 ff.
the penal charges. Soon afterwards the crime rate fell 
lob
demonstrably. It is said that the official figures 
indicate that the "hadd" punishment for theft, for 
example, has never been carried out in Saudi Arabia more
185
than twice a year. This was stressed in the Arab
Conference on 'Crime and Treatment of Offenders' held
186
in Kuwait in 1970.
It is interesting, in this context, to mention that
a similar punishment to that prescribed for theft by the
Qur'an, has stopped all sorts of theft in the Irish City
of Ardoyne. It was administered by the I.R.A. and reported
180
sensibly,in the Times as "Rough Justice". Moreover, and 
rather astonishingly, an American philosopher stated that 
"touching a hot stove and getting once painfully burned 
causes one automatically to refrain from touching a hot 
stove again. So, if pick-pockets were similarly pain­
fully burned or cut by the purse they reach for, they
188
would similarly stop picking pockets." It is the
18^. 'Uda, vol.I, p.712. Shalabi, al-Fiqh al-Islami, op. 
cit. p.207-8. Abu Zahra, al-Jarimah, op.cit. p.lU-.
185. 'Amer, al-Ta'zir, Cairo, 1957? p.^52.
186. See the conference's final report, p.lU.
187. The Times, 8th April 1971.
188. Professor Ducasse, C.J., Philosophy and Wisdom in 
Punishment, in 'Philosophical Perspective in Pun­
ishment' , p.16.
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need for deterrent punishments and the belief in the 
validity of the deterrence theory which underlies both 
the American philosopher's view and the Irish Republican 
Army's experience. The success of the Saudi Arabian 
experiment is often mentioned as evidence of the effect­
iveness of "hadd" punishments.
Leaving the practical side, the jurists of all schools 
of Islamic law have laid great stress on the deterrence 
theory. According to Ibn al-Humam , the well-known
Hanafi jurist, the "hadd" punishments are prescribed for 
• •
general deterrence, but when an individual suffers the
punishment for one of the "hadd" offences, it is here
•
where individual deterrence comes into play. The same
view is expressed by many of the commentators on the
Qur'an. It is agreed also that all "hadd" punishments
bhould be carried out in publid in order to give the
punishment its fullest deterrent effect. The Qur'an
commands the punishment for adultery to be carried out
in public. Hence, the jurists extended this command to
191
all other "hadd" punishments. This is a clear appli- .
cation of the deterrence theory as was mentioned above.
189. Fath al-Qadir, vol.IV, p.112.
.  , . . .
190. See for example, Jassas, Ahkam al-Qur'an, vol.Ill, 
Istanbul, 1335 A.H. j "p.261*.-
191. Kacanl, Badai' vol.VII, p.60 ff. 'Uda, vol.I, 
p. 761*, ff.
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However, the views expressed by the jurists on certain 
aspects, may give a clearer illustration. Two aspects 
will be dealt with here in some detail, i.e. disinherit­
ance, as an incidental punishment for homicide, and the 
rejection of the offender's testimony, as an incidental 
punishment for a slanderous allegation of unchastity and 
other "hadd" offences.
VII. 3. 1. Disinheritance and Deprivation of Legacy:-
In cases of deliberate homicide, and apart from
retaliation "qisas" or the payment of blood-money "diya"
. .
when the murderer happened to be an heir of the victim,
or when the victim had appointed the murderer as his
legatee, the murderer could be deprived of his right as
an heir or legatee. This rule of deprivation is known
as (al-hirman min al-mirath wal-wasiyah)• It was based 
. . 
on a Prophetic report related in many different ways
"turuq", the most trustworthy of which runs "nothing
192
will be given to the murderer." All the schools of 
Islamic law agree on the application of this rule. Never­
theless, each school, or group of schools, holds its own
.  !93
view as to how this rule is to be interpreted.
19B. Abu Dawud, vol.IV, p.313-311** See also the comment­
ary o£ A. M. Shakir on the Risalah of Shafi'i, p.171- 
172.
193. Shu*rani, Mizan, vol.II, pp.89-91. Coulson, Success­
ion in the Muslim Family, Cambridge U.P. 1971, p.176.
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The Hanafi, Shafi1 i. Hanbali and Zaydl! schools apply 
• • 19h*
the rule to both deliberate and accidental homicide.
This view is based on the generality "■urnum’1 of the words 
of the Prophetic reports, on the one hand, and on the 
other, on the accepted rule of f,usul al-fiqh'1 known as 
the prevention of excuses "sadd al-dharailM. That is to 
say that if the murderer was allowed, in a case of acci­
dental murder to be granted his right to inherit, this 
would encourage every murderer to claim that he had 
committed accidental homicide. So it is better to avoid 
it altogether by applying the deprivation rule to all
195
cases of homicide.
The jurists of the Maliki school hold that only delib­
erate and unlawful murder should be considered as a bar to 
inheritance. Accidental, and deliberate, but lawful
homicide, e.g. as in carrying out a punishment or in
196
self-defence, has no effect on inheritance. This view 
is based on the nature of disinheritance as a punishment 
which may be inflicted only for a wrong, or a crime 
committed. At the same time, they say, the reason for
191*. Kasani, vol.VII, p.339* Shirbini. Mughni al-Muhtaj, 
vol.Ill, p.2*f. al-Rawd al-Nadir, vol.V, p.119-120.
.  •
195- al-Keshki, al-Mirath al-Muqaran, 3rd Ed. Baghdad, 
1969, p.51.
196. Khalil, Mukhtasar with the commentary of Zurqani, 
vol.VIII, p.28i.
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the deprivation of inheritance is that the murderer had
tried, or is assumed to have tried, to get his portion
of the inheritance before the due time, and this is not
197
the case in either accidental or lawful murder.
As for the deprivation of legacy, the Islamic law
schools are again divided into three views.
The Hanafi, Zaydi, Hanbali and some of the Shafi1i 
• « 
scholars, hold that the nature of legacy is the same as
inheritance. So they apply the same rule of deprivation
198
by way of analogy f,qiyasn.
The rest of the Shafi1i scholars, and the Maliki
school, hold that homicide is not a proper reason for
the deprivation of legacy even in cases of deliberate 
199
homicide. In other words they restrict the application 
of the above-mentioned Prophetic report to inheritance, 
while the holders of the opposite view extend it to cover 
legacy as well. The third view is held by some scholars 
who differentiate between two assumptions regarding 
legacy. The first is that the murdered person had made 
his legacy before his death, or before the action which
l^i* Ibid. Shu1 rani, Mizan, vol.II, p.90.
198. Kasani, op.cit. p.339. al-Rawd al-Nadir, op.cit. 
p.158-9. Shirbini, op.cit. p.WO. Bahuti, op.cit. 
p.358. c.f. fTJda, vol.I, p.681-3-
199- ZurqanTa on Mukhtasar Khalil, op.cit. p.220-1. 
Shirbini, ibid.
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led to his death. In this case they deprive the murderer
of his right of legacy. In the second case, they assume
that after the act which resulted in his death, the
victim ordered some of his bequest to his murderer.
Here they granted the murderer his right to take the
money on the grounds that the rule behind the deprivation
rule, i.e. that the murderer had tried to possess his
200
heritage before its due time, is inapplicable.
The rule that killing is a bar to inheritance and 
legacy, is to be interpreted in the light of the fact 
that the Islamic penal system is generally based on 
deterrence philosophy. It is true that homicide is not 
a "hadd11 offence, but this does not affect the use of 
this example. Homicide in Islamic law is regarded, as we 
will see in due course, as a private wrong or a tort 
rather than a public wrong or a crime. The murderer 
under Islamic law may be punished by the death penalty, 
or by paying blood-money "diya11. The choice lies in the 
hands of the victim1s relatives, who may, even, pardon 
the offender altogether. Such an attitude in treating 
homicide, led the jurists to make good use of the above- 
mentioned Prophetic report. As it was said some apply
it even to cases of accidental homicide, where any criminal
200, See Zurqani, Bahuti and !Uda, ibid. For this rule 
see, Ibn-Tvujaym, vol.I, p.190.
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intention is absolutely absent. This cannot be under­
stood unless it is related to the jurists1 aim to deter
201
people from committing the offence.
VII. 3* 2. Rejection of the Offender!s Testimony:-
In dealing with the punishment for t!qadhf!l it was
mentioned that there are in fact two punishments:
flogging and the rejection of the offender*s testimony.
Here we are not concerned with every minute detail
discussed by the jurists. However, more may be said
later about the qualifying conditions for witnesses.
The most fundamental condition is that a witness must
possess na quality of high moral integrity, which is
202
known as * adala”•
Jurists classified any one who has been convicted
of the commission of a nhaddn offence and punished for
it as lacking this condition, and therefore as not
203
qualified to give evidence before the court. Gen­
erally it is held that this rejection of testimony
20b
should come to an end as soon as the offender repents.
201. Homicide as a bar to inheritance is excellently 
surveyed in Coulson, ibid. pp.176-85.
202. Coulson, N.J. Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic 
Jurisprudence, Chicago, 19^9, p.62. See also 
below Chapter V on the law of evidence in crimi­
nal cases.
203. al-Rawd al-Nadir, vol.IV, p.86. Mughni, vol.X p.lM3.
20»+. £arakhSi, MabSut, vol.XVI, Cairo,_Ed. p.132. Shaft1-!
Umm, Vol.VII, p^l-2. Ibn Hazm, Muhalla, vol.IV. 
PP.^31-33.
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This rule of rejection he.s no basis in the Qur'an or the 
Sunna except in cases of "qadhf". For other "hadd" 
offences, the jurists apply the rule on grounds that 
the offender has lost his "moral integrity” or "'adala".
This also, is to be interpreted as a means to deter 
people from committing the offences in question. Since 
the person who is not 11 fadl,! would not be considered as a 
respectable person, no one would risk it, at least no 
one who is aware of his personal reputation x^ould risk 
it. This is the only explanation I can see for the 
extension of the rule of rejection of testimony to all 
the "hadd1 offences, despite its Qurfanic restriction 
to the offence of "qadhf".
VII. k. Reformation and the flKaddtf Punishments:-
Due to scientific research on the subject of crime 
and punishment during the last hundred years, reformation 
has become one of the major ends which punishment is
205
supposed to achieve.
For many criminologists "reformation” is rapidly
becoming synonymous with "cure". The criminal is no
206
longer a "bad man" but a "sick man".
The belief in the need for reformative punishment 
seems to have reached its peak during the last ten years,
2©5. Howard Jones, op.cit. p.lb-3 et seq.
206. Ibid.
so some philosophers argue that na convict needs treat­
ment, He is genuinely ill, perhaps physically, almost 
certainly mentally, and psychiatrically. He is truly 
a sick man. He needs help. Something has gone wrong 
which leads him to react in an antisocial way in situa­
tions which stimulate others to constructive actions*M 
The increased emphasis on reformation has had a 
great deal of effect on the types of punishment and the
On the other hand, criticism still arises against 
the reformative theory and the discussion is still
going on.
Whatever may be the place of the reformative theory 
in Western penology, such a theory has no place in the 
nhaddt? punishments of Islamic law. That is because these 
punishments are based on nothing but the will of Allah. 
Allah prescribed these punishments for the related crimes, 
whether or not they will reform an offender, in the sense
207. Baylis, C.A. Immorality, Crime and Treatment, in 
•Philosophical Perspective on Punishment,1 op.cit. 
p.^7 et seq.
208. Canham, op.cit. p.If) and see the *fth U.N.C. on the 
Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, 
working paper on 1 the Standard Minimum Rules for 
the Treatment of Prisoners.1
207
208
al system in nearly all Western countries
209
209. Howard Jones, ibid. and see the comments on Prof­
essor Baylis*s paper, ibid. pp.50 et seq.
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of reform referred to above as treatment - this is not
210*
a relevant question in this issue.
In spite of this fact, Ibn al-Qayyim claimed that
the "hadd" punishments are of reformative value as well
211
as retributive and deterrent. He explained this value
by referring to the fact, well-established among the
Muslim jurists, that an individual who has received his
punishment in this world will not be sent to hell in the 
212
next world. But this explanation, although supported
by some reports "ahadith" related to have been said by
some of the Prophet’s companions, and in harmony with
the divine nature of Islamic law, does not from a lawyer's
point of view, imply that the "hadd” punishments have a.
reformative element in the sense of the word "reform" 
known in legal writing.
Consequently, the "hadd" punishments, in my view, 
are only of retributive and deterrent value as was seen 
before.
But this view has one exception; that is in regard 
to the fourth aspect of the "hadd" punishment for "hiraba"
210. For similar view see, ’Uda, op.cit. vol.I, p.6ll
et seq. and esp. p.6l6 et seq.
211. Hadi al-Arwah, op.cit. pp.268, 272, 273, 279.
• •
212. Ibid. p.267.
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i.e. "nafy". It has been said before that the offender
who has been sentenced to this punishment is to remain
in exile or imprisoned till he displays good character
and is not expected to commit another crime.
This sort of punishment is clearly prescribed to
improve the criminal's character, therefore in this
case one can say that it is aimed at reforming him, and
this is the only exception to the general theory of
the "hadd" punishment.
.
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CHAPTER II
CATEGORIZATION OF THE PUNISHMENTS FOR 
WINE-DRINKING- AITD APOSTASY____
(SHURB AL-KHAMR WA AL-RIDDA)
I. Traditional Islamic Law:-
Tfre overwhelming majority of the Muslim jurists
classify the punishments for wine-drinking and apostasy
1
as "Hadd'1 punishments. So do the Western scholars of 
2
Islamic lav/. The Western scholars in fact follow the 
views stated in one or another of the Islamic law texts. 
But to establish an objective study about these two 
punishments one should consult the texts of Prophetic 
reports, especially those of jurists who concentrated 
their research on reports of a legal nature Mahadith al- 
ahkam". It is necessary to study the punishments for 
drinking wine and apostasy in this way because they are 
both prescribed by some Prophetic reports. They have 
not been mentioned in the Qurfan, and the Prophet dealt 
with the crimes in different ways on different occasions.
1* See for example, Kasani, Badai1 al-SanaiL, vol^VII, 
pp.33 et seq. Shirwani and 'Abbadi. Hawashi Tuhfat 
al-Muhtaj, vol.IX, Cairo, 1938, p.166 et seq. fUda, 
op.cit. vol.I, p.oW et seq. and vol.II, p.b96 et seq.
2. e.g. Ctbulson, History, p.l2*f. and for drinking wine, 
see J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, p.175* 
179. For Apostasy see: S. M. Zwemre, The Law of 
Apostasy in Islam, London, 192^, throughout the book.
3. This is particularly applied to the crime of drinking 
wine.
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Therefore, it is a question of understanding and explain­
ing the Prophetic reports concerned rather than writing 
a treatise on a specific legal clause.
This appears to be a departure from the traditional 
approach to the various topics of Islamic jurisprudence.
The traditional approach is to explain the law as it 
stands in the Medieval legal manuals, and to condemn any 
attempt to reinterpret the authorities and sources of 
the ftshari1 aM i.e. the Qur*an and the Sunna, on the grounds 
of the finality and exclusive authority of these manuals 
as the expression of the t!shari1 aT*. This, briefly, is
the doctrine of "taqlid” which was established as early
if
as the mid-seventh century A.H. This is a doctrine 
which has gained very wide support on the basis of the 
infallibility of the alleged consensus flijmal!!. Without 
going any further into this doctrine, it is becoming 
clearer that the need to reinterpret principles contained 
in the Qur*an and the Sunna is an urgent one for any
5
reform within the Islamic legal system.
Such a view may be criticized as putting forward a 
description of the law as it ought to be, not as it is.
Shalabi, Usui al-Fiqh, Beirut, 196 7, p.22-31 and his 
al-Ma&khal’Lil Fiqh al-Islami, 8th Ed. Beirut, 1969, 
p.138 ff.
5. A clear though brief account of this view is to be 
found in Coulson, ibid., p.202-3. For the invalid­
ity of the alleged consensus see ShalabT, TJsTll al- 
Fiqh, ibid.
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Indeed, such a criticism is sound, but one cannot refrain 
from pointing out that the Islamic legal manuals are 
wrong when they are. Nevertheless, for those who may 
not like it, I would say that the views expressed in 
this chapter are by no means the innovations of an un­
authorised student of Islamic law. Fortunately author- 
atative jurists have mentioned them, not literally, but 
by clear implication.
To turn to our subject, first we will deal with 
the punishment for wine-drinking, and then with the 
punishment for apostasy.
II. The Punishment for Wine-Drinking
Wine-drinking, or t!shurb al-kharar’* is one of the
topics which has been given a good deal of attention on
the part of Muslim jurists. Under this heading, there
are many topics for discussion, e.g. what wine is, what
it is made of, which kind of wine is prohibited !,haramn
«
... etc. But in this study there is no room to discuss 
all the relevant topics. Whgt we are concerned with is 
the punishment for drinking. It is important, however, 
to note that the Prophet defined wine as !,any drink 
which makes a person drunk11; and declared all drinks of
6. See for details, no.(l) of the Encyclopedia of Is­
lamic jurisprudence, the preliminary Ed., Ministry 
of Awqaf, Kuwait, 19&9*
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this sort to be forbidden "haram11.
In the Qur'an, drinking wine, and many other things,
e.g. -usury 11 riba” and eating the meat of the pig,
”akl al-khanzir” are simply declared to be forbidden
”haram”. The drinking of wine, however, was the most
common of these acts among Arab tribesmen, so the Prophet
imposed a punishment for it, while the others remained
8
purely as civil matters, or as crimes for which there
9
can be a "ta’zir” punishment.
As the definition of the Mhadd,! punishment implies,
it can only be prescribed by God. In the one case when
it was prescribed not in the Qur’an, but in the Sunna,
the Prophet made it crystal clear that he was acting
10
according to divine revelation "Wahy”.
On the other hand, when the Prophet imposed a punish­
ment for wine-drinking he neither declared that he had 
imposed it according to revelation nor did he prescribe 
it in specific terms, i.e. he did not fix a definite 
sentence as the punishment.
7. Muslim, with the comment of al-Nawawi, pub. in the
margin of al-Bukhari, vol.X, p.172.
8. Coulson, op.cit., p.11-12.
9. As the definition of "ta’zir” punishment was extended
to overcome every sin for which there is no ”hadd”
punishment or penance " ’’Kaffara.” •
10. See what has been said above about stoning to death 
as a punishment for a married adulterer.
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The Prophetic reports concerned with wine-drinking
are related by all the collectors of reports lfahadith,f:
.
but in none of these reports can one find the Prophet
sa2^ ing that the punishment was a definite number of
lashes as is claimed by Muslim jurists.
All the schools of Islamic law consider the drinking
of wine to be a crime for which there is a MhaddM pun-
ishment. Although they disagree about the number of
lashes which should be the Mhaddn, they all claim it
to have been fixed by the Prophet.
According to the Hanafi school the punishment for
11
drinking wine is 80 lashes. The same view is held
12
by the Maliki and Hanbali schools. According to. .
another Hanbali view, and to the Shafi*i, Zahiri and
!3
Zaydi schools the punishment is only k-0 lashes.
This variety of views about the number of lashes 
due to be inflicted is a result of the different views 
ascribed to the companions of the Prophet. It was
11. Kasani, Badai*, vol.VII, p.57 and 60. Ibn al-Humam, 
Fath al-Qadir, vol.VI, p.183 et seq.
12. For Maliki school see, Sharh al-Hattab on Mukhtasar 
Khalik, vol.VI, p.317 and Sfiarh al-Mawwaq in the* 
margin of_the same book, p.317*. _For Hanbali school 
al-Ruhaybani, Matalib uli al-Nuha, vol.VI, Beirut,
1961,*p.212.
13* Hughni, vol.VIII, Pjl307? for Shaft* i school see, 
Nawawi, Minhaj al-Talibin, vol.XV, p.l7*+j for 
ZahirT school, al-Muhalla, vol.^I, p.365? for 
ZaydT school: Rawd, op.cit. vol.IV, p.50p at seq.
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related that the first Caliph Abu Bakr used to impose
IfO lashes upon the person who drank wine, so did 'Omar
in the first few years of his caliphate. Afterwards
when the number of people who drank wine increased un-
precedently, 'Omar consulted the Prophet*s companions,
who were at al-Madina, about it. *Ali or, according to
some, 1Abd al-Rahman, b. *Awf suggested that the pun-
ishment for drinking wine should be parallel with the
Ilf
punishment for slander"fladhf". In accordance with
this, some jurists hold the view that the "hadd** is 
IfO lashes and the other lf0 lashes are "ta'zir"; while 
others consider the "hadd" to be 80 lashes, supporting 
their view by claiming that this resulted from consensus
15
"ijma1".
II. 1. Facts, about the Prophetic Reports
Now to turn to what was related to have been said
or done by the Prophet about the subject, one finds that 
in none of the related reports did the Prophet say that 
the person who drank wine should be given IfO lashes or 
80 lashes. All that is related is that the Prophet 
ordered the offender to be beaten, "beat him" is the 
clearest word which is related to have been said by the
Ilf. Bayhaqi, al-Sunan al-Kubra, vol.VIII, Hidar Abad 
Ed., 135U A.H. p.320.
15. Shawkani, Nayl al-Awtar, vol.VII, Cairo, 1357 A.H.
pp.138-1^3.
Prophet* In addition to that in some cases the Prophet 
ordered his companions to reprimand the offender but not 
in other cases. The Prophet took some dust and threw 
it in the offender1s face, but not in every case. At 
the same time when one of his companions reprimanded a 
drunken man after he had been punished, the Prophet 
prevented him from doing so on the grounds that this
17
may help the devil lead the offender to commit more sins.
There were no specific methods of beating the
offender, in the Prophet1s time. In some cases they
18
were beaten by clothes, hands and sandals. But in 
other cases they were beaten with sticks and palm
19
branches in addition to sandals.
Moreover, the exact amount of beating an offender 
should receive was not known to the Prophets’ companions. 
Bayhaqi and Abu Dawud both related that when Abu Bakr, 
the first Caliph, faced the problem of drunkenness he 
asked some of the Prophet’s companions, but they did 
not know exactly how many lashes drunkards used to receive 
in the Prophet’s time. Accordingly they guessed how many
16. A collection of the reports concerned_will be found 
in Shawkani, op.cit. p.138; and Mishkat al-Masabih, 
vol.II, Damascus, 1961, PP.30J+-8.
17. See Mishkat al-Masabih, ibid. esp. pp.305 and 308.
. •
18. Ibid^ and what is related by Ahmad b. Hanbal,
BukharT, and Abu Dawud.
19» See ibid., p.305 and ShawkanT, op.cit*. p*.13.8,
where he quoted Ahmad b. Hanbal and Bukhara..• •
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it had been and estimated it at about 1*0 lashes. Then
Abu Bakr imposed this amount as the punishment for 
20 _ 
drinking. When 'Omar b. al-Khattab was asked by
• •
some of the Prophet's companions to review the punish­
ment for drinking as the number of drunkards had notice­
ably increased, he consulted the Prophet1s companions 
at al-Madina and it is related that they agreed to
raise it to 80 lashes bringing it level with the punish-
21
ment for slander. But that was by no means the on^y
punishment which 'Omar imposed for drinking. There
were cases in which he banished the drunkard, shaved
22 .
his head, and gave 60 and **0 lashes instead of 80.
'Osman b. 'Affan and *Ali b. Abi Talib, both pun-.
ished the drunkard with **0 lashes, but it is also
23
related that 'Osman punished him with 80 lashes as well.
Apart from this, it is related by trustworthy 
people that the Prophet said "if a person drinks wine, 
lash him for the first three times, and put him to death
20. Bayhaqi, op.cit. p.319-320; and Abu-Dawud, al-Sunan, 
with the treatise of 'Awnu al-Ma'bud, India, 1323? 
A.H., vol.IV, p.28**.
21. Bayhaqi, ibid., p.320 and Nayl al-Awtar, op.cit. 
pp. ll*0-1**2.
22. lluhalla, vol.XI, p.365*
♦ _
23. Muhalla, ibid. and Nayl al-Awtar, op.cit. p.138-139*
101*.
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for the fourth." But when a man was brought for the
fourth time before the Prophet's court, he did not put
him to death, but simply ordered him to be beaten.
All these reports show clearly that there was no
fixed punishment for drinking wine in the Prophet's time,
nor was such punishment known during the epoch of his
companions. In spite of that, all the schools of Islamic
law hold the view that the punishment for drinking is
a "hadd" punishment, as was mentioned before. At the
same time they claim that the death punishment for a
recidivist is abrogated and is no longer applicable
(with the exception of the Zahiri school which holds
the view that a man should be sentenced to death for
26
the fourth offence).
II. 2. The Alleged Consensus:-
Moreover, the jurists claim that there is a consensus
"ijma1" that the punishment for the drinking of wine is
a "hadd" punishment. Accordingly, they disapprove of .
the view expressed by some jurists that the punishment
27
for the drinking of wine is a "ta'zir" punishment.
21*. Abu Dawud, op.cit. 280-2 and Nayl al-Awtar,_o|)..cit. 
p. 11*6-7, where he quoted Ahmad b. Hanbal, BukharT, 
Muslim and TirmidhT. * •
25. Ibid. and Mishkat al-Masabih, op.cit. p.305*
• •
26. See the above mentioned references in F.N. 11, 12, 
13 and Muhalla, op.cit. p.365-370..
27. Shawkun?, op.cit. p.ll*2.
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This alleged consensus "ijma*1 about some contro­
versial topics is a very common method, among Muslim
28
jurists, of rejecting the view of the opposition.
29
But, fortunately, it has no legal value.
To explain this, one should know that consensus 
nijmaIM according to the jurists of "Usui al-Fiqh" or 
origins of Islamic law, is the agreement of all the
learned men of Islam about a legal verdict at /certain
30 / 
time. . This sort of agreement in theory gives the
agreed verdict an everlasting and infallible legal
31
value.
There is much to be said about this legal value,
and about consensus itself. But for us it is sufficient
to say that the authoritative jurists give examples of
it, which in fact show that it was not, as is defined,
"the agreement of all ...M but simply the majority view
about the subject in question.
All the examples of it are no more than the majority 
32
view and sometimes the majority of one school of law
28.) Shalabi, Ta'lil al-Ahkam, Cairo, 19^9, al-Azhar,
29.) U.P., p.5-6.
30. Khallaf, Usui al-Fiqh, 8th Ed. Kuwait, 1968, p.45.
31. Khallaf. op.cit. p.*+6 et seq.
32. Ibn al-Qayyim, I1lam al-Muwaqq*in, vol.I. p.62.
. Khallaf,' ibid. p.4-9.
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only. This applies even to consensus among the com­
panions of the Prophet. A contemporary scholar, after 
investigating all the topics where there was a claim 
to consensus among them stated that it was no more than 
their majority1s view. Then he concluded by saying that 
the consensus known to the jurists of Islamic law could 
not come about except by chance or through the unanimity 
about something like ritual prayers or fasting during
- 33
the month of "Ramadan".
.
In accordance with this, one can say that the claim
for consensus with regard to the punishment for wine-
drinking does not close the door to research into the
correct classification of the punishment. That is to
say that even if there were a consensus, (which is the
view of the majority), it could not establish a legal
verdict which did not exist before; nor could it be of
infallible everlasting legal value as the jurists claim.
From the historical facts previously discussed, it
is clear that the Prophet1s companions held various views
about the punishment for wine-drinking. Even the Prophet
himself imposed different punishments, and in some cases
34
he did not punish the offender at all.
33. Shalabi, al-Fiqh al-Islami, op.cit. pp.147-8.
34. Abu Dawud, op.cit. vol.IV, p.277, and Shawkani, 
op.cit. p.148-9.
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Taking these facts into consideration, one can 
give no credence at all to the Islajmic law schools* 
view about the punishment for wine-drinking. All that 
can be agreed upon is that drinking wine is a sin, like 
any other sin, and makes a person who commits it liable 
to a ,,ta*sirn punishment, which can be defined briefly 
as an (unfixed punishment) for every sin for which there
35
is no f1hadd,T punishment or penance.
This definition is nearly universally agreed upon, 
and although all the followers of the Islamic law 
schools wrote about it, none of them classified the 
punishment for wine-drinking as a ,,ta,zir,t punishment.
The reason for this, as I see it, was the tendency 
towards unquestioning adoption of the view of one or 
another of the 1 imitated" scholars l,taqlid Imam** on the 
one hand; on the other hand the fear of contradicting 
the common view among jurists. So only those who were i
not affected by these two considerations stated clearly
that the punishment for wine-drinking was really a ”tafzir,!
punishment. This view is supported by what b. * Abbas is
related to have said "the Prophet had not determined a
36
fixed punishment ,Ihaddf* for the drinking of wine*11
35* Al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam al-Sultaniya, op.cit. p.22k; 
and see below Chapter IV on ,,ta!zirtl*
36. Abu Dawud, op.cit. vol.IV, p.277> and Shawkani * 
op.cit. p.lU-8 where he quoted Ahmad b. Hanbal.
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II, 3* Individual Juristic Views:-
Among the jurists who hold this view are Ibn al-
Qayyim, Shawkani and Ibn Farhun; and among contemporary
- 37
scholars Professor Shalabi. Shawkani, Ibn Farhun and 
Shalabi were interested in showing that the claim of 
consensus is untrue and they declared how various pun­
ishments were imnosed both by the Prophet himself and
‘ 38
by his companions. Ibn al-Qayyim explained that this 
diversity of punishments, means that the punishment is 
a ”tafzirM, and he considered the verdict in the Pro­
phetic report which ordered the offender to be sentenced 
to death as the most severe sort of "ta^ir1 which can 
be inflicted among the punishments suitable for the
39
recidivist offender.
This Prophetic report, in my opinion, shows that 
in this case, the case of the recidivist offender, the 
court may go beyond the limits drawn for "ta'zir" punish­
ments in another report related by Bukhari, Muslim,
bO
Tirmidhi, Ibn Majah and Abu Dawud. There are different
37. Ibn al-£ayyim, I1lam al-Muwaqq*inA vol.II, p.97.
Shawkani, op.cit. j>. 1^ -2. Ibn Farhun, Tabsirah, vol.
II, p.20p. Shalabi/ Ta*lik al-Ahkam, p.59-62,
" * *
38. Ibid.
39. I'lam al-Muwaqq'in, vol.II, p.97.
WO. Shawkani. Nayl al-Awtar, vol.VII, p.lW-9-150. Mishkat
al-Masabih, vol.II, p.310. The words of the report are 
"It is not allowed to give more than 10 lashes, ex­
cept for a "hadd" which belongs to Allah."
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views about what this report implies, but whatever one 
thinks about it, it does limit the punishments of 
"ta’zir” for the less important sins to 10 lashes. As 
for the more major sins, the Prophet made it possible 
to exceed this limitation when necessary for the public 
interest "Maslaha".
• o
By understanding the matter in this way, one need 
not hold a view which contradicts the Prophet’s pract­
ice, i.e. the view claiming that the punishment for 
wine-drinking is a "hadd” punishment; nor the view that 
the Prophet abrogated the report in which he gave the 
death penalty for the fourth crime. This view is unsub­
stantiated, and is based simply on the fact that no-one
has ever been sentenced to death for drinking wine more
kl
than three times. At the same time, our view about
this punishment, avoids the danger brought about by the
extreme view of the Zahiris who consider the death penalty
for the fourth crime of drinking as a "hadd” punishment.
*
To summarise what has been said in this section one 
can say that the drinking of wine in Islamic law is a
*+3
sin which one should not commit. There is no punishment
1+1. See for this view, Shawkani, ibid. p.ll+7 ©t seq,
1+2.. Muhalla, vol.XI, p.365-370.
1+3o Qur’an, Surah V, verse 90 et seq.
I
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in the Qur'an for this sin; it is declared to be for- 
f bidden "haram", but nothing more. The Prophet, as
t •
wine-drinking was a common habit among the Arab tribes­
men, imposed different kinds of punishment, mainly
1+1+
beating the drunkards. Most of the jurists claim that
there is a "hadd" punishment for this sin, but this .
claim has been shown to be untrue and unnecessary.
One remaining argument for the majority view, is
that the word "hadd" refers to the offence rather than
to the punishment. Therefore, as wine-drinking is
declared in the Qur'an to be "haram" it is right to.
consider it as a "hadd" offence. But this argument
ignores the fact that a "hadd" offence is, by definition,
*
an offence for which a fixed punishment has been pre­
scribed in the Qur'an or the Sunna. Otherwise, all 
prohibited acts and omissions should be, or are, offences 
of "hudud". This has never, and can never be, defended. 
It is worth mentioning that recently the punishment for 
wine-drinking was referred to as a "penalty stated in
1+5
the Qur'an", but this is evidently an error. Accord­
ingly nothing can prevent the law-maker in a Muslim
1+1+. See for the habit of drinking among Arabs, Ta'lil 
al-Ahkam, op.cit. p.l5*
1+5. Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam, 
Cambridge U.P. 1969? P*3^6.
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community from prescribing any suitable punishment for
this sin, on the same grounds as those on which he can
establish a punishment for any sin which has become in
certain circumstances common enough among the people
of a society to threaten the existence of the community,
the good of the majority, or the public interest.
III. The Punishment for Apostasy:-
The Arabic word for apostasy is "ridda11 or "irtidad1
which means literally "turning back". The former is
usually used to signify turning back from Islam to
another religion or to unbelief, while the latter has
this meaning among others; a person who leaves Islam
for unbelief or for another religion is called "murtadd1 
k6
(apostate).
The common view among Muslim jurists, as well as 
among Western orientalists, is that apostasy from Islam 
is a crime for which the death penalty is prescribed.
The majority of the Muslim jurists, it has been remarked,
k?
classify this punishment as a "hadd" punishment.
It has already been noted that "hadd" punishments
are punishments determined by the Qurfan or the Sunna,
and that they should be carried out in each case where 
the crime has been proved. Now in order to see whether
!+6. al-Mukhtar min al-Sihah, p. 190.
. . .
1+7. See for example, Shafi11. al-TJmm, vol.VII, p.156. 
!fda, op.cit. vol.I, p.79*
112.
apostasy is a crime for which Islamic law prescribed
the alleged "hadd" punishment or not, one should con-
suit the relevant verses of the Qur’an, the Prophetic
reports concerned and the practice of the Prophet’s
companions, which indicates how they understood both
the Qur’an and the Sunna in relation to the subject.
In this way it can be seen whether what is commonly
accepted among Muslim jurists is right or wrong.
III. 1. Apostasy in the Our’an;-
Apostasy is mentioned in the Qur’an in 13 verses
in different chapters "Suwar", but in none of these
verses can one find any mention of punishment to be
carried out in this world. On the contrary all that
these verses contain is the threat that the apostate
1+8
will be punished in the next world. Some examples of 
these verses may be useful to indicate this fact.
In .verse 106, Surah XVI, the Qur’an says "anyone who, 
after accepting faith in God, utters unbelief, except 
under compulsion, his heart remaining firm in faith - 
but such as those who open their breasts to unbelief, 
on them is wrath from God and theirs will be a dreadful 
penalty." This verse was revealed in the late Mecca
*+8. e.g. Surah II, verse 217, Surah III, verses 90-91? 
and Surah V, verse 5b.
b9. Here I quote the translation of Yusuf 'All, ^th 
Ed., New York, 19^6, vol.I, p.685.
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period, and it is clear from the words that the apostate 
is threatened only with punishment in the next world.
At al-Madina, where the Prophet established his state 
shortly after his migration "hijra", Surah II was re­
vealed. In this Surah the mention of apostasy was also 
accompanied by the threat that the apostate would be 
punished in the next world, (verse 217). At al-Madina 
too, the Prophet received the revelation of the third 
Surah of the Qur’an, in which apostasy was again mentioned 
in many verses, but always wTith the declaration that the 
apostates would be punished, not in this world, but in 
the next (verses 86-91). Yet, in another Madina revel­
ation, the Qur’an simply declared "0 you who believel 
Should one of you turn back from his religion, then 
Allah will bring a people whom He shall love, and they 
too shall love him" (Surah V, verse 1+5)♦ In this verse 
the "murtadd" is certainly exempt from any sort of pun­
ishment in this life.
On the other hand one can say that the death penalty 
for apostasy - especially when it is considered as a 
"hadd11 punishment contradicts the Qur’anic law declared 
in SITrah II, verse 256 "No compulsion in religion". Ibn
Hazm, to escape this criticism, claimed that this verse 
.
was abrogated and that compulsion is allowed in religion,
11b .
so the punishment for apostasy does not contradict the 
- - 50
Qur’an. But this claim is untrue as the jurists of 
Qur’anic studies calculated all the abrogated verses
51
and this verse was not among them.
Accordingly, one can say with the Encyclopaedia of
Islam "In the Qur’an the apostate is threatened with
52
punishment in the next world only.”
III. 2. The Sunna and Apostasy:-
It is a common practice among the Muslim jurists 
to quote one or another of the Qur’anic verses dealing 
with apostasy, when introducing their discussion of it. 
At the same time, the strongest evidence they use to 
prove that apostasy is punishable by the death penalty 
as a "hadd”, is that of two reports of the Prophet’s 
words and the report about the group from the tribe of 
*Uk&! to which reference was made in the first chapter
53
of this study.
As for the report concerning the group from the
tribe of ’Ukal, some of the Muslim jurists claimed that
5b
they were punished because of their apostasy. The
50. Muhalla, vol.XI, p.195*
51. Suyuti, Itqan, vol.II, Cairo, 1951? p.22-2b-.
52. Heffening, Encylcop&edia of Islam, vol.Ill, London,
1936, p.736 under Murtadd.
53. See above the section dealing with punishment for "hiraba”
5b. See Fatlj al-BSTrl, vol.XII, p.91* Ibn Taymiyya, al-Sarim 
al-Maslul, 1st Ea. Hidar Abad. India 13*2 A.H. p.319 
for this view, and p . 322 for its criticism.
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same view has held by some Western orientalists. Zwemre, 
in his book, "The Law of Apostasy in Islam", described 
the case of the fUkal as the earliest case of apostasy.
He quoted Muslim in it, and commented that the text shows
55
how "the earliest apostates were tortured by Muhammad."
On the other hand, the prevalent view among Muslim 
jurists is that the case of this group of 1 Ukal and 
’Urayna was a case of "hiraba" (armed robbery); therefore_ 56
they received the punishment for "hiraba". The text
•
itself shows this very clearly. It is true that most
of the jurists used to Classify them as apostates "mur-
taddun" and fighters against God and his Prophet, Muhar-
.
ibun", but the name apostate came to be used incidentally 
or because the people of ’Ukal and ’Urayna, in addition 
to their having committed the crime of "hiraba", were 
apostates too. It is not a legal clause implying that 
the punishment which was inflicted upon them is applicable 
in every case of apostasy. Accordingly nothing can be 
inferred from this report to serve in determining the 
punishment for apostasy.
55. Samuel Zwemre, The Law of Apostasy in Islam, Marshall
Brothers Ltd., London, 192b-, p.39-^0, and opposite
p.6b- where the writer, presents a photocopy of a page 
from Muslim Kitab al-Sahih and comment on it; Coldziher, 
Muslim Studies, London, 1967? P-l6 (trans. from German 
by C. R. Barber and S. H. Stern.)
56. See Tabari, Tafsir, vol.VI, Cairo, 1326 A.H. pp. 132-1+6,
Ibn al-Qayy&m, Zad al-Ma*ad,_vol.Ill, Cairo, 1379 A.H.
p.78. Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari, ibid. where he crit­
icised Bukftari’s view.
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Another Prophetic report commonly used in discussing the 
subject, is the report related by Bukhari, Muslim and 
Abu Dawud "The life of a Muslim may only be taken in 
three cases, i.e. in the case of a married adulterer, 
one who has killed a human being "qatal nafsan" and one 
who forsakes his religion and separates himself from his
■ . - - 57
community "al-murtadd 1 an dinihi al-mufariq lil-jama1a".
According to this "hadith" the jurists say that the
*
Prophet allowed the death penalty for a Muslim if he
58 _ _ _
apostatized. But this report was related in Abu Dawud 
in different words; the Prophet explains what he meant 
by "one who forsakes his religion and separates himself 
from his community". In the latter version he was des­
cribed as "a man who went out (from the community!) to 
fight against God and his Prophet, and should then be
59
put to death, crucified, or imprisoned." Ibn Taymiyya 
explained that the crime referred to in this report is 
the crime of "hiraba" (armed robbery), in order to recon-
. mm mm
cile the words of the report with the words of the Qur’an 
(Surah V, verses 33-3*0• He holds that this is an explan­
ation of the former version: "one who forsakes his religion...".
57. Bukhari, vol.XII, p.169# Muslim, vol.IX, with_the comm­
entary of NawawT, Cairo (n.d.), p.89-90. AbU Dawud, al- 
Sunan, vol.IV, p.22-3.
58. See the commentary on Bukhari, Muslim and Abu Dawud, ibid.
59. Abu Dawud, vol.IV, p.223.
Therefore, this report has nothing to do with the 
case of simple apostasy, i.e. apostasy which is not 
accompanied by fighting against God and his Prophet. In 
other words, this report indicates that any one who 
commits the crime of "hiraba",in fact, separates himself 
from his religion because a Muslim would never commit 
such a crime. Again the law for apostasy cannot be in­
ferred from this report.
The strongest emphasis is laid on a report which
was related by Ibn ’Abbas in which the Prophet said
6l
"whoever changes his religion, kill him".
On this the jurists based their view that an
apostate should be sentenced to death. Their work on
62
the subject generally shows them to interpret the words
"kill him" as a grammatical imperative "sighat al-amr",
i.e. as an order which must be carried out.
In his book, "The Religion of Islam" Muhammad ’Al.i
.
defended the view that Islam knows of no death penalty 
for apostasy unless the apostate joins forces with the 
enemies of Islam in a state of actual war, and therefore
60. Ibn Taymiyya, al-StTrim al-Maslul, op.cit. p.315-96.
*
61. Bukhari, vol.XII, p.228. Abu Dawud, vol.IV, p.222.
Nayl al-Awtar, vol.VII, p.190-191.
•
62. I have said generally because there is at least one 
jurist who has seen apostasy to be merely a sin for 
which there is no "hadd" punishment, as will be 
seen later. .
he is killed not because of his apostasy, but simply as
  63
any other fighter against Islam "Muharib". He explain-
ed his view by saying that the above report, unless we 
apply this limitation to its meaning, cannot be recon­
ciled with other reports or with the principles laid down 
» — 6 k"
in the Qur!an. Moreover, the words of this report are 
very wide-sweeping, in that they include every change of 
faith, from one religion to any other. Thus even a non- 
Muslim who becomes a Muslim, or a Jew who becomes Christ­
ian, must be killed. On these grounds Muhammad *Ali 
stated that the Mhadith,! cannot be accepted without. “ 65
placing a limitation upon its meaning.
This last statement is already agreed upon by the 
majority. All schools except the Zahiri, and some Shafi11 
jurists, allow that a non-Muslim who changes his religion 
to another non-Muslim religion, should be left unharmed, 
but a Muslim who leaves Islam for any other religion
66
should be sentenced to death unless he returns to Islam.
The HanafT school puts another limit on the meaning 
of this report by applying it to the male apostate only.
63. Muhammad *AlT, The Religion of Islam, Cairo, 1967* P*596* 
6k. Ibid*
65. Ibid. and for details of his view, see pp.591-99*
66. Muwatta1, with the comment^of al-Baji, vol.V, Cairo, 
p.28i*et seq. Nayl al-Awtar, oplcit. vol*VII, p.193*
According to their view a female apostate is not liable 
to the death penalty as she is not in any position to
. . . ‘ 67
fight against Islam: the reason for killing an apostate.
But these limitations on the meaning of the above 
report do not lead to the conclusion approached by Muhammad 
*Ali, i.e. that an apostate cannot be killed unless he is 
in a real state of war against Islam. A careful objective 
study of the subject, avoiding the apologists1 view which 
influenced Muhammad *Ali, may lead to an entirely differ- 
ent one.
IV. A View about Apostasy:-
It has already been mentioned that nothing in the 
Qur*anic verses mentioned can be taken as a justification
of the death penalty as a nhaddM punishment for apostasy._ .
As for the Sunna, it has been said that one of the two
reports concerned has nothing to do with the point in 
question. The other report is the one which ordered 
the apostate to be put to death, and which was understood 
as a clear order prescribing the death penalty for apostasy 
as a "hadd” punishment.
The jurists usually tried to avoid the execution of 
the penalties as far as possible, either by the principle 
of doubt, or through the law of proof. But with regard to
67. Sarakhsi, Mabsut, vol.X, pp.108-110,
120.
apostasy they have widened the cases in which the pun­
ishment can be carried out, by extending the acts and 
\srords which might be considered as formal apostasy, to
an extent entirely beyond the actual meaning of "apostasy"
68
or "changing1 one's religion.
The jurists were led to this, I think, by the
emphasis placed on the question of faith by Islamic law
and the feeling that after changing his religion, a man
might become an example which may be imitated. Moreover
it is common knowledge among Muslims, that nothing is
worse than becoming a disbeliever after being a Muslim.
They were also influenced by the literal meaning of the
report which ordered the apostate to be killed. I will
concentrate my inquiry into the punishment for apostasy
on this last consideration.
To understand an Islamic legal clause one should
consult the authorities on the origins of Islamic law
"'Ulama* al-usul". The point one should be sure of here 
*
is the meaning of the imperative mood (sighat al-amr) in 
Arabic generally and in Qur'anic and Prophetic usage 
particularly.
68. Examples of this may be taken beyond the limits of 
this"study, but_it may_be found in any book of 
fiqh, e.g. Minhaj al-Talibin^ vol.IV, p.123-132. 
KhirgiiT, his commentary on Mukhtasar Khalil, vol^
IV, pp.30^-3l6. And the commentary of Shikh 'Ali 
al-’Adawi in the margin of the same text.
121*
The jurists who wrote about the subject indicated
that the imperative may be used in sixteen different
ways; amongst them are recommendation, inimitability,
threat, permission and the literal meaning of the imper-
69
ative, which implies a command or an order.
In the Prophetic report concerned, the imperative
mood is said to be a command or order. So the jurists
generally classified the punishment for apostasy as a
"hadd1 punishment. The imperative mood, however, cannot
be said to imply one particular meaning, unless there
is factual evidence to support it.
The factual evidence in the case in question by no
means supports the view that this imperative indicates >
an order. First the Qur*anic verses concerned did not
prescribe any punishment for apostasy but simply declared
it to be a great sin. Secondly, the Prophet who said
these words about apostates never killed an apostate.
There were some cases in which people apostatized after
being converted to Islam, but zhe Prophet never ordered
70
anyone to be killed. On the contrary, Bukhari and
69. Bajdawi, Nasir al-Din, Minhaj al-Wusul, ila 1ilm al-
Usul, Cairo^ 1326 A.H. p.37-8. Nasafi, Manar al-
Anwar__UT Usui al-Fiqh, Asitanah, 1315 A.H. p.21+-9• 
Khallaf, Usui al-Fiqh, p.!9*+-95. Examples for these 
forms of usage may be found in the first authority.
70. Nayl al-Awtar, op.cit. vol.VII, p.192 where Shawkani
indicated that all the reports according to which
the Prophet killed an apostate are not trustworthy.
122.
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Muslim related that "an Arab (a bedouin) came to the
Prophet and accepted Islam; then fever overtook him
while he was still at al-Madinu, so he came to the Prophet
and said ’Give back my pledge* but the Prophet refused,
then he came the next day and said to the Prophet: * Give
me back my pledge1, and the Prophet refused. The Arab
did the same a third day and the Prophet refused." The
report goes on to say that the man afterwards left al-
Madina unharmed. This is a clear case of apostasy in
which there was no punishment. It is clear from the
words of the report that the bedouin was seeking to return
to his old religion, or at least to leave Islam, and in
72
spite of that he went unharmed. There is another case 
of apostasy in which the apostates were a group of Jews 
who accepted Islam and then returned to their original 
religion. The case is mentioned in the Qur!an Surah III, 
verses 71-73* These Jews used to pretend that they had 
accepted Islam in the first part of the day, and show 
that they did not believe in it at the end of the day.
This was, according to the Qur*an, in order to detach
71. Bukhari, with the comment of Ibn Hajar, vol.IV P.77^ 
and XIII p.170. Muslim with the comment of al-NawawT,
vol.IX, p.391 et seq.
72. Ibn Hajar, Path al-Bari, ibid. NawawT, his commentary 
on the text_of#Muslim, vol.IX, p.391 et seq. where
he quoted qadi !Iyad, a well known Shafi*i jurist 
as saying that this * bedouin was definitely an apos­
tate. According to ZamakhsharT, quoted in Fath al- 
Bari, the name of this bedouin is Qays Ibn Hazim 
(probably al-MinqarT).
123.
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newly-converted Muslims from Islam. At this time, the 
Prophet was the ruler of al-Madina and one cannot imagine 
how such people could do this under a government which 
punishes apostasy with the death penalty, and not be 
punished in any way.
This is the factual evidence surrounding the Prophetic 
report concerned. And according to it, I understand apost­
asy to be punishable by "ta'zir" punishment and not by
"hadd*1. The words *kill him* in the report concerned 
«
make it possible for the judge to go beyond the limits
for ,,ta*zirn laid down in another report, which was men-
7^
tioned before. This is the sane as the report in which 
the Prophet ordered a man who drank wine for the fourth
75
time to be sentenced to death, as a ntafzirM punishment.
In spite of the view that apostasy is punishable by 
a "hadd" punishment, which is a death penalty, there are 
jurists who consider its punishment to be "ta’zir". This 
view has been expressed during different eras of Islamic 
law. During the Caliphate of * Omar, a man came to him from
a group of the army, who were fighting for Islam, and the
Caliph asked him what they had done with some people who 
were known to have apostatized. The man told *0mar that
73. Ibn Kathir, Tafsir, vol.I, Cairo, (n.d.), p.373.
7*+. See above, p.108, F.N. 1+0.
75. See above what has been said about the punishment 
for wine drinking.
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they had been killed in battle. ’Omar said that if he
could have taken them in peace it would have been the
best thing for him. The man asked !0mar what he would
have done if he had taken them in peace and the Caliph
replied that he would have asked them to adopt Islam again,
76
and if they refused he would have imprisoned them.
It is clear that imprisonment is not one of the
"hudud" punishments, and it could not be inflicted except
in cases of " t a ^ i r ”.
Among the followers of the Prophet1s companions,
Ibrahim al-lTakh«i(d. 95 A.H.) and Sufyan al-Thawri (d. l6l
A.H.), hold the view that the apostate should be invited
77
back to Islam and should never be sentenced to death.
Baji, the distinguished Maliki jurist, made it crystal
clear that apostasy is 1 a sin for which there is no ’hadd1 
78
punishment”. A sin of this sort can be punished by 
nothing but a "ta'zir” punishment.
Finally, Ibn Taymiyya stated categorically that the 
punishment for apostasy is a TTta!zirn punishment; it is 
or it should be a severe punishment, but still it is a
76. Nayl al-Awtar, vol.VII, p.191. Ibn Taymiyya, al-Sarim 
al-Maslul,*op.cit. p.320. *
77- Ibn Taymiyya,_0£.cit._p.318. Mughni. vol.VIII, 
p.126. Shu1 rani, Mizan, vol.II, p. 13*+.
78. Biji, his commentary on al-Muwatta’, vol.V, p.282.
Baji died A.H.
I
i
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punishment of ntafzir2.
I Moreover, the jurists who think; that the apostate
should be sentenced to death, do not all agree that this
is a MhaddM punishment. They sometimes call it Mhadd!t and
8° A
sometimes not. According to the Eanafi, Shafi1i. and
M i  M  •
Zahiri schools, the death penalty for apostasy is a "hadd1 
8l _. •
punishment. 3ut according to the Hanbali school it is
.
not a ,ThaddM , but still an apostate should be killed
because of his unbelief ,lkufrM. Ibn Qudamah, in al-
Mughni, went on without categorizing the punishment as
82
"ta'zir" or anything else. The Islamic penal system
recognizes three sorts of punishment: "hadd" (fixed pun-
ishment) , "qisas" (retaliation), and !1ta!zirn (discret- 
• .
ionary punishments). The second is certainly out of the 
question here. It cannot be proved that the punishment 
for apostasy is a "hadd" punishment. So it can only be 
a punishment of ,,tatziril. All my remarks about the reasons 
for claiming wine-drinking to be punishable by "hadd"
83
apply here and need not be repeated.
To sum up, the Qur'an knows no punishment in this 
life for apostasy. The Prophet never sentenced a man to
79. Ibn Taymiyya, al-Siyasat al-Shar1iya, Cairo, 1951? p.l2W.
80. See the Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol.II, London 1928,p.8927*
81. Sarakhsi, Siyar, vol.IV, p.211. Shafi1i, Umm, vol.VI,
P.15S7
82. Mughni, vol.VIII, p.128.
83. Above p.107*
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death for it; some of the companions of the Prophet re­
cognized apostasy as a sin for which there was a "ta'zir" 
punishment, and so did some jurists. Actually, Islamic 
law considers apostasy as the most major sin and the 
limits for "ta'zir" are not, in its case, of obligatory 
fore o'. So a court may sentence an apostate to death, 
imprison him, or may simply leave him unharmed. The 
lawmakers of a Muslim community may fix for it whatever 
punishment they see fit and in the public interest.
V. A Survey of Wine-Drinking and Apostasy Punishments;-
A conclusion made in the two former sections was 
that wine-drinking and apostasy cannot be categorized as 
crimes for which there is ,lhaddn punishment. Both are 
sins which a Muslim is highly recommended not to commit. 
But a "ta'zir" punishment is prescribed for both under 
Islamic law, and such a punishment, by its nature, is 
expected to vary according to the culprit's personal 
character, the circumstances, the time and according to 
the way in which the crime was committed.
Some may question the basis for prescribing punish­
ments for these two sins. To put such a question in fact 
shows a complete misunderstanding of the whole conception 
of Islamic criminal law. Islamic criminal law knows of 
no distinction between sin and crime. Such a distinction 
is well-established among Western thinkers, and in Western
127.
writing, in both lav/ and philosophy. But as the function
of "ta'zir" in Islamic lav/ is to provide a legal sanction
for every sin for which there is neither "hadd" punishment,
84 .
nor penance "kaffara" , the distinction between sin and
crime, or between criminal action and moral guilt, no
longer exists.
Accordingly, the use of the word sin "ma'siya" pi. 
"raa'asi" in this text, and in Islamic legal writing,should 
be understood to refer to an action or ommission, for 
which there is no "hadd" punishment, or penance, but which 
makes its doer liable to a "ta'zir" punishment.
This question, then,should be rephrased. One should 
ask: why did the lav/maker of Islam mention the penalties 
for some particular sins, whereas others are left to the 
discretion of judges or rulers? A simple explanation could 
be that he ordered punishment for the major sins in order 
to draw his followers' attention to them, and not to 
allow those who committed them to go unharmed. Islam, in 
the Qur'an, threatens every misdeed with grave punishment 
in the world hereafter; this may lead people, and it has 
led some, to say that nothing should be done about it in 
this world, or through the state's authority. To avoid 
this result, the Prophet drew attention to some major 
misdeeds, and taught his followers that such conduct must
8k*. 'Imer, al-Ta'zir, p.36.
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be punished. By the expression "major misdeeds", I mean 
two main things: a) an act or ommission which nay become
so widespread among the people as to threaten the public
interest; b) an act or ornmission which is likely to harm 
an individual, either physically or mentally, so that its 
spread is undesirable. In other words, any sort of con­
duct which threatens the existence or the efficiencv of 
the community, either directly or indirectly, could be 
considered a major sin in this sense.
The purpose behind punishing such conduct is merely
to deter people from indulging in it. It has been shown
85
before , that deterrence is one of the major purposes of 
punishment in Islamic law. But here, deterrence plays the 
role of a mere means, while there it could be considered . 
as an end in itself. The sorts of conduct mentioned before 
should not exist in a Muslim community, simply because they 
may harm it. It is the right and the duty of the state, 
at the same time, to protect the community from such conduct 
or harm. Penalty is one of the means by which society can 
be protected.
Protection of society is universally accepted as a
86
purpose of punishment. It assumes that crime is an evil
85. Above, pp.80-92.
86. Thorsten Sellin, his foreword of Punishment and Social 
Structure, Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1939* Ueo 
Page, Crime and the Community, Faber and Faber, London, 
1937, P.79-89.
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against the public interest which should be prevented. On 
the other hand, it is to the good of the individual not to 
commit this sort of action again, even if the means of pre-
87
venting him are necessarily painful.
The protection of society is, I think, the purpose 
behind such punishments as those in question, i.e. punish­
ments for wine-drinking and apostasy.
Islamic law prescribed deterrent punishments for such
crimes(or misdeeds), in order to protect Muslim society
88
from their consequences. To support this view, one
should show what effect these misdeeds could have upon
the community, and how they could harm its existence or
efficiency. For the sake of clarity, the subject is divided
into two sub-sections.
V. 1. Wine-Drinking:-
Alcohol is as old, no doubt, as civilized man; nearly
every society appears to have discovered it, in one or
89
another of its many preparations. In Western social life, 
alcKohol has an honoured and traditional place. Prof.
Kessel and Dr. Walton stated in the very beginning of their
87. Page, ibid. esp. p.83.
88. Muslim ¥riters_treated these two crimes among the 
offences of "hudud", so what has been said about the 
inadequacy of’their work there is applicable here*»
See p.67.
89. Carstairs, G.M. in his foreword of Alcoholism, Pelican 
Original, 3rd revised edition, London, 1969.
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book "Alcoholism" that "it is the abstainer who strikes
90
us as the more abnormal"•
As for the reasons behind this "universal habit of 
drinking wine, the same authority declared: "with alcohol 
we offer hospitality and display our sociability ... over 
a glass we enjoy old friends and make new ones, proclaim 
our loyalties, discuss affairs, negotiate and seal bar­
gains ... strangers relax and mingle if alcohol is pro­
vided ... drinks will make them (the strangers) socialize ... 
they will become less inclined to judge others critically.
Oiling the social wheels is at the centre of society*s
91
approbation of regulated drinking."
The situation was very much the same among Arabs; the 
_ _ 92
Qurfan indicates that wine has some usefulness. But the
same verse indicates that the drinking of wine is a great
sin and its bad outweighs its good. This great sin was
explained simply, in a later revelation in terms of the
93
effect which the devil "shaytan" had upon those who drink;
• M
and accordingly it was declared to be forbidden "haram"..
The Qur’an classifies wine as an impure thing or "rijs".
This may be questioned as the actual reason for its pro-
90. Op.cit. p.11.
91. Ibid., pp.11-12.
92. Surah II, Verse 219.
93* Surah V, Verse 91.
hibition. But the Qur’anic verse in which wine is so
classified gives the reasons for this classification.
It runs: "the Devil seeks only to cast among you enmity
and hatred by means of drinking and gambling, and to turn
you from remembrance of Allah and worship." (Surah V,
verse 91)* So one can say that the evil effect of wine
on men led to its classification as an impure thing and
to its prohibition. Yet the latter is borne out by the
fact that the above verse was revealed when a group of
Muslims who, after getting druhk, engaged in a fight among
themselves, whereuoon the verse was revealed and wine
9k
declared to be forbidden. It is therefore right to say 
that wine-drinking was prohibited in order to protect the
95
society and the individual from its harmful effect.
However, the prohibition and its explanation were
accepted among Muslims and they still accept it, merely
as the will of God, who has the right to determine for his
creatures what is right and what is wrong, or in the
expression of Muslims, what is lawful "halal" and what
9h
is unlawful "haram".
9^. Ibn al-JawzT, Zud al-Masir fl’Ilm al-Tafsir, vol.
II, Damascus, p.^17*
95. Shalabi, Ta’lil al-Ahkam, op.cit. pp.15-17*.
9 6. This right of making things lawful and unlawful was 
reserved to "Allah" in many Qur’anic verses^ e.g. 
Surah II, verse 275, Surah 71, verse 119, Surah VII,
verse 32, Surah X, verse 59, etc.
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Accordingly, Muslim writers have said very little 
about both the utility and the harmful effect of alcohol
97
drinking. In fact, the vast majority of Muslims, if 
not all, disapprove of it, simply as it is not allowed 
by the religious law of Islam.
In recent times, scientific research has made a good 
contribution to our knowledge about the harmful effects of 
alcohol. Doctors, criminologists, psychotherapists and 
sociologists, have all proved alcohol to have a consider­
able effect on both physical and mental health and there­
fore on criminality and the crime rate.
An important chapter of Kessel's and Walton's book 
"Alcoholism" is the one dealing with the harmful effects 
of alcohol on the brain and the body. These effects can 
differ, from malnutrition to the destruction of brain
»r>f
cells. Symptop's of each effect are different, and the 
chances of recovery are different too; while some may
98
recover completely, some may suffer permanent damage.
Dr. Frances Smart discussed some cases which proved 
an effective causal relationship between alcoholic addic­
tion and the committing of crime. In one of these cases, 
a man of forty-two had had periods of compulsive fire-
97. See for example what Ibn Kathir wrote about it in 
Vol.I, p.255 of his Tafsir al-Qur'an.
98. Kessel and Walton, op.cit. pp.304^2.
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raising. The fire-raising had always followed fairly 
heavy drinking, or, to use the man's words, he "only 
thought about fire-raising when he was in a ^articular
99
mood, and this only came on after he had been drinking* 11 
There are other cases to which Dr. Smart referred, connec­
ted with drinking and the committing of crime, but this
100
case is the most serious one.
The relationship between drunkenness and crime was
discussed in different parts of Hermann Mannheim1s dis-
101
tinguished book "Comparative Criminology". In this
book, the relationship between drink and motoring offences
was discussed, and a reference was made to a report by
the Medical Research Council about the effect of small
doses of alcohol on driving, which indicated that drivers
under the influence of alcohol are responsible for about
102.
500 deaths, and 2000 or 3000 injuries annually.
99* Frances Smart, Neurosis and Crime, Ed. by B.C. Brown, 
Gerald Duckworth and Co. London, 1970, pp.2^-5. See 
also Sir Norwood East, Society and the Criminal, H.M. 
S.0. London, i960, pp.281-293* The Report of the 
Working Party on Habitual Drunken Offenders, H.M.S.0. 
London, 1971*
100. Op.cit. pp.15, 23, et seq. 68 et seq.
101. First Ed. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1965? vol.
I, ch. lb and 18, vol.II, ch.26.
fry
102. Ibid. p.2U8 and F.N. bO. The report was conceded 
with motoring accidents in the U.K. and its reiults 
were published in the Observer, 6.10.59*
I3*u
Moreover, the connection of alcohol with homicide
cases and juvenile delinquency, was discussed too. For
the latter, the same authority quoted some researchers1
results which proved an indisputable relationship between
103
alcoholic parents and children who committed crimes.
For homicide, drinking was the cause of motive of 90
cases out of a total of 551 of murders committed in
England and Wales during the twenty years ending in 
104-
1905. Mannheim also referred to some researchers
who illustrated the relationship between alcohol and 
105
homicide.
Figures and statistics referred to by C. Hibbert,
prove a very close relationship between drinking and
crime, in various Western countries, including the
106
United States.
What has been said, about the harmful effects of 
drinking, on both the individual and the community, and 
especially about its relationship with crime, is enough 
to support the prohibitionists1 view. These facts were 
completely unknown at the time when Islam prohibited 
drinking, but they are often used in recent writing to
103. Ibid. p.21+8-4-9.
104. Fry, Arms of the Law, Victor Gallancz, London,
1951, P.189.
105. Mannheim, ibid.
106. C. Hibbert, The Hoots of Evil, London, 19&3? p.255-
259.
justify the "hadd" punishment that was claimed to have
107
been applied for it. A better approach, I think,
could be that these facts are clear evidence for the
harm which may befall the nerson who drinks, and his 
108
society. Therefore, it justifies, and could underlie, 
the state's intervention, by means of punishment, against 
drunkards. But this punishment should be determined in 
each society in order to meet the real needs in part­
icular circumstances.
As far as classical Islamic law is concerned, these 
facts have nothing to do with the punishment dealt with 
in the legal manhals. That was a punishment established 
on religious grounds i.e. to follow the Prophet's, or
rather his companions' "sahaba" teaching. But as far
. •
as modern Muslim societies are concerned, such facts
were the grounds on which the prohibition of drinking
and of its production and trade, were introduced in 
109
Kuwait.
However, it is interesting that the punishment pre­
scribed by the penal code of Kuwait is not the claimed 
"hadd" punishment, in spite of the strong influence of
m .
107. See e.g. !Uda, op.cit. vol.I, p.651.
108. See Ted Honderich, Punishment: the Supposed Just­
ification, Hutchinson & Co., London 1969, p.176.
109. The explanatory memorandum of the articles 206 and 
206 A, B and C of the penal code of Kuwait.
conservative circles and organizations there; the pun­
ishment fixed by the penal code varies according to the 
crime committed. Its minimum is six months' imprisonment 
or 50 dinars' fine, and the maximum penalty is 10 years1 
imprisonment or 300 dinars' fine. Such a punishment 
could be classified as a "ta'zir" punishment, but not as 
a "hadd"; and it has been proved to be successful in
serving the aim of protecting society from the dangerous
110
effects of drinking.
To summarize, we can say that the underlying phil­
osophy of the punishment for drinking In Islamic law is 
the protection of society, by means of a deterrent pun­
ishment. Society needs to protect itself against the 
spread of such a habit because of its undoubted harmful 
effects, and also because of its relationship to crime.
A reference has been made to the pioneer experiment of
introducing a punishment for drinking and wine-trading in 
Kuwait, which has shown that the so called "hadd" punish- 
ment for wine drinking in a largely conservative Muslim 
community was replaced by a "ta'zir" punishment in terms 
of fines and imprisonment, and that was with regard to the 
facts brought to light through modern scientific research.
110. Although there are no figures available concerning the 
effectiveness of the new punishment in Kuwait, I have 
served there in the Le^al Dept, of the Council of Min­
isters from 1967 to 1969 and my own experience led to
the stated conclusion.
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Attention may be given here to the similarity between
the offence of drinking and that of drug addiction. It
is common knowledge that drug addiction is a habit which,
through its harmful effect on individuals, endangers
society. In the West, and almost all over the world, the
campaign against drug addiction is now wider and stronger
than ever. Yet the habit is still increasing alarmingly.
The Muslim jurists who dealt with the problem of
drug addiction agreed to the prohibition of drugs, but
111
disagree as to the penalty for it. Mainly the Islamic
legal manuals deal with the addiction to cannabis or *
"hashish11. But the agreed prohibition, evidently, covers
all other drugs. To return to the Kuwait experiment again,
it is interesting that under the Kuwait penal code, drugs
are treated in the same section as wine drinking and
the related offences are punished by very similar penal- 
112
ties.
Apostasy is less discussed than drinking. The subject 
is completely unknown to Western writers; some oriental­
ists have written about it, but only to explain the Muslim
111. IbnJTaymiyya, al-Siyasa al-Shar1iya1, pp.116-19* 
QarafT, FUrTfq, vol.I, p.2l6.
112. Articles 207? 208.
138.
point of view, as they understood it. It was dealt with 
in the Jewish Encyclopaedia, but only as a matter of 
historical importance, and without any attempt to ex­
plain the philosophy behind its punishment in Jewish law.
As for Muslim writers, it has been mentioned that 
there are two different views about it. The most common 
is that the punishment for apostasy is the death penalty, 
and it is a "hadd" punishment. A less common view, but 
well-documented, is that it is a "ta'zir11 punishment, 
which could be as severe as a death penalty, and which 
must, like all "ta'zir" punishments, be determined 
according to the particular circumstances in each case. 
This view I have agreed X\rith. But none of the supporters 
of either of these two views have tried to approach the 
purpose behind prescribing a punishment for such conduct. 
The holders of the first view did not analyse its pur­
pose because it was, according to them, a "hadd" punish- 
ment which need not be widely discussed, but completely 
accepted as the will of Allah. Those who hold the second 
view do so unquestioningly because they concentrate on 
presenting evidence and proof of their view. Indeed one 
can find, in some of the Islamic law texts, some general 
expressions about the reasons.behind the punishment for
apostasy, especially in the Hanafi school books, but such
*
general comments do not contribute much towards fulfilling 
the aims of an attempted modern legal study.
139.
I assumed, in the beginning of this section, that 
the philosophy behind the punishment of drinking and 
apostasy is the protection of society against the poss­
ible or actual harm of such acts. This has been adequate­
ly proved with regard to drinking. Whether or not it is 
right, too, with regard to apostasy, is the subject of 
the next pages.
Some preliminary knowledge is necessary for this.
The first thing is the widely-believed principle among 
Muslims that Islam provides a whole system of life, start­
ing from birth, extending throughout every minute of life, 
and governing the events following death. The laws of 
child-feeding and nursing, marriage and divorce, legacy 
and inheritance, bargains and contracts, war and peace, 
international relations, the treatment of minorities and 
many others have in one way or another legal rules re­
lating to them in the sources of Islamic law. Secondly, 
Muslims, and especially Muslim jurists, considered all 
these aspects, as having the same importance as, let us 
say, that of ritual prayer and fasting. The problems of 
arising should be treated and solved in the way recommend­
ed by, or at least in harmony with, the related rules in 
113
Islamic law. Accordingly, all aspects of Islamic law
113. See e.g. Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Turucj. al-Hukmiya, Cairo, 
1953? p.13. 100 et seq. Mawdudi, The Political 
Theory of Islam, Arabic trans. 3rd Ed. Damascus,
1067, p.if9-5l.
IbO,
should be fee ken and accepted as a uni tv, or as on*
l l V
picture T-'hich one cannot subdivide. With. regard to 
those principles, some jurists think that if the govern­
ment or the ruler “al-Hakim1 acts against some of the 
rules of Islamic law, ho should bo advised by the learned 
man to rectify the error in harmony with thorn, and to 
remedy the harm, if any, brought about by his actions.
If ho, or the government, docs so the matter is over.
But if not, the believers should fight for th^ir right 
to be governed in accordance with the divine rules of
115
Islam.
Thus, a Muslin state should bo shaped, and the 
various authorities in it should bo given their power, 
in accordance with, and not outside, the limits of the 
law of Islam. This principle is recognised as a very 
fundamental one, to the extent that all conflicts and 
challenges which have been raised against the rulers of
116
one or another Muslim, country, were connected with it.
11*+# Al-Shatibi, al-I'tisam, vol.II, Cairo, 1332 A.H.
p.2Pf-2k5*
115. Ibn Hazm, al-Milal wajbal-Nihal, vol.IV, Cairo, Ed. 
(n.d.#), pp.171-176. !Mda^ Islam and our Political 
Affairs, al Islam wa*awdafuna al-Siyasiya1, 2nd 
Ed., Beirut, 1967j pp.151-153.
116. It was this principle which underlay the conflict led 
by some of the -hi1i leaders against the Ummayad^and
1Abbassid States, behind the conflict between *Ali b.
Abi Talib and al-Khawarij, and between the Wahhabis 
and the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century.
Even recently the demand to adopt this principle was 
behind the conflict between the Islamic movement and
117
some of the Arab governments.
It is quite natural, according to such principles, 
to consider loyalty to the laws of the community as a 
highly necessary condition for the enjoyment of the pro­
tection of the law and the authority of the state. At 
the same time, it is natural to consider disloyalty as a 
reason for justifying the deprivation of such protection.
This was the explanation given for the punishment
118
for apostasy by some modern writers on the subject.
The question which remains is - how disloyalty to 
the Islamic law could be an act harmful to society, and 
its punishment be justified. For this point we can give 
two explanations. The first one is that of the case re-
- _ 119
ferred to in the Qur*an, i.e. the case of the Jews who
used to pretend that they accepted Islam at the beginning
of the day, and then at the end of it they used to say
that they had rejected it, in order to detach newly
120
converted Muslims from their religion.
117. The example of this is the conflict between the Egypt­
ian government and the movement known as ”The Society
of the Muslim Brotherhood” during the years 195^g^5• 
See for a brief but careful survey, Hassan 1AshmaWT,
one of the foremost_leaders of the movement, in al- 
Fard al-fArabi wa1Mushkilat al-Hukm, Beirut, 19795 
pp.l7k-l80.
118. *Uda, op.cit. vol.I, pp.53*+-538.
119. Surah III, verse 72.
120. See above, pp.122-3.
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The second is the case of those who apostatize from
Islam and join hands with its enemies in an actual state
of war, or collect people against Islam or the Muslim
state and then fight against it.
Both cases are clearly harmful to the society; the
first leads people towards the rejection of the law and
order of the society which is based on its religion,
by rejecting the religion itself, and the second involves
the raising of war, or helping those who raise it, against
the apostate’s own state. In both cases punishment is
justified, I think, in order to protect society from
the harm brought about by the apostate’s action. In any
other case, however, i.e. the cases of simple change of
religion, the punishment cannot be justified. Thus I
understand the Hanafi school’s view of punishing the
male apostate only, and leaving the female apostate un-
punished because she is not able to fight against the
Muslim country, while the male apostate is able to do 
121
so.
This view was understood by some as based on ”pot-
122
entialit^’ to fight” , so it was therefore not accepted.
121. Sarakhsi, Mabsut, vol.X, Cairo, 132k- A.H. p.110.
122. Muhammad *Ali, The Religion of Islam, p.599*
But the fact is that it is based on what usually happens,
and not on the mere potentiality. The proof is that
some of the Hanafi school jurists said that 11 an apostate
could not be punished for mere unbelief, but to prevent
the mischief of war” which follows his rejection of 
123
Islam.
Finally, the conception of punishing a person who 
displays disloyalty towards his country is well known 
to all legal systems.
In modern legal systems, it may be called treason,
12k
or conspiracy, but the concept is nearly always the same.
A summary of what has been said could be as follows. 
Islam is regarded by Muslims not as a mere religion, but 
as a complete system of law. Its rules are prescribed 
not only to govern the individual’s conduct, but also to 
shape the basic laws and public order in the Muslim state. 
Accordingly, apostasy from Islam is classified as a 
crime for which there is a ’’ta’zir” punishment. The 
punishment is applied in cases where there is harm brought 
about by the apostate. So in exceptional cases where
123. Fath al-Qadir, vol.IV, op.cit. p.389. SarakhsT, 
ibid.
12k. See Mozley and Whiteley’s Law Dictionary, Under
Treason and Treason Felony, 8th Ed. Butterworths, 
London, 1970? pp.368-369. The second book of the 
Egyptian penal code, Khalifa, al-Nazariya* al- 
’Amrna lil-Tajrim, Cairo, 1959? pp.250-253.
someone simply changes his religion the punishment cannot 
be applied. But it must be remembered that this is only 
a rare exceptional case, and the common thing is that 
apostasy is accompanied by some harmful actions against 
the state. A comparison between the concept of punishing 
those who commit treason in modern systems of law, and 
those who commit apostsy under Islamic law could be useful 
towards understanding the notion of punishing apostates 
according to the law of Islam. The notion of protecting 
society is the underlying philosophy of this punishment.
3M.
CHAPTER III,
RETALIATION (QISAS)
PUNISHMENT FOR HOMICIDE AND WOUNDING
Undoubtedly the greatest crime known to mankind is
murder. It has been punishable in all systems., of law
from early history, and throughout the ages up to today.
The punishment prescribed in Islamic law for murder -
and the infliction of injury - is what is called "Qisas11
• •
or "Cawed" (retaliation), i.e. causing the culprit harm
1
exactly equal to the harm he inflicted on his victim*
In studying the law of "qisas" in Islam, the most
• •
important point is the classification of the act of 
homicide, i.e. is it a crime for which the state must 
interfere by means of punishment, or is it a civil wrong, 
or tort, for which a remedy is available for the wronged 
individual if he so requests. The place given under
1. The word "qisas" is derived from the verb flqa§sa" mean­
ing *he cut1'or fhe followed his track in pursuit* and 
it came therefore to mean retaliation by killing for 
killing, and wounding for wounding. The word 1lQawad,! 
is derived from the verb "qada" meaning to^drive and 
to lead. Its usage in the meaning of "Qisas" is due 
to the fact that the culprit was often led by some­
thing (e.g. a piece of rope) to the place of execution, 
or because he was led by his action to the result which 
followed, i.e. the execution of the "qi§as" against him* 
However, the word "qisas" is much more common in Islamic 
legal writing than the word "qawad". See for details Ibn. 
Manzur, LLsan al-!Arab, vol.VIII, Cairo, p.3^ -1* Ibn Paris, 
Mu*jam Maqayis al-Lughat, vol.V, Cairo 13^9 A.H. p.11* 
Sharabasl, al-Qisas TTl-Islam, Cairo, 195*+> P-17*- — T • ' ••
1W6.
Islamic law to the individual's wishes, in the context of
"qisas" distinguishes the treatment of homicide there, from 
• «
its treatment under modern legal systems. For under Islamic 
law homicide appears to be essentially a civil wrong the 
remedy for which is the victim1s concern, or his relatives1, 
and not as a crime in the strict sense. Such is onefs 
first impression of the subject when one reads Islamic 
law texts. But a close investigation may lead to a slightly 
different conclusion. We will turn to this later in this 
chapter.
The following aspects will be dealt with nows the
historical background of the law of “qisas11, retaliation
. •
and blood-money "diya*1, some disputed points, and the
application of ^qisas" under the penal codes of some Muslim
• «
countries. Afterwards the problem of classifications will 
be approached.
I. The Historical Background:-
Among the Arab tribesmen of pre-Islamic Arabia, the 
feeling of hostility was characteristic. Friendly co­
operation in life was known only among the members of the 
2
same tribe. One of the main features of this state of 
hostility was personal revenge for homicide. The obligation
2. Ahmad Ibrahim, al-Qisas fil-Sheri*atif1-Islamiya (a
Ph.D._thesis) Cairo, 19*+*+, P«9* It is noteworthy that 
the Qur'an mentioned this fact in more than one verse 
in different chapters, e.g. Surah III, verse 103,
Surah VIII, verse 63.
!
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of vengeance (tha’ r) was inbred in the Arabs1 very nature.
Historians often refer to cases of revenge between two or
mere of the tribes which lasted for several years and began
for a very trivial reason such as a female camel or a stupid 
if
word. It was by no means rare for the motive of vengeance 
to turn into an actual war between two tribes: the war 
between the tribe of Banu Bakr and the tribe of Banu 
Taahlib lasted for hO years because one of Bani Taghlib
5
killed a female camel belonging to a woman of Ba.nx Bakr!
An attempt at a peace settlement was made after the killing
of the son of a distinguished Arab i.e. Shas b. Zuhayr
b. Judhaymah, but the father asked the representative of
the killer1s tribe to do one of three things in order to
stop him from taking revenge for his son: to return his
son to life, to fill his garment Mrida,!f with the stars,
or to hand over all the killer’s tribe to him to be killed.
’’Still” the father continued, ”1 will not be compensated 
6
for my son,”
One of the strongest causes behind the motive of 
revenge ”tha’r” among Arab tribesmen was their belief
3. Ahderson, Homicide in Islamic Law, B.8,0.A.S. 19?1> p.811,
h. Ibn *Abd-Rabbih, al-’Iqd al-Rarid, vol.VI, Cairo, 19h0, 
pp.hO, 71-77-
5. Kulayh_b. Rabi’a killed a female camel belonging to 
al-Basus bint Munqidh. See, ibid.
6 . Shafi’i, Umm, vol.VI, p.7*
1W.
that after the death of a murdered person a night-bird, 
known as "hama" would stand on his grave and cry: 111 am 
thirsty, give me a drink’1 i.e. the revenge should take
7
place to quench her thirstl
Moreover, revenge used to be taken not only against
the murderer but against any of his fellow-tribesmen,and
frequently tribal pride would only regard several victim^s
an equivalent to one fellow-tribesraan and the same was
8
applied to the infliction of injury.
.Blood-money "diya" was known among the Arab tribesmen 
as a peaceful alternative to revenge. But it varied 
according t. the position of the murderer and his tribe.
Ad for Quraish, the customary blood-money was a hundred 
camels but for the nobles (Ura^ra, s. Amir) it was one 
thousand. It was very common, on the other hand, for the 
blood-money for some tribes to be half that of other 
tribes, a rule which was due largely to the difference
9
in strength and prestige between one tribe and another..
The law of "qisas” was introduced by Islam into this
• •
society. Just retaliation allowed one life, i.e. the 
life of the culprit only, to be taken for the life of the
7* Damiri, Hayat al-Eayawan, vol.II, Cairo, (n.d.),
p.*+37-W; al-Jahiz, Kitab al-Eayawan, vol.II, Cairo 
1356, A.PI. p.298.
8 . Ibrahim op.cit. p.9* Anderson, op.cit. p.812.
9. Ibrahim, op.cit. p. 10. Ibn Ka.thir Tafsir, vol.I, p.209*
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murdered person, or a fixed amount of money to be
exacted as blood-money. This was not to vary from
one tribe to another or according to the victim’s
position in his tribe. The law of "qisas" will shortly• *
be discussed in detail but at this stage one should
note that the Qur’anic law "radically altered the legal
10
incidents of homicide" from the pre-Islamic custom
of revenge "tha’r" to the Islamic law of "qisas". The. •
distinction is illustrated by the change of terminology.
Justice is now to be measured "in accordance with the
moral standc?rd of just and exact reparation for loss 
11
suffered". Moreover, the maxim "a life for a life"
stems from the religious principle that all Muslims are
12
equal in the sight of God. It was in terms of these
principles that the punishment for "qisas" was prescribed;
• «
and it should be understood accordingly.
10. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, p.l8.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid. It is noteworthy that Prof. Coulson here 
considered the majority’s view which claims equality 
between Muslims but not between them_and non- 
Muslims. But according to the Hanafi school, 
equality in relation to this particular question
is based not on religion but on being a human being.
So "qisas" should be executed when a Muslim kills
a non-Muslim, while the majority1s view does not
allow "qisas" in this case, but only blood-money.1 • # '
150.
II* Retaliation and Blood-Money;-
The punishment for homicide and the infliction of
injury in Islamic law could be either "qisas" (retaliation)
• *
or "diva" (blood-money). "Qisas" itself is divided into• •
two categories: "qisas" for homicide "fi’n-nafs) and
— * •
"qisas" for wounding (fi’ma dun1an-nafs). For the former 
• •
it is more common to use the term "qisas", while for the
• •
latter to use the term "qawad". As for "diya", the term 
is commonly used for blood-money owed for killing, while 
the term "arash" is used for blood-money owed for wounding. 
Again "diya" and "kaffara" or penance are remedies for 
accidental homicide, but we will not deal with them at 
this stage as we are more concerned here with the punish­
ment for deliberate homicide or wounding.
In the Qur’an both kinds of homidide are mentioned: 
deliberate and accidental. For deliberate homicide the 
punishment prescribed in the Qur’an was the killing of the 
culprit, or blood-money if the relative(s) of the victim
did not demand "qisas". In Surah II, verses 178-9 the
« •
Qur’an says: "0 believers, prescribed for you is retaliation
13
for killing freeman for freeman, slave for slave , female 
for female. But if aught is pardoned a man by his brother,
13. Here and throughout this thesis I am omitting all 
that is found in the books of Fiqh about slaves, 
simply because it has long been a matter of histor­
ical concern only.
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let the pursuing be honourable, and let the payment be
with kindliness. That is a lightening granted for you
by your Lord, and mercy, and for him who commits aggression
after that - for him there awaits a painful chastisement.
1*4-
In retaliation there is life for you . In Surah
IV verse 92 the law for accidental homicide was laid down 
"never should a believer kill a believer; but if it so 
happened by mistake ... he should free a believing slave, 
and pay compensation to the deceased1s family, unless they
15
remit it freely . Taking these verses together, the
jurists laid down the principle that there is no "qisas"
. •
owed for accidental homicide, but only the blood-money
_ 16
and penance or "kaffara".
For deliberate homicide the punishment of "qisas" means
• •
the taking of the culprit*s life on account of his murder.
This is, in modern terms, the death penalty for murder.
The jurists are agreed on this, but their opinions vary
about the means by which the death penalty should be carried
-
out in cases of "qisas". The Hanafi and Hanbali schools
lb-. Prof. A.J. Arberry*s translation, The Qur*an Interpret­
ed, Oxford Univ. Press, in the World*s Classics,1969•
15. Yusuf *Ali*s translation, New York, 19^+6.
16. Jassas, Ahk^m al-Q*ar!,an, vol.II, p.222 et seq. Sh^fi*T
.. • . — —
Umm, vol.VI, pp.*+ et seq.
17. It would be clearer to discuss this point here, than
to add it to the other controversial points to which
we will turn afterwards.
hold that the culprit should be killed by the sword
18
whether or not he had killed his victim in this way.
On the other hand, the Maliki, 3h~fi'i and Zahirl schools 
think that the murderer should be put to death in the same
19
way as that which he had used to kill his victim. The
first view assumes that the purpose of prescribing Mqisasn
• •
as a punishment is to put the murderer to death for his
crime, so it should be done only in the easiest and most
20
effective way. The second view depends on an interpret­
ation of the meaning of the word ’’qisas” as "equality”;
• «
therefore equality should be considered both in the
taking of the culprit’s life, and in the means by which
21
it should be taken.
According to the late Sheikh Shaltut, one should not
concern oneself with the jurists’ views about such a
subject. It is related that the Prophet ordered the
believers to improve the method of killing (even for
animals). So whatever quick, easy and efficient means
22
of execution can be found should be used. Therefore,
18. Jassas, ibid. volt!_I, pja.l60-3. Matalib u}i al-Uuha, 
Sharh Ghavat al-Muntaha, vol.VI, p.52.
•
19. Mudawwanah, vol. IV, p. .h9 5-6. Turn, vol.VI, p. 5*+ •
Muhalla, vol.X , pp.370-78.
20. Jassas, ibid, p.l6l. Matalib I“lT al-TTuha, op.cit. p. 52.
#
• t •
21. Muhalla, ibid. p.370 et seq. Jassas, ibid.. •. ,
22. Mahmud Sh-.ltut, Islam ’Aqida w^-Shari'a, 2nd Ed, Cairo, 
196**, P.3S3. See -Iso a decisionTFntwa) of the Azhar 
jurists’ com ait tee*, Majallt 1-Azhar, vol,VIII. p.503? 
referred to in Ibrahim's al-Qisas, op.cit. p.208.
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one can conclude that retaliation for deliberate homicide 
is the punishment prescribed in the Qur’an, and it should 
be carried out in the way that causes the least possible 
amount of pain.
Unlike retaliation for ’homicide, retaliation for 
wounding was not prescribed in clear terms either in the 
Qurfan or in the Sunna. The verses of the Qur’an on which 
the jurists based the law of retaliation for wounding are 
all controversial. The most important one is verse b-5,
Surah V "We prescribed for them (the Israelis) a life for 
a life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a nose, an ear for
23
an ear, a tooth for a tooth, and for a wound retaliation,." 
But to interpret this verse as a source for the law of 
retaliation for wounding is unjustified as it concerns 
what was revealed and prescribed for the Jews in the Torah.
It is a part of a set of verses concerning the law prescrib­
ed for the Jews and the Christians. Accordingly it is 
not the proper verse on which to base a verdict, part­
icularly when the last statement but two of this set of
verses says: "For each of you (the Prophets) we have
2k
appointed a divine law and a traced-out way.1 as it indi­
cates the fact that every Prophet has his own law revealed
25
to him.
23. Arberry’s translation; see Jassas, op.cit. vol.II, 
p.232. Mughni, vol.VIII, Cairo, 19&9? p.320-21.
2k. Qur’an, Surah V, Verse b-8.
25. Shaltut, ibid. pp.^03-5.
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The other verses which are used in the same way are;
verse 19*+ Surah II, and verse 126 Surah XVI. Again all
these verses are irrelevant in this context as they were
revealed to determine the relationship between the Muslim
state and the non-Muslim states, but not to be adopted by
26
Muslim society.
As for the Sunna there is only one report in which 
the Prophet is said to have ordered retaliation for wounding. 
This is the report related by Bukhari and Muslim; a woman 
broke another woman’s tooth, and the Prophet ordered her 
tooth to be broken in retaliation, but her brother Anas b. 
al-ITadr swore that his sister1 s tooth could not be broken. 
Then the victim1 s relatives accepted the ,!diya!1 instead of- 27
"qisas11. This report was subject to discussion: many 
. •
points in this report are the subject of dispute, was it 
Anas b. al-Nadr who swore that the sister’s tooth could 
not be broken, or was it his mother? Did this happen once, 
or twice? The collectors of "hadith11 are not unanimous 
about the Prophet’s words either. Moreover, it is only
26. Ibid. p.V05. Kasani, 3adai*, op.cit. vol.VII, p.295*
27. Mishkat al-Masabih, vol.II, p.26l. It was related 
too by the other six collectors of "hadith11 except 
Tirmidhi. See, Shaltut, op.cit. p.W02.
"information of one" which the scholars of "U.sul al-Fiqh"
‘ 29
deny to be a sound basis for establishing a law.
Accordingly, one can say that the law of "qisas" for
^  —  * •
wounding is not laid down by the Qur*an or Sunna, Can we
then find another source for it? According to Shikh
Shaltut it is based on consensus "ijma1", the jurists
from the time of the Prophet until today are agreed about
it (although each school or single jurist on a different
basis). It is not a case of "ta!zir" which can either be
adopted or not, but a law established on consensus which
should be followed according to all the schools of Islamic 
30
law.
The conditions required for "qisas" for wounding can
• •
be summarized as follows: a) the wound must be deliberate
28. "Information of one" refers to the reports related by 
one_follower of the Prophet in their age (iasr_as- 
sahaba) and by one of their followers (attabi’un)* and 
so'on till it was written in the collections of reports 
On the other hand there are the reports handed down to 
the collectors in "regular succession" i.e. related in 
each age by a great number of narrators, so the idea of 
their having combined in telling falsehoods i£ axcluded 
The first kind of report is_known as "hadith ahad" and 
the second as "hadith mutawatir" to which the power of 
establishing a new verdact or law is mostly agreed^ 
upon. See, Khallaf, Usui al-Fiqh, pp.36-M+. Shaltut, 
ibid. pp.73-75.
29. Shaltut, ibid. p.h-06.
30. Ibid. pAOb-. Jassas, op.cit. p.232. Shafi1!, Umm, 
vol,VI, p.M*. Where both authorities related the 
consensus.
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M,amdTT and not accidental "khatant* b} the part of the
body on which "qisas" may be inflicted must be the same,
• •
and in the same condition, as the part of the victim1s 
body which was injured by the culprit, c) it must be 
practicable to inflict "qisas1* i.e. the infturv must involve
" • • 31
cutting off from a joint as for example from the wrist*
If all these conditions are fulfilled, "qisas1* must be«— — . .
inflicted, according to Malik and Shafi* i by experts in
32
order to avoid any possible error. The jurists of the
Eanafi school agreed that "qisas" for wounding should be 
• • *
inflicted, in two cases only: the case of an injury which 
reaches the skull-bone (al-muwaddaha) and the case of
* 33
articular injury (al-jiriaya *ala-mifsal).
All other cases of injury are either unanimously held
not to be subject to "qisas", or agreed upon among the
» * *
Hanafi jurists but not among others, or subject to dispute
31. Mughni, op.cit,*. pp.320-21. Matalib Uli al-Nuhaa op. 
cit. pp.63-9* Umm, vol.VI, px*flf. Badai* al-Sanai* , 
vol.VII, pp.297 et seq. Hattab, his commentary on 
Mukhtasar Khalil, op.cit.* p.2bo et seq.
32. Mudawwanah, vol.IV, p.*+99* Hattab, ibid. p.2^7* Emm, 
ibid. p.52. Prof. J. Schacht in his article, Qisas, 
in the Encyclopaedia of Islam referred to Malik*
only as requiring this condition.
33. Shaltut, op.cit. pp.399-l+01. It is noteworthy that he 
rightly described this latter case as a mere assumption.
3^
among the Hanafi scholars themselves. However, in 
the texts of Islamic law there is quite a long discussion 
concerning the different kinds of wounds and the possibil­
ity of equality in retaliation for each; together with the 
possibility of fulfilling the other conditions required*
All these discussions I have left untouched, as I think 
it is a matter for expert knowledge and not a matter for 
legal knowledge. One must accept the opinion of a surgeon, 
for example, about when just retaliation is physical!y 
possible, and when it is net*
A scholar of Islamic law, however, has nothing to do 
with such a decision as it is completely beyond his field 
of experience and knowledge. It is possible that the 
jurists made correct decisions about some of the topics, 
but at any rate they cannot be taken as the final word for
35
the above reason.
It remains, now to explain the other aspect of the 
punishment for homicide and wounding. The Tldiya!I or 
blood-money is the sole punishment for quasi-deliberate 
homicide (shabah al-'amd). It is due in cases of deliberate
3*+. I have left the question of !,qisast1 for wounding by
a man of a woman at this stage as it will be referred 
to later on among other disputed points.
35* Ibn Hazm, for instance, considered'that all wounds 
make*the culprit liable to !Iqisasn , Muhalla, vol.X, 
p.*+6l. It is interesting that'he allows it even 
for defloration committed by a man, see pp.*+55-6*
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homicide if, and only if, the nearest relatives of the
victim do not insist on the carrying out of "qisas"
36 * .
against the murderer. At the same time ,,diya,, (together
with the kaffara) is the remedy for accidental homicide.
"Diya11 as a remedy for homicide and wounding was 
prescribed by the Sunna only. It is related that the 
Prophet said "as for quasi-deliberate homicide (Shibhi 
al-'amd) the blood-money is one hundred camels of which
37
bO are pregnant." The same number of camels (100) was
determined in another report as the "diya" for deliberate 
38
homicide. Unlawful homicide, however, is subdivided
into categories which vary from one school to another, or 
even from one jurist to another within the same school.
The widest subdivision is that of the Hanafi school which 
contains five varieties: "deliberate "1amd", quasi- 
deliberate "shabah al^amd", accidental "Khata1"« equi­
valent to accidental "jari majra al-Khata" and indirect 
39
"bisabab". Qisas may be carried out for the first sort
• •
of homicide only while the remedy for the other four is
36. More will be said about the relatives1 right later.
37. Mishkat al-Mas'abih, vol.II, p.268, where Nassa1! 
Darimi and b.*Magah are quoted.
38. Ihid., where he quotedi'Nasaii and Darimi, see also 
Malik, al-Muwattal, Cairo, 1951 > P*530.
39* Anderson, op.cit. p . 8 l 8 .
the exaction of blood-money* These five subdivisions 
came into existence as the Hanafi school1s view after
the famous Hanafi jurist al-Jassas (died 370 A.H*) wrote
•   ^  m  * • *
his book "Ahkam al-Qur’an". Before him, as he stated,
the Hanafi jurists used to divide homicide into the first
four only. The Shafi1i, Hanbali and Zaydi schools recog-
nize three subdivisions only: deliberate, quasi-deliberate
and accidental* The Maliki and Zahiri schools divide it
k2
into two categories only: deliberate and accidental.
The definition of each of these categories is dis­
puted not only among different schools but also among 
different individual scholars of the same school. It 
is, as Prof. Anderson rightly stated, a matter of "much 
complexity and confusion, for often the same writer
kO. Ibn-I'Tujaym, al-Bahr, al-Ra*iq SJiarh Kanz al-Daqai!q, 
Cairo,(n.d.), vol.’VIII, p.287.” Anderson, ibid.
kl. See Ahkam al-Qur*an, vol.II, p.222-3* and Sarakhsi, 
rlabsut, vol.XXVI, p.59*
k2. Mughni, op.cit. p.260. al-Rawd al-Nadir, vol.IV,
p.5?7. Muhalla, vol.X, p.3^3*'Mawwaq] his comment­
ary on Mukhtasar Khalil, Cairo, 1329 A.H. vol.VIj. 
p.2k0. It is’interesting that some of the Maliki 
and Hanafi jurists hold a view according to which 
the varieties of homicide are the first four of the 
five held by_the majority of the Hanafi school.
See e.g. Kasani, Badai1, op.cit. p.2^3* snd Dardir, 
al-Sharh al-Kabir, a commentary on Mukhtasar Khalil 
Cairo, (n.d.), vol.IX, p.319*
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will in places assert that deliberate homicide means 
homicide committed with the actual intention to kill, 
while in other places he will state or imply that it 
means homicide which results from an intentional use of
^3
any weapon or means intrinsically likely to kill.**
Whether or sot the accused intended to kill is
something that only he can know* The difficulty of
ascribing the intention to kill to the accused, in the
absence of adequate proof, led to a divergence of views
among the schools of Islamic law as to the circumstances
in which a homicide should be classified as deliberate.
Generally speaking, the Hanafi, Shafi1i and Hanbali
• * 
schools classify as deliberate "cases of homicide in
which the killer intended to kill and employed some means
likely to have that result." Other cases of homicide
which result from an act or omission which is not likely
to kill are classified as "quasi deliberate" homicide.
The first category only makes the offender liable to
"qisas", while the second makes him liable to blood-. .kk
money.
The Maliki school, on the other hand, considers "a 
person guilty of deliberate homicide if he causes the
k3. Anderson, ibid. p.819* However for generally accept­
ed definitions, see Coulson, Succession in the Muslim 
Family, Cambridge, 1971? p.177-8.
hh* Anderson, ibid.
l6l.
death of another by any intentional act or omission, 
directed against a human being which is either hostile 
or intrinsically likely to kill. 11
However, in cases of deliberate homicide the punish­
ment is the death penalty by means of "qisas". But "qisas”
• • • .
could be ruled out if the victims1 nearest relatives
did not demand it or, in other cases, when it was imnoss-
1+6 * '
ible to carry it out. Then they may ask for the pay­
ment of "diya” or forgive the killer altogether. In the 
case of their demand for "diya" to be paid, it is to be 
a hundred camels, and the same "diya” is due in all cases 
of quasi-deliberate homicide as this does not incur "qisas” 
(but here too forgiveness may take place). So, "diya” 
is the only remedy in cases of quaSi-deliberate homicide
end it is a substitute punishment for deliberate homicide.
h-8
It is in both cases to be one hundred camels, according
*+!?. Coulson, ibid. p.177* cf« 'Uda, vol.II, pp.78^83*
^6. For_these cases end the different views about them see,
fUda, op.cit. pp.l55-75« Ahmad Ibrahim, op.cit. pp.l78-9*+*
*+7* The "diya” is of two categories: Mughallaza, i.e. in 
the higher amount, and Mukhaffa, i.e. in the lighter 
amount. Both are one hundred camels, the difference 
appears in kind and age of camels only.
k-8 . There are other substitute and incidental punishments, 
i.e. "ta* zir"; kaffara and al-ljlrmsn min al-mirath wal- 
wasiya "deprivation of inheritance and legacy”; to 
the third reference has already been made, the first 
will be tree ted afterwards, while the second will not 
be considered as it cannot be classified as a punish­
ment in the legal sense of the word.
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to one view, on the heavier or higher rate, and accord­
ing to the other on the ordinary or lighter rate. The
same dispute existed concerning quasi-deliberate and
*+9
deliberate homicide. It has been already mentioned 
that the "diya" is due to be paid originally in camels, 
but it is almost universally admitted that it can be 
paid by an equivalent amount of money, either gold or 
silver, cows, sheep or garments. As for the Zahiri school 
they believe that it should be paid only in camels unless 
this is impossible, there being no camels available, in 
which case it can be paid by the orice equivalent to a
5o
hundred camels.
In cases of deliberate homicide, the culprit himself 
is to pay the "diya” from his own property. However, 
various opinions among the schools concerning deliberate 
homicide committed by an insane man or a minor Msaghir<il.
The three schools, except the Shafi*i (its prevalent 
view), agree that the 11 diya11 in such a case is to be 
paid by the lt?aqilaM (tribal group to which the culprit 
belongs). This is based on the fact that the minor and 
the madman are not able to discriminate one act from
*+9 * TUda, op.cit., pp.l80-l8l, 190 and of the references 
he cited, see Dardir, op.cit. vol.IV, p.237 et seq.
50. ’Uda, ibid, p.170-8 and Ibn Hazm, Muhalla, op.cit. 
pp.3o8 et seq.
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another or are possessed of a defective power of discrim­
ination. Moreover, Islamic law is not regarded as app­
licable to those who have not reached puberty or who 
are insane. The Shafi1is prevalent view allows the 
,!diyaM to be paid from the insane • nd minor* s own property
by method of analogical reasoning tfqiyas!l on the ground
52
that they are subject to **ta*zir,! for their deeds.
In cases of quasi-deliberate homicide, the f,diya** is 
to be paid by the”•aqila*1 of the culprit in all the schools* 
views except that of the Maliki school, who do not recog­
nize quasi-deliberate homicide (nor do the Zahiri school
53
of course). An important difference between the payment 
of the 1 diya1 in deliberate and quasi-deliberate homi­
cide, is that in the former it is to be paid immediately 
after the case is closed by the court, while in the 
latter it is to be paid after three ye^rs, starting 
either from the day of the victim*s death (according to 
the Shafi* i and Hanbali schools), or from the day of the 
case being closed by the court (according to the Hanafi 
school). There are indeed some points of dispute and
51. *TTda, opoCit. p.179* Anderson, ibid,, p.825.
52. Abu Ishaq al-Shirazi, Muhadhflhab, Cairo, (n,d.),
Vol.II* p.210.
53* Mughni, vol.VIII, p.375 *t seq. Badai*, vol.VII, p.255*
5^. Ibid. the Malikis hold the- same view as the ganafi* s 
in relation to accidental homicide, see Mawwaq, op. 
cit. p.267.
161+*
contradictory opinions, but we need not go through any
55
of them. Among the points of universal agreement in 
Islamic law is that the b^ood-money of a woman is half
56
that of a man. It Is interesting, however, that all
jurists are agreed that it is allowed to the nearest
relative of the victim and the culprit to settle the
matter peacefully "sulhan" on the basis that the culprit
• •
may pay the victim*s relatives more money than the fixed
57
amount for "diya1*.
Up to now we have summarized the principles of the 
law of "diya" -for homicide and it remains for us to con­
sider the law of ,fdiya,! for wounding.
The subject, in the texts of Islamic law, is very 
complex and confusing. Nearly every part of man*s body 
was discussed in relation to the amount of Mdiya,! or 
"arash" \\rhich was due to be paid for its injury, and 
most of the points were disputed. As we are not concerned 
here with explaining the law but with stating the general 
principles of it in order to know the philosophy behind
55* For detail see *Uda, op.cit. pp.192-8. The articles
"Qisas, Katl and Diya1'in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, 
vols.I & II._Homicide in_Islamic Law by Prof. Ander­
son, and Ibrahim, al-Qisas, op.cit.
56. Shu* rani, Mizitn, vol.II, p.127. al-Rawd al-Nadir,
vol.IV, p.568 et seq. •
57. Mughni. op.cit. p.363. Shirbini, Mughni al-Muhtaj, 
volTlV, Cairo, 1308 A.H. p.*+5.
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the punishments prescribed for crimes, we will not go
through these disputed points at all. It is sufficient,
I think*to say that for some injuries the full amount
of "diya” is due, e.g. the eyes, nose, lips etc; and for
some others a fixed amount, or percentage of it, should
be paid (although there are different views about some
injuries as well). When there was no fixed amount (either
whole or part of the full diya" the victim would be entitled
to some compensation known as "hukumat * adl". This was
an amount of money to be fixed by the judge "qadi" and.
paid to the victim for the loss suffered.
The fixed amounts were assessed eithdr from what the 
Prophet reportedly laid down in his letter to !Amr b.
Hazm when he was appointed to represent the Proohet in
58 _ 59
Yemen , or from personal opinion "ijtihad".
However, all jurists agreed that the blood-money
(diya or arash) may replace retaliation when it is not
possible to inflict it or when a peaceful agreement "sulh"
60
is achieved. Blood-money is due also, according to some 
jurists, if the culprit has already lost the part of his 
body parallel to that which he injured of the victim*s
58. Shafi1!, Risalah, op.cit. p.b22-3. Mughni, ibid.
?.367.
59. Muwatta', Cairo, 195W P»535.
• •
60. MughnT, ibid. *TJda, op.cit. vol. II, p.26l*
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body. But according to other jurists nothing is due
6l
in such a case. The payment of "diya11 in cases of
injury is the duty of the culprit himself. Here the
IMaqila" is exempt from any responsibility. The deed is
the culprit*s alone and so should be the loss of money
due for it. On this point, complete agreement has been
62
established among all the schools of Islamic lax*.
III. Disputed Points about the Infliction of M01sos11;-
Under this heading three points will be treated:
the execution of "qisas” against a group of people for
• •
killing a single person, against a Muslim for killing a 
non-Muslim "dhimmi" and against a father for killing his 
son. Indeed , there are many other disputed points treated 
in the texts of Islamic lav/, but these are the most import­
ant ones as they are directly concerned with the fundamental
principle of "qisas" itself. "Qisas" was prescribed to
. « . •
discourage the motive for killing in man’s nature. "There
63
is life for you in retaliation" , is the obvious reason
61. The first view is held by the Hanbali_and Shafi*i schools,
while the second is held by the_Maliki and, with little 
modification, the Hanafi, see *Uda, op.cit. p.257-8. It 
is noteworthy however that the same dispute is raised 
in cases of homicide.
62. Jassais, op.cit. vol.I, p.157 et seq. Baji, al-Muntaqa, 
voi.’vil, Cairo (n.d.)^ pML03. NawawT, Min^iaj, in the 
margin of Tuhfat al-MuJjtaj, op.cit. vol,IV, p.87.
Mughni, ibid/ p.382. Uuhall$, vol.XI, p.50. al-Bawd 
al-Nadir, op.cit, p.56.*
63. Qur’an, Surah II, verse 179.
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given by the Qur'an for legalising this punishment. To
hold the view that “cLisas11 in the above mentioned cases
• •
cannot be inflicted is to demolish the theory of "qisas"
• 4 - ^  * *itself. So, here we will try to see what evidence supports
such a view and to what extent it can be accepted,
III* 1. A Group for a Sinrle Person:-
Murder can be committed by one person or by a group
of people against one person. In the first case there
is no problem about inflicting "qisas51 on the culprit*
» ■
But in the second case some of the Muslim jurists think
that a man can be executed for killing one man but a
group cannot be executed for doing so. This view was
reportedly held by - among others - Zuhari, Ibn Sirin, and
Iiabib b. Abi Thabit. The Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi1! and
Sahiri schools hold an opposite view according to which
a group can be punished by means of "qisas" for killing
• •
one person. It is not clear, however, which view was 
held by Ibn 'Abbas and Ahmad b. Hanbal as both views
Cb
were attributed to both of them.
Those who hold the first view support it by an 
interpretation of the two Qur'anic verses in Surah II 
and V, as it is mentioned there that one person can be 
killed for one. Accordingly, they claim,two or more
6b-. Mughrii, op.cit. pp. 189-90. Muhalla, vol.X, p.^12*
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people are not "equal" to one, and the lav; of "qisas"
is based on ^equality", so it is not justifiable to
kill more than one person for killing one person. In
fact it is easy to refute this claim by saying that
"qisas" is a punishment for a specific act, i.e. the 
• .
killing of a person, and any punishment should be inflicted 
for the commission of the act for which it was prescribed, 
disregarding the number of people who shared in it. Thus, 
when four people shared in killing a boy in Yemen, 'Omar 
ordered his representative there to carry out "qisas" 
against them. The seme was done by 'Ali when three men
65
killed a single man. Moreover, if the first view is
right, it will open the door to anyone who,wants to kill
another by allowing him to seek the cooperation of a
66
third person and so escape the punishment.
So the preferable view in relation to this point is
the majority one which allows "qisas" to be inflicted upon
• •
a group of people for killing one person. The same applies
in cases of "qisas" from a man for killing a woman.. .
III. 2 . A Muslim for a non-Muslim:-
It is characteristic in religious laws to consider 
the follower of religion as superior to other people who
65. Mughni. op.cit. p.290. Jassas, vol.I, p.1^ -5.
• • •
66. ShalOTt, op.cit. p.393* Badai', vol.VII, p.238.
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do not believe in this religion. This distinction is 
clearly expressed in the Qur*an and the Sunna in relation 
to the position of the people in the sight of God, esp-
67
ecially in the hereafter. According to this distinction 
the majority of Muslim scholars hold that a Muslim is 
not liable to "qisas" if he has killed a non-Muslim,
68 • * I
"dhimrai". Only the Hanafi school allows the “qisas"
69 • •
to take place in such a case.
The majority view is supported by Qurfanic verses 
which declared that non-Muslims were not equal to Muslims, 
and a Prophetic report which forbade the killing of a
70
Muslim on account of his killing a non-Muslim ,lkafirM.
The Hanafi school supports its view by insisting on the
application of the general meaning of the Qur*anic verses
relating to “qisas11 as these verses did not discriminate
• •
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim but simply declared
"qisas1* to be the punishment, for homicide disregarding 
. . 71
the faith of the victim. One can add to this the
67. Ahmad Ibrahim, op.cit. p,119.9 *
68. A "dhimmi" is a non-Mulsim living in a Muslim state.
6 9. According to the Maliki school a Muslim is liable to 
the death penalty for killing a non-Muslim by way of 
deceiving "ghila" as it is in the Maliki view a sort 
of "hiraba" for which the death penalty is prescribed 
as a "hadd" punishment. See Mukhtasar Khalil, with 
the commentary of al-Mawwaq and al-Hattab, vol.VI,
P£*230-3. Dardir, in the margin of Hashivat al- 
Dusuqi, vol.IX, p.383.
70. Mughni, vol.VIII, pp.273-^. Muhalla, vol.X, pp.3^7- 
59* Umm, vol.VI, pp.32-3^.
71. Jassas, op.cit. pp.1^0-Mf.
Prophetic report related by Bukhari, Muslim and Abu-
Dawudc "The life of a Muslim may be taken in three cases
only - i.e. in the case of a married adulterer, one who
has killed a human being "qatal nafsan” and one who has
forsaken his religion and separated himself from his 
72
community.1 In the second case mentioned in this
report, the committing of homicide was described as
against 1 a human being1 and not a Muslim human being.
Moreover, to limit the infliction of "qisas1 to
cases of killing a Muslim only is contradic^^j? to the
general principle of the law of ,fqisas!1 itself, as was
• «
stated before. This law was made in order to protect
human life, and if one imposes such a limitation on it,
this clearly contradicts its purpose. One cannot deny
that the law of ,1qisas1 is based on equality but equality
in what? This is the question. The Hanafi school rightly.
hold that equality here means that both the killer and
the victim must be human beings, therefore, any human
being who kills another human being should be liable to
"qisas" disregarding the religion of the victim.
• .
The verses used by other schools to support their 
view that there is no equality between a Muslim and a 
non-Muslim, are all concerned with the situation in the
72. See above, p. 116-117•
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nexj? world* So none of these verses is relevant to
73
this discussion.
As for the Prophetic report concerned, its words
were not clear about the verdict intended by the Prophet,
so an explanation was necessary. It is obvious from
what Jassas said about it that the explanation given 
• • •
by the Hanafi school is harmonious with the general
spirit of the Islamic law rather than the exulanation
7*+
given by the majority.
It may be said here that the Hanafi1s view, and that
of the Malikis in cases of rl£hilaf1 assume that nqisas1f
• •
is a punishment by the authority for the sake of justice. 
The majority view on the other hand is influenced by the 
pre-Islamic distinction between individuals according 
to their social or tribal position, a distinction which 
Islam completely condemned. On this basis, the contemp­
orary scholars are generally in favour of the Hanafis1
75
view rather than that of the majority.
At the same time a parallel may be drawn between
the Hanafis1 view and the view unanimously agreed upon V/ .
about theft. It is subject to consensus that if a Muslim
73. Muhalla, ibid. and Ahmad Ibrahim, op.cit. pp.121-23.
7k-. Jassas, vol.I, p.ll+2-ll+3.
• • .
75. e.g. Ahmad Ibrahim, ibid. Shaltut. op.cit. p.393-5*
•Uaa, vol.I, p.339 end Vol.TT, p. 12k, Sharab5.si, op.
cit. p.132-3.
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steals a non-Muslim*s property and the crime is proved,
the Muslim's hand should be amputated; the cause or
'"ilia" of this is the protection of the non-Muslim's
property. It is clear enough how illogical it is to
grant more protection for the non-Muslim's money, than 
7 6
for his life. This view may be objected to on the
grounds that the punishment for theft is due to God,
"haqq Allah" and therefore it must not be equal to "qisas"
• •
as the latter is essentially due to the victim or his 
relatives, i.e. ,!haq.q adami". Such an objection is not 
valid. This parallel does not affect the fact that the 
punishment for theft is "haqq Allah", but it has the 
clear object of prescribing a punishment for theft, i.e.
" 77
the protection of property.
III. 3. "Qisas" from a Father for Killing his Son:-.—i — mi l  .iimp wh. .hi n.n.m i ^ » i.umh m ■ i i i wtttm—»i m ■ ^  ■ ..Ml i — mm;—
There are two views among Muslim jurists concerning
this point. The Hanafi, Shafi*i and Hanbali schools hold
. 78
that a father who kills his son is not liable to "qisas".
—  ♦ •
The Maliki school hold an opposite view according to which
the father is liable to "qisas" for killing his son where
76. Jassas, ibid. p.lkk.
» » •
77• Shalabi, al-Fiqh al-Islami, op.cit. p.200, 20^-5.
78. Badai*, op.cit. p.235. Jassas, vol.I, p.lM+. Nawawi, 
Minhaj, vol.IV, p.17* Mughni * op.cit. pp. 285-6.
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the homicide is proved to be deliberate.
The three schools1 view is based on many arguments. 
Firstly, there is the alleged Prophetic report "no retal­
iation is due in causes of a feather who kills his son11.
Secondly, they say that "qisas" is prescribed to prevent
• •
the commission of homicide, and the love of the father
towards his sen is enough to prevent him from such an
act. Thirdly, they claim that the father was the direct
cause of his son!s being alive, therefore it is not fair
that the son should become the cause of his father*s 
80
death. To consider this evidence, it is clear that
the second and the third pieces are not based on any
legal principle, but are emotional statements which have
nothing to do with a legal topic. The third piece of
evidence, again, is in fact a mere falsification. It
is not true that the son in such a case may be the cause
of his father*s death. It is the father*s deed which
causes his death. The son was the father's victim, and
he is merely facing his punishment in being subject to 
81
"qisas". As for the Prophetic report, it is sufficient 
• •
to say that at least three of the scholars of "hadith"
79* Baji, Muntaqa, vol.VII, p,105* Kinani, al-*Iqd al-
Munazzam, vol.II, Cairojl301 A.H. (in the margin of
b. Farhun Tabsirat al-Hukkam), p.2^3.
• • •
80. See the references cited in F.N. 8l.
81. Ahmad Ibrahim, op.cit. pp.10^-8. Sh3ltut, op.cit. 
pp.398.
17*+.
declared it to bo related by untrustworthy people, such a
"hadith" cannot be used as evidence or refutation of anv 
82
legal view.
The Maliki view is supported bv the general meaning 
of the Qur*anic verses which do not distinguish one killer 
from another or one victim from another*
Again this view is su ported by all the contemporary 
writers about the subject as it is in harmony with the 
Islamic legal principles of equality as applied in the
_ 83
lav/ of "qisas".
• *
It is clear that the Kaliki view fits the idea of 
punishment administered by the state for the sake of 
justice, which allows no distinction between offenders 
based on their relationship to the victim. The majority 
view, on the other hand, considers homicide as a civil 
wrong for which,according to another Prophetic report, 
no remedy is granted to the son against his father*
82. Ibn:_ al-Mr^b!, Ahkam al-Qur'an, vol.I, Cairo, p.28 
and Qurtubi, Tafsir^ vol.II, Cairo, p.2b-9 where he 
quoted that Tirmidhi denied that report to be auth­
entic.
83. Ahmad Ibrahim and Shafttut« ibid. It is interesting 
tfiat the same principle is applied for mothers as 
well. Also the word father in Arabic means father 
and grandfather, or rather generally, all ancestors.
8b-. See al-Rawd al-Nadir, vol.IV, p.583-^? where he
quoted the*Prophetic report "you (the son) and your 
property are belonging to your father".
II
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A final remark about all these disputed points
: may be that the chosen view in e:ch point is applicable
in cases of "qisas" for wounding as well.
» •
IV. The Application of "Qisas" in Muslim Countries:-
• •
Here we will concern ourselves with considering
the possibility of applying the law of "qisas" in Egypt
• •
under the current penal code. This discussion came up/'
in relation to the explanation of tho first article of the
Egyptian penal code of 1883. A reservation was made in
this article: that no interference with the personal
rights granted according to Islamic law "shari1a" should
result from the adoption of the penal code. Soon after
the adoption of the code, a case known as the case of
"Fyrus Apha" started the conflict between the law of
"qisas" and the punishment prescribed in this code for . .
homicide. The defendant of the culprit claimed that the
prosecutor had no right to demand the infliction of the
death penalty as this demand is the "right of the relat-
8?
ives of the victim according to the Shari1a". The 
court rejected this claim and explained the reservation 
in the first article as referring only to "diya", while 
the punishment is wholly a "government task". This view
85. Bustani, Sharh Q~nun al-’Uqubat al-Misri, Cairo, 
1895, pp.15-17.
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was approved by the court of appeal in 8th September 
06
I889. The commentators, thereafter, discussed the
problem and were divided into three groups. The first
held the view that the punishments prescribed in this
code for homicide and wounding abrogated the law of
"qisas", but they allowed by the reservation in article 
• •
(1) the right that "diya" could be claimed by the injured 
party. The second held the view that "qisas" was still 
a part of the penal law according to the above-mentioned 
verdict, but a court would not operate it as it contra­
dicts the principles of modern penal law which were 
introduced into the Egyptian penal code of 1883. Such
a decision would be against the law, so this reservation
8&
should be abolished. The Egyptian penal code was
altered in 1937 but the verdict was reintroduced in
article (7) of the new code. Dr. A. Ibrahim in his
thesis "al-Qisas" defended a third view according to which
the law of "qisas" is a part of the Egyptian penal law,
. .
and the court should adopt it where all the conditions
89
laid down by the "Shari1a" are fulfilled. According to
86. Ibid. the same verdict was reintroduced in the 
Egyptian penal code of 190b-, and it remains in the 
current penal code of 1937.
87. Bustani, ibid.
88. Abu Haif, al-Diya, Ph.D. thesis, Cairo, 1932, p.13b-.
89. Ahmad Ibrahim, op.cit. pp.27-3b-.
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his view a crime of homicide or wounding has two punish­
ments determined by the law: a) the punishment of "qisas11
• •
as laid down in the "shari1 a11, and b) the punishment pre­
scribed in the penal code. A conflict between the two 
punishments may be solved on the basis of article 32 of
the 1937 penal code which allows the severer punishment
90
only to be inflicted in such a case.
Though the evidence used by Dr. Ibrahim is theoret­
ically quite sound, in practice his view cannot be accepted 
for many reasons. The most important one is the question 
of which school "madhhab" among the Islamic law schools 
the court should take as its model, and act according 
to its precepts. We have seen some of the disputed 
points among the schools but there are many more disputes. 
In a modern state, it is the legislator who must decide 
which school or opinion should be followed. It should 
not be forgotten that this difficulty was the reason 
behind recent legislation on inheritance and legacy in
most of the Muslim countries. With the law of "qisas"
. •
the situation is likely to be even worse and more intol­
erable. Moreover, a realistic view about the verdict of 
article (1) in the 1883 code or article (7) 1937 code, 
is that both articles came into the codes to satisfy the
90. Ibid. p.3^.
the country and it should not be overruled by any legis­
lation. But this was just a pretence as it is clear
that none of the "sh^ri1a" punishments were enforced by
these codes. Evidence for this is th-t no one except 
Dr. Ibrahim has expressed or supported his view, and, 
as far as I know, the criminal courts have never faced
the problem of adapting the law of "qisas" since the case
— * *
of "Fyrus Aaha" in 1889. If the law of "qisas" is to be
• •
adopted in Egypt, or in any Muslim country, this should 
be through a piece of legislation to avoid the diffi­
culties expected from its adoption according to Dr. Ibra­
him1 s view. But insofar as the circumstances remain 
the same, this is very unlikely to happen. On the con­
trary, one can say that the reservation of article (7) 
of the current penal lav/ in Egypt is on the way to being 
abolished in the new penal code now in preparation. It
was made, as has been said, for a particular reason which
no longer really exists; therefore it is meaningless to 
91
retain it.
V. Classification of Homicide:-
In the very beginning of his article "Homicide in 
Islamic Law", Prof. Anderson draws attention to the fact
91.. Ahmad Khalifa, al-Nazriya al-’Amma lil-Tajrim, 
Cairo, 1959? pp.ll5-ll6«
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that homicide in the text books of Islamic law is treated
rather as a tort than as a crime. Here the question of
the classification of homicide between these two cate-
92
gories will be considered. It may be helpful to 
start here with a definition of both tort and crime in 
order to clarify the subject, and then to see whether 
homicide is treated under Islamic law as a tort, a crime, 
or as both at the same time. Indeed, the matter of 
defining both tort and crime is far from being settled, 
but we noed not add anything to the current arguments on 
the subject. It would be better to take one of the many 
definitions provided by the writers on each subject as 
the basis for this study. As for tort, the best definit­
ion known in English law for tortious liability is that 
of Winfield: "Tortious liability arises from the breach of 
a duty primarily fixed by the law; this duty is towards 
persons generally and its breach is redress/ble by an
93 '
action for unliquidated damages.11 Tortious liability 
is distinguishable from criminal liability by the fact
92. A detailed study was done by Prof. Anderson in his
article, Homicide in Islamic Law, B.S.O.A.S. op.cit*
pp.811-8,cf. with regard to the North Nigerian prac­
tice, Prof. Anderson1s book, Islamic Law in Africa,
H.M.S.O., London, 195*+? pp.198-218.
93. Winfield on Tort, 8th Ed. by J. Jolowicz and E.
Lewis, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1967? P*3. This
definition is preferred by Clerk and Lindsell,
Torts, 13th Ed. by A. L. Armitage and others, London, 
1969? P*l*> and also by Fleming in the Law of Tort, 
3rd Ed. Sydney, 1965? p.l.
180,
that a crime is na wrong the sanction of which involves 
9b
punishment*1. Or, we can define criminal prosecution 
as concerned with the imposition of penalties upon the 
wrong-doer, in order to protect society as a whole, while 
utort liability on the other hand exists primarily to 
compensate the person injured by compelling the wrong-doer
95
to pay for the damage he has done,**
According to these definitions, one can say that the 
distinction between a tort and crime, generally speaking, 
appears in the purpose underlying the court*s decision.
If it is to compensate the wronged party, then it is a 
case of tort. . On the other hand, if it is to punish the 
wrong-doer, it is a criminal case. The wronged party 
has nothing to do with the trial or the carrying out of 
the court*s decision in the latter case, while in the 
former, he will benefit from this decision by the compen-
96
sation payable to him or the repair of his damaged property.
9*+* Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, l6th Ed. 1952, p.539> 
quoted in Winfield, ibid. p*6.
95* Fleming, ibid. p.2.
9 6. It is possible that a criminal court may order a com­
pensatory sum of money to be paid by the wrongdoer to
the injured party. But this is distinguished from
tort cases by: a) it is obtainable only in addition to 
a punishment, or an order in the nature of punishment, 
inflicted or made by the court; and b) in a crime the 
compensation which may benefit the injured party is 
not claimable in the first instance; but in a tort 
it may be, Winfield, op.cit. p.6.
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Now to turn to homicide in Islamic law, the victim
or his nearest relatives have three rights: first the
right to demand the execution of "qisas" against the
• •
murderer, second, the right to pardon the murderer in
return for his paying the fixed amount of blood-money,
and, third, the right to pardon him freely, i.e. to pardon
the offender without taking the blood-money. Here these
three rights will be considered respectively in order to
reach the correct classification of homicide. It is the
right of the nearest relative of the murdered person to
demand retaliation or ’'qisas”, and without this demand it
• *
cannot be inflicted. The jurists added, that when "qisas”
• •
is demanded it is the right of the murdered relatives to 
carry it out and he cannot be deprived of this right if
97
he is capable of using it in the proper way. This is
the view of the four Sunni schools, and it is clear that
the old tradition of personal revenge was the reason behind 
98
this view. This view, however, was supported by an 
interpretation of the Qur'anic verse "... and if any one 
is slain wrongfully we have given his heir authority" XVII, 
33. To explain this "authority" which was said to have
97. Mughni, op.cit. p.307. Badail, op.cit. p.2k2 et 
seq.^ jtJmm, op.cit. p. 17. Hattab, his commentary 
on Mukhtasar Khalil, op.cit. p.250.
98. Anderson, Homicide in Islamic Law, p.8l8.
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been given to the heir, the majority hold that it is
the authority to kill the culprit. On the other hand,
some of the commentators on the Qurfan explain it as his
(the heirfs) authority to demand the execution of "qiaas"
• •
or to remit it. But the execution itself is the ruler’s
99
or judge’s duty end not anybody else*s. In the majority
view, "qisas” is clearly a matter of private justice or 
• •
rather personal revenge. But in the other view the idea
of crime and punishment emerges. This view is held by
100
all the contemporary writers on the subject. The
strongest evidence they use to support their view is that
in the Qur’an "qisas" was described as the duty of the
* •
Muslim community, who could not carry it out except through 
a representative who would be, in this case, the judge or 
ruler. To explain this concept, Shaltut stated that the 
duties of the community in Islam are two-fold. Firstly, 
there are the duties incumbent on each individual, like 
prayer, fasting and the payment of alms, and secondly 
there are those carried out by a representative acting 
for the community, it being impossible for each individual
99- Qurtubi, Tafsir, vol.II, pp.2^ -5? 2|56. See also:_ 
Shaltut, op.cit. pp.385-88, where he cjuoted Razi, 
Qurtubi and Muhammad ’Abdu, in al-Manar (Tafsir)*
100* Shaltut, ibid. Ahmad Ibrahim op.cit. pp.215-218.
*Uda, op.cit..vollll, ]%155* SharabasT, op.cit. 
p. 134* et seq. Sayed Sabiq, Fiqh al-Sunna, vol.X, 
Kuwait, 1968, p.61-63.
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to do them. One of these is the carrying out of the
101
"qisas1 when it is demanded.
As for the second right of the victim’s relatives,
i.e. the right to remit retaliation and to receive the 
"diya", it is here where homicide appears to be more of
a tort, or completely so. The "diya" is, above all, a
compensation, fixed to satisfy the victim’s relatives. 
This is even more clear in cases where the matter is 
settled out of court for an amount greater or smaller 
than the fixed "diya". If it could be argued that it 
is a sort of punishment in cases where the "diya" is 
ordered to be paid by the court, such an argument is 
completely unfounded in the other case.
Moreover, the victim’s relatives have the right 
to remit retaliation freely, without being paid anything. 
This right may be exercised even after the court has 
ordered "qisas" to be executed against the culprit. The
M M  •  ft
Qur’an and the Sunna recommend the remission of retal- 
102.
iation. Or, to use Prof. Anderson’s words, "It is
regarded as more meritorious to remit retaliation, and 
for this reason most jurists hold that if any adult,
101. Shaltut, op.cit. p.386, attention is drawn to other 
juristic views, according to which the concept of a 
punishment for a crime is predominant, see Section 
III, above.
102. Qur’an, II, 178 and for Sunna see Abu Dawud, vol.
II, p. 1*78.
I8*f#
sane heir waives this right, the others have no option
103
but to comply.11 According to most of the jurists,
if the right of- remission was exercised, the culprit
would not be liable to any punishment. But the Maliki
school allow a discretionary punishment "ta'zir11 to be
inflicted in this case, and indeed, in all cases of
deliberate homicide where, for one reason or another
lOh
there was no retaliation. Here, unlike in the other 
viexv, the concept of crime which should be punished for
105
the sake of justice, emerges.
It can be said, therefore, that neither the con­
cept of crime nor that of tort is dominant. Therefore, 
it may be rightly said that homicide and its punishment 
in Islamic law have a dual nature, that of a crime for 
which punishment is given, and that of a tort which makes 
the wrongdoer liable to pay a compensation from which 
the wronged party may benefit. Of course, such a dual 
system, with regard to homicide, is completely divorced 
from the modern idea of crime and punishment. But it 
is the heritage of the old pre-Islamic Arabian tradition 
which was merely modified by Islamic law, and by no means
103. Ibid, p.812.
10*+. Mawwaq, op.cit. p.268. Anderson, op.cit. p.8l8.
105. See Anderson, ibid., for other points concerning 
this topic.
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completely changed. Indeed the concept of punish­
ment inflicted by the state for homicide is clearly, 
as far as the Arabs were concerned, an innovation of 
Islam, but this does not mean that there was a complete 
change in the pre-Islamic conception.
VI. A Survey of the Law of "Qisas11:-. .
Several points need to be discussed in this part
of the study. Perhaps the first interesting one is that
of the origin of the law. It is said in the Our*an that
"qisas" was prescribed for the Jews in the Torah. This 
. .
fact can be found in the Torah itself in nearly the same 
words as those recited in the Qur*an. In the Old Testa­
ment one of the ten commandments says: ,fYou shall not 
kill” and the punishment for disobedience came shortly
after it: "Whoever strikes a man so that he dies shall
107
be put to death"• The command and the punishment
for killing were both revealed again in the Qur*an in
108
almost the same words. Again the detailed law of
"qisas" for injuries which was stated in the Qurfan, V, 33>
. . . . .  -   . . _ - - -
106. Shaltut, p.335-6. Saved Sabiq, p.23. A. Ibrahim, 
p.10. However, many points of the subject were 
ignored in this study as they are beyond its 
scope, which is limited to the general principles 
of the theory of punishment. For details see the 
references mentioned throughout this chapter.
107. Exodus, 20:13 and 21:12. Nelson*s Ed. London, 1965.
108. Our*an, XVII, 33 and II, 188.
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is found in the Old Testament: Ma life for a life, an
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand,
a foot for a foot, a burn for a burn, a wound for a 
109
wound.” The rule that gives the nearest relative of
the victim the right to ask for the punishment of the
culprit, or even to carrv it out himself, is as well
110
known in the Torah.
According to some Muslim commentators, the lax/ of
”qisasM was omitted in the Bible. This view is supported 
• •
by what is written in Matthew: ”You. have heard that it
was said, *An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth1
But I say to you, do not resist one who is evil. But
if any one strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him
111
the other also.” But these verses of the Bible should
be interpreted in the light of what is said by Christ in
the same version: ”Think not that I have come to abolish
the law and the Prophets; I have come not to abolish-
112
them but to fulfil them.” The law of ”qisas” was a
• •
part of the law of Moses which Christ came to fulfil.
Its fulfilment in this context was through the addition
109. Exodus, 21: 23.^.5.
110. Numbers, 35:19?21.
111. Matthew, 5:38,39. This view was supported by A. 
Ibrahim, op.cit. p.5? but opposed by Shaltut, _ 
op.cit. p.326-7, where he quoted Muhammad !Abdu.
112. Ibid. 5:17.
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of the command of forgiveness and pardon to the concrete
law of retaliation as was laid down by Moses in the Torah,
Once more, the command of forgiveness itself was revealed
again in the Qur!an, and it cannot be said that it con-
tains any contradiction to the law of "qisas” . In
• .
accordance with this, it can be said that the three
major religions of the world approve the law of "qisas"
• .
as a part of their commandments for the control of
Mankind1  ^behaviour. Islam did not initiate the law of
"qisas". It was known before to the followers of Judaism 
• .
and Christianity. Its introduction in Islam was a re­
assertion that it is God!s law which must be obeyed.
However, we have here to consider the law of "qisas"
* .
in the light of modern penologists' theories and ideas.
It has been mentioned above that "qisas" for homicide
■ V f  •  •
means inflicting the death penalty as a punishment for
the crime, whereas "qisas" for injuries, where it can
• •
be applied, means a Corporal punishment. The notion 
of "diya" or blood-money, may be compared with the modern 
concept of compensation to the victim or the wronged 
Party,
To start with capital punishment, it is well known 
that the argument for and against it has been going on
113, See the Qur'anic verses mentioned before, together 
with many others, e.g. Surah XLI, verse 3^ *.
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for a long time. Most of the European countries have 
abolished it. The last country to do so was England.
The Abolition of the Death Penalty Act of 196?, abolish­
ed it as a punishment for murder. It can still be in­
flicted for treason, piracy with violence, and setting 
fire to H.M. ships. But this possibility seems to be, 
in the present circumstances, much more theoretical than 
practical. In other parts of the world such as the 
United States and the Arab countries, capital punishment 
is the penalty for murder. In the American States, gen­
erally speaking, it can be pronounced for deliberate
murder which falls within the category of “murder in the 
111*
first degree11 , in the Arab countries for murder committed 
deliberately. If the argument has ended in England and 
most European countries in favour of the "abolitionists11, 
it is still going on in other countries on almost the 
same grounds as in the countries which have abolished it.
So a brief account of the relevant evidence will be
115
sufficient.
lib-. See the brief account and definition given for the 0 /
law of homicide in U.S. in M. E. Wolfgang,Patterns 
in Criminal Homicide, Hew York, 19^6, pp.22-2b-.
115. As far as England is concerned, the argument seems
to be about to start again, if it has not already 
started. Since the murder of Supt. Gerald Rich­
ardson, the Blackpool Police Chief, on 23rd Aug.
1971j many voices have reopened the case, demanding 
the reintroduction of the death penalty. See 
The Times, 27.8.71. and the following three issues.
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In the first place, those who defend the abolition 
of the death penalty support their argument by the fact 
that its abolition in other countries has proved success­
ful. There are also other objections to the punishment 
itself, such as 1 the irrevocability of the death sentence, 
and the consequent danger of the execution of an innocent 
person, ... the depressing, and indeed demoralising, 
effect of execution upon both the officers of the prison
and other prisoners; the false glamour which the exist-
116
ence of the death penalty throws over murder trials.”
The supporters of the death penalty, on the other 
hand, argued that ”these arguments are erroneous. Law 
exists for the protection of the community. It is not 
necessary to show that capital punishment is an absolute 
preventative of murder, or even that it is the only 
deterrent. If it can be shown that it is more effective 
as a deterrent than any other punishment, then I shall 
be satisfied that it should be retained. To hold other­
wise is surely to forget the innocent victims of murder 
in the interests of their murderers. And I have no doubt 
at all that the fear of the gallows is the most powerful
117
of all deterrents”. As for the other points, Page
116. From Leo Page, Crime and the Community, London, 1937? 
p.131. See also Fry, Arms of the Law, London, 19^1> 
pp.181-197.
117. Page, ibid., p.132.
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stated: "The most searching examination of records for
the past fifty years (up to 1937) has failed to bring
to light a single case in which it can be suggested
118
that an innocent person has been hanged.” Experts
in prison administration are usually quoted as supporters
of capital punishment, and great stress was laid on this
by Page, as well as on the fact that social circumstances
are different from one country to another, and what may
justify the abolition in one, may not be at all relevant 
119
in another. The deterrent effect of capital punish­
ment was very often discussed, and it was always suggested
that life imprisonment would be a similar, if not a better 
120
deterrent. But, as far as the English penal system is 
concerned, life imprisonment means from ten to fifteen years 
imprisonment. The Home Secretary announced on 22 April 1970
118. Even the case of Christie and Evans, which is widely 
known as a case of hanging an innocent man, is a 
disputed case. See Hibbert, The Roots of Evil.
Penguin, 1966, pp. 1+17 et seq. and *+20-1+21. of the 
report on the case by Mr. J. Scott Henderson, QC 
presented by the Secretary of the State for the
Home Dept., to Parliament on 1*+ July 1953 (cmd 8896).
119. Page, p. 132-*+. The fullest discussion of this topic may 
be found in the Royal Commission on Capital Punish­
ment (report) 19*+9-1953. Cmd. 8932, reprinted 1965?
H.M.S.O, p.17-24- and Appendix 6 , ppl32o-80.
120. See the Royal Commission Report, ibid. and Page, 
p.132.
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that 172 convicted murderers had been released from
prison since i960, most of them having served nine
years or less of their statutory life sentence. Only
five of this number had served 12 years or more, while
nine had served six years or less and one had comolcted
121
only six months. Life imprisonment as an alternative 
deterrent to capital punishment must therefore be eval­
uated on this basis.
As far as the Arab countries arc concerned, the 
argument was imported from the West. There are two main 
trends of opinion, one for abolition and one for retention, 
as well as a middle one which holds that it must be abol­
ished in general but retained for some serious offences
122
and political crimes.
To turn to corporal punishment, it must be noted 
that this has been abolished in most countries for a 
relatively long time. Even in Arab countries, where 
it is considered part of the religious law of Islam, it 
was abolished almost everywhere early in the twentieth 
century. In some countries it was reintroduced in war­
time as a punishment for some crimes, but it no longer 
exists. An exception to this abolition is for crimes
121. The Times, 23rd April 1970.
122. See Ibrahim, al-Qisas, pp.236-*+2. 'Uda, vol. I, 
pp.731-2. SharabasiJ pp.59-11^5 where he quoted 
some lawyers1 and judges' views as well as those 
of religious men.
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committed in prisons and by members of the national
123
forces during their service. We need not discuss 
the different views on corporal punishment as there is 
no practical value in this. From the theoretical point 
of view, all that is said about capital punishment may 
be applied to corporal punishment as well. The topic 
was fully discussed, however, in the Report of the 
Departmental Committee on Corporal Punishment in England, 
1938* The Committee's unanimous opinion at the end of 
their inquiry was that "corooral punishment was of no
121+
special value as a deterrent and should be abolished. 11 
Once again, the argument was imported into the Arab 
countries, but it was less important then that of
125
capital punishment.
The other punishment for homicide or wounding, in 
Islamic law, is the blood-money, or 11 diya" for homicide 
and "arash" for wounding. It has been seen that the "diya11 
or "arash" must be paid to the victim in cases of injury
123. 'Uda, ibid. pp.712-*+. Compare for corporal punishment 
in England, Fry, op.cit. p.108 and appendix F. 
pp.235-6.
12b-. Fry, op.cit. p.23b-, see the recommendation of the 
committee in its report Cmd.568b-, pp. 12b— 7 (1963 
publication). The ^dvisory council on the^treatment 
of £ffenders, came*to largely the same conclusion, 
see the Report on Corporal Punishment, Cmd. 1213, 
i960, pp.26-8 . (1961 publication).
125. See 'TJda, op.cit. pp.708 et seq. A. Ibrahim, op. 
cit. pp.2b-2-6.
193.
and to his nearest relative(s) in cases of homicide. 
According to 'Uda, "diya" is a compensation to the 
victim and his relatives as well as a punishment in­
flicted upon the culprit. He argued that it is a pun­
ishment because it is determined by the law and when the 
victim or his relative remit retaliation freely (without
taking diya), the culprit may be punished by a discret-
126
ionary punishment "ta'zir". But this view may be 
objected to as its evidence is not, as claimed, the 
concrete law on the subject. The amount of "diya" deter­
mined was seen above to be by no means mandatory. The 
parties concerned may agree to settle the matter for 
more, or even for less, than the amount determined for 
the case. The discretionary punishment is not universally 
agreed upon. Some jurists allow it to be imposed while 
others do not agree, or at least have hot expressed 
their view in relation to it.
So the preferable view about "diya" may be that it 
is an institution established in order to satisfy the 
victim or his relatives by compensating them for the 
harm suffered. It may have some penal function similar 
to that of punishment, but that is only an incidental or 
secondary function. The idea of compensation to those
126. 'Uda, vol.I, pp.668-9.
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who suffered harm or damage is well established in Western
127
law systems in civil procedure. As for criminal pro­
cedure, a compensatory system is not yet common in Western 
countries. It was discussed in relation to victims of 
crimes of violence in England and Wales in two reports
submitted to the House of Commons in 1961 and 196V; but
128
has not yet entered current legislation. The discussion
in the two reports concentrated on the idea that the state
may pay the proposed compensation in order to help those
who were affected by a crime of violence. It is here
that we see the difference between the idea as introduced
in Western thought, and as it is known in Islamic law.
It was suggested that the state must take the responsibility
of paying the "diya" or blood-money in Muslim countries in
cases where the culprit could not afford it, but still
it is primarily the culprit's responsibility, while in
the above-mentioned reports it was proposed as a social
129
duty to be carried out by the state.
127. See the references mentioned above on the Law of Tort.
128. Cmd. lb-06, 2323 respectively, published by H.M.S.O.
129. Ibid., and 'Uda, vol.I, p . 677 et seq. It is notice­
able that he was speaking there about the "diya" as a 
punishment for quasi-deliberate and accidental homi­
cide, but what he stated can be generalized to all 
cases in which the "diya" is due (see especially p.678) 
An interesting discussion concerning the ..difference 
between compensation and punishment is in Qarafi,
Furuq, vol.I, p.213, where he is inclined to the 
classification of "diya" as a compensation not as a 
punishment.
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It is interesting, however, that the 1971 Criminal 
Justice Bill contained a section dealing with compen­
sation orders against convicted persons. Under this 
Bill, it is proposed that a court may order the offender 
to pay compensation in respect of any personal injury 
or any loss of, or damage to, property caused by the 
offence for which the offender has been tried before 
the court, or any offence which was taken into consid­
eration by it. If this Bill gained the approval of 
Parliament, the compensation order may be rightly com­
pared with the rules of "diya" and "arash" in Islamic 
law.
196.
CHAPTER IV 
THE DISCRETIONARY PUNISHMENT 
"AL-TA'ZIR11
It has been previously mentioned that the Islamic
penal system recognizes three kinds of punishment: "Hadd"
 , •
punishment, "Qisas" and "Ta^ir". In the first chapter
• •
we dealt with the "hadd" punishment, in the third with
the law of "Qisas11, while the second chapter was devoted
• •
to discussing two punishments traditionally classified 
as "hadd". There, the punishments for wine-drinking and 
apostasy were shown to be "tafzir" punishments and not, 
as traditionally categorized, "hadd" punishments. Here, 
the third kind of punishment recognized in Islamic penal 
system will be discussed.
I. Definition:-
Etymologically, the word "ta!zir" is derived from
the verb "azar", which means to prevent, to respect and 
1
to reform. The verb was used in its first and second
2
meanings in the Qur*an. However, in Islamic legal writing 
"ta*zir" is a punishment aimed firstly at preventing the 
criminal from committing further crimes, and secondly, at
1. Mukhtar al-Sihah, op.cit. under " fazr". *Amer al- 
Ta1zir, op.cit.‘p.3o.
2. Surah, V, verse 12. VII, 157> and XLVIII, 9*
i
!■
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reforming him. This may remind us of the confusion 
between the reformative and deterrent theories of pun­
ishment. In the Islamic penal system, "ta*zir" is a 
typical case of this confusion. In his well known book,
"Tabsirat al-Hukkam", Ibn Farhun tried to define the aim 
• • • 
of "ta'zir" by saying that it is a "disciplinary, reform-
3
ative and deterrent punishment ...M. This indicates 
the fact that the two aspects, i.e. reformative and de­
terrent, are combined here. Since "disciplinary11 can 
mean nothing but deterrent, it is right to say that it 
is the real basis of "ta*zir" while reformation became, 
in fact, a means to deter.
However, "ta^ir" was defined as "discretionary pun­
ishment to be delivered for transgression against God, or
against an individual for which there is neither fixed
If
punishment, nor penance (&r kaffara)".
This definition excludes, as well, all crimes for
which the "qisas" is prescribed. Where "hadd", "kaffara", 
• • • 
or "qisas" are applied, "ta'zir" cannot intervene or re- 
* •
place any of them. It is possible that "tafzir" appears 
as an alternative (and/or) additional punishment in some 
cases, as will be seen shortly, but not as the sole
3. Ibn Farhun, Tabsirah, vol.II, p.200.
U-. Sarakhsi, Mabsut, vol.IX, p.36. ShirbinI, Mughni
al-Muhtaj, vol.iv, Cairo, (n.d.), p.176#
punishment.
According to some orientalists, "ta'zir” punishment
is not mentioned in the Qur'an. The Sunna have very
6
little to record about it. This view leads us to
investigate the possible origin "asl" of the"ta'zir"
punishment in both the Qur'an and Sunna. From this
starting point we will discuss the different aspects of
the punishment with special reference to "ta'zir11 by the
death penalty, and by seizure of property, as well as
to the possibility of inflicting "ta'zir" in addition
to other punishments, e.g. "hadd" or "qisas".
. _ . .
II. "Ta'zir" in the Qur'an and Sunna:-
It must be admitted that the word "ta'zir" was never 
used in the Qur'an or in the Sunna in the sense in which 
it is used in Islamic legal writing. On the other hand, 
the Qur'an and the Sunna referred to some types of crimes 
for which there is no fixed punishment and where it was 
left to the judge or the ruler to decide what sort of 
punishment to impose, and how to inflict it. One instance
of these crimes was mentioned in the Qur'an. "If two men
7
among you are guilty of lew&ness, punish them both."
5. Ibn Nujaym, al-Bahr al-Ra1iq_Sharh Kanz al-Daqa*iq, 
vol.V, p.V+ et seq. Ibn al-Humam,*Fath,al-Qadir, 
vol.iv, p.211 et seq.
6. e.g. Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol.IV, p.J?10, under 
"Ta'sir".
7. Surah IV, verse 16.
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This verse, according to the commentators, refers to
8
homosexual relations between men. The order npunish 
them both" is given to the ruler of the community 
without determining the sort of punishment or its amount, 
or how it must be carried out. The decision therefore, 
is entirely left to the ruler or the judge.
Another case in which the authority to punish is 
given in the Qur'an in similarly flexible terms as in 
the above case, is to be found in verse 3*+ of Surah IV.
The verse runs 11 As to those women on whose part you fear 
disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (next)
9
refuse to share their beds, and (last) beat them (lightly)." 
This verse is concerned with the treatment of wives who 
disobey their husbands. Although the methods of dealing 
with such wives are laid down and were to be used con­
secutively, there is a lot left to the discretion of the
husband, who is the head of the household. He is to have
10
a free hand in deciding how to use his authority.
It was this authority which some jurists considered 
as the origin of the "ta'zir" punishment, "al-asl fi-1
8. Ibn Kathir, Tafsir, vol.I, Cairo, p.b-62. Sayed_Qutb, Fi- 
Zilal al-Quran, vol.IV, p.257* Ibn al-Jawzi, Zad al- 
Masir fi!ilm al-Tafsir, vol.II, Beirut, 196?, p.3^.
9* Here and for the ebove verse, see Yusuf Ali's transaltion.
10. For the husband^s authority over the house, or rather, 
the wife, the Qur!an says "men are in charge of women,
because Allah has made the one of them to excel the 
other" SUrah IV, Verse 3?+.
11
ta'zir”• This view may be interpreted by way of ana­
logy "qiyas". That is to say that the husband as the 
ruler of the basic unit of society has boon given such 
an authority in order to safeguard the interest of his 
unit and its members. Consequently, the ruler of the 
whole society and his representatives, e.g. the judges, 
must have the same authority over the society or the parts 
of it with which they are concerned. In this way the 
ruler, and consequently the judge, are enabled to safe­
guard the society's interest when it is threatened by 
actions or omissions which fall outside the very limited
area of the fixed punishments "al-budud” and the punish-
^  •
ment of retaliation "al-qisas”.
A Third verse in the Qur'an may be even more directly
concerned with "ta'zir”. In this verse the Qur'an puts
forward a general principle: "The recompense of an evil
12
is an evil the like of it." This verse indicates a 
legal rule concerned with the treatment of any misdeed, 
i.e. that it cannot be punished with anything but an equal 
misdeed. This "equality” does not indicate the minimum 
penalty but the maximum one. For the next version of the 
verse nuns: "But if a person forgives and makes reeoneil-
13
iation, his reward is due from God". As far as I know,
11. Mughni al-Muhtaj, op.cit. p.176.
12.) Surah XLII, Verse ifO, see Arberry'ss translation for
13.) the first part of the varsc, and Yusuf1 Ali for the 
second part of it.
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this verse "The recompense of an evil ..." has not been 
mentioned in this context. But I see it as a va^id 
source for the law of "ta'zir" because it is assumed 
that the person who is liable to "ta'zir" has done what 
is considered evil to either the community or to another 
person. His punishment, therefore may be justified by 
the rule laid down in this verso. At the same time, the 
other two verses in Surah IV may be understood as appli­
cations of this principle.
Accordingly' it cannot be said, as it has boon that 
the "Qur'an does not know this kind of punishment". On 
the contrary the Our'an laid down the principle from
%/ •* i i
which the "ta'zir" punishment was deduced and also 
mentioned some of its applications. It was the jurists' 
reluctance to admit the Qur'anic origin of this punish­
ment which led to siich a dubious statement. By paying 
more attention to these three verses one may say that 
the legal principles of'ta'zir" are expressed in the 
Qur'an, by implication, if not directly.
In the Sunna, more examples and cases of "ta'zir" 
may be found. All these cases were used afterwards, 
in one way or another, to construct the juristic form­
ulation of the "ta'zir" as part of the Islamic penal 
system. So far as the jurists are concerned, they are 
indebted to these Prophetic reports for their knowledge
202 :.
and understanding of ’’ta’zir”. It is true that the 
decisions of the Prophet’s companions relating to 
’’ta’zir1 appear more clearly in the manuals of Islamic 
law, especially the decisions of ’Omar. But these 
decisions, in turn, are based on Pronhetic reoorts and 
practices. Moreover, there are many examples of 
Prophetic reports concerned with ’’ta’zir”. The following 
are some of them, taken from both the words and actions 
of the Prophet.
The most important example of Prophetic practice 
concerning ’’ta’zir” punishment is the punishment for 
wine-drinking. In chapter II the view that it was a 
’’ta’zir” punishment was fully explained, so we do not 
need to concentrate on it here. This was by no means 
the only example. Once a companion of the Prophet in­
jured a slave of his, as a punishment for his having 
hadl sexual relations with a female slave. When the 
Prophet saw the injured slave, he freed him. This was 
a punishment for the slave’s owner because of the harm
15 - - -
he had done to him. Muslim and Abu-Dawud related a 
report according to which the Prophet deprived a man
lb*. See Ibn al-Qavvim. Ighathat al-Lahfan, vol.I, Cairo, 
1939? p.333* Shalabi, Ta'lil al-Ahkam, op.cit. 
p.60-6l in relation to wine-drinking.
15. Ibn al-Qayyim, ibid. p._332._ The report_was related 
by Ahmad b. Hanbal, Abu-Dawud and Ibn Majah.
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of his share of the sooils of a battle because of a
16
misdeed committed against the Commander of the army.
Among the Prophet1s companions who did not go with him 
to the battle of Tab’uk, were Ka'b b. Malik, Murarah b* 
al-Rabif, and Hilal b. Urnaya. After the Prophet1s return 
to al-Madina some of those who had not gone with him 
gave him false excuses, but these three men told the 
truth, which was that they had had no real reason to 
stay at home in al-Madina and not join the army. The 
Prophet ordered the Muslims to avoid any contact with 
them; their wives were not even allowed to share their 
beds. Fifty days later, a 0ur*anic verse was revealed 
saying that Allah had forgiven them and accepted their
17
repentance. This Prophetic order to avoid and ignore
the men, was a "ta^ir11 punishment imposed upon them
18
for their absence from the Muslim army.
To turn to the Prophet1 s words concerning ,,talzirM, 
punishment, again we must refer to chapter II where the 
punishment for apostasy was mentioned. It was explained 
there that the penalty for apostasy can be nothing but a 
sort of ,!tafzirfl. Once more it is not the only Prophetic 
saying concerning the subject.
16. Ibid. and I!lam al-Muwaqq*in, vol.II, op.cit. p.98.
17. Qur*an, Surah IX, Verse 118.
18. Ibn al-Qayylm, Zad al-Ma*ad, vol.III^ Cairo, 1379 A.H. 
pp.11-13. See also Ighathat al-Lahfan, op.cit. p.332.
For the theft of fruit of a value less than that 
for which the "hadd" punishment may be applied, the 
Prophet said that the thief must pay Mdouble its value 
and be liable to punishment." The "doubled value" is 
a fine which can be interpreted as a "ta*zir". But a 
more obvious reference to "tafzir" is the last statement 
of the report: "and be liable to punishment", because 
both the kind and amount of punishment here are left
19
entirely to the discretion of the judge.
In relation to the giving of alms, the Prophet said
"who gives them will be rewarded (by God), and who
refuses to give them, from him they will be taken, and
we will take one half of his property, not for Muhammad
or his family but for the state treasury." This fining
20
of the offender is also a sort of "tafzir" punishment.
It is a Qurfanic command that if a debtor is in
financial straits, the creditor must give him a chance
to pay his debt. But if a rich man refused to pay his
debt the Prophet allowed him to be punished. In this
report, again, the Prophet did not explain what kind of
punishment he meant to be inflicted for this deed or its 
21
amount. This is, I think, because such a situation
19. Mishkat al-Masabih, vol.II, p.lb-6 and Ibn al-Qayyim, 
ibid.
20. Ibid. p.331*
31. Mishkfrt al-Masabih, op.cit. p.112.
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must be dealt with in the light of the circumstances
of both the creditor and the debtor, as well as the
general financial situation of the community at a given
moment. What is important however, is that this report
represents a case for which the Prophet ordered a “ta’zir” 
22
punishment.
In the light of this we reach the conclusion that 
“ta’zir1 punishment is based 011 the Our’anic verses 
previously mentioned, and on the above Prophetic reports. 
It is true that the development of this system of punish­
ment was expressed at a comparatively later stage by the 
different schools of law. But this does not justify the
claim that the Qur’an does not know it, and the Sunna
23
have very little to record about it.
It was important to illustrate the Qur’anic and 
Prophetic origins of this punishment for two reasons; 
the first is that it has not been examined, and the 
second is that it will help to determine our viewpoiht 
in many of the ensuing topics.
22. I have omitted many other reports relating to the 
subject because it may be argued that they were 
invented (by the jurists) to support one or the 
other of the different views about this punishment.
23. Compare the article ”ta’zir” in the Encyclopaedia 
of Islam, vol.IV.
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Ill, Kinds of ,tTa!zirn Punishment:-
Unlike the "hadd" punishment or the punishment of 
g #
"qisas", "ta'zir" punishments are not determined in spec- 
• •
ific terms. The judge, in cases of crimes for which
"ta'zir" punishment is prescribed, has a wide variety
of punishments from which he can choose the one suitable
for the particular crime, according to the criminals
circumstances, his record, and his psvchological con- 
2k
dition. The judge's authority is limited by his 
obligation not to order a punishment which is not allow­
ed by Islamic law. He cannot, for example, order the 
offender to be whipped naked.
Here the punishments allowed as "ta'zir" will be 
briefly discussed; but the most important ones will be 
dealt with in more detail. However, these punishments 
are by no means the only punishments which could be 
applied in cases of "ta'zir". That is to say, any pun­
ishment which may serve the purpose of "ta'zir” , i.e. to 
prevent any further crime, and reform the offender, can 
be used.as long as it does not contradict the general 
principles of Islamic law. Therefore, the ensuing pun­
ishments represent what was known, and actually used, in
2k-. Ibn Nujaym, al-Bahr al-Ra'iq, vol.V, p.kk. !Uda, 
op.cit. vol.I, pp1685-708.
25. 'Uda, op.cit, p.lk3*
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Isl amic legal texts and practice, but any other useful
26
punishment could be legally used.
Apart from the determination of the punishment, the 
ruler or the judge is traditionally granted the right to 
determine whether an act is criminal or not. This is the 
key concept of 11 ta1 zir" / it is defined as a punishment 
for "any transgression". transgressions cannot be fore­
seen, so this right was granted to the ruler, or the judge, 
to meet the needs of the societv and protect it against
27
all sorts of transgression.
III. 1. Admonition "al-Wn 1z":-
Admonition means reminding the person who has committed
a transgression that he has done an unlawful thing. It
was prescribed in the Qur’an (IV, 3*+) ns the first stage
in dealing with wives in cases of disobedience. The
purpose of admonition is to remind the offender if he had
forgotten that he had done something or to inform him if
28
he was not aware that he had done something wrong. This
sort of treatment of the offender must be restricted to
those who commit minor offences for the first time, pro­
vided that the judge thinks it is enough to reform the
29
offender and prevent him from any further transgression.
26. Ibid. p.687*
27. Qarafi, Furuq, vol.IV, p.179-80.
28. fAmer, al-Ta*zir, op.cit. p.369. Where he quoted Ibn 
'Abdin.
29. *Uda, op.cit. p.702.
III. 2. Reprimand "al-Tawbikh11 ?-
2C8
Reprimand may be through any word or act which the 
judge feels to be sufficient to serve the purpose of 
f,tarzirM. The jurists usually refer to some specific 
words and acts as a means of reprimand, but it is not 
necessary to concentrate on these means as they vary 
according to the offence and to the offender. One ex­
ample of this punishment led a companion of the Prophet
to free his slaves and repent of having insulted some- 
30
body.
HI. 3 . Threat ”al-TahdidM:-
Threat is a f,ta,zirl! punishment which was supposed to 
serve its, aims by making the offender fear the punishment 
he was threatened with. It may be carried out by threat­
ening the offender with punishment if he repeated what 
he had done, or by pronouncing a sentence against him 
and delaying its execution till the offender committed 
another offence (within a limited period of time). Besides 
the normal condition of the suitability of the ,!tafzirn
31
punishment, the threat must be sincere.
30. Mishkat al-Ma^abih, voHII, p.586 where he quoted 
Bayhaqi in Shu1ab al-Iman.
31. 1Uda, ibid. p.703.
239.
This way of dealing with offenders who commit
offences punishable by "ta’zir” may be compared with the
modern penal concept of suspended sentences which is
known to almost all modern penal systems. Under the
English Criminal Justice Act of 1967 (secti?n 39), for
instance, a court which passes a sentence of imprisonment
for a term of not more than two years may suspend the
sentence for a specified period. This period is known
as the "operational period" of the suspended sentence,
> /
and may not be less than one yearVor more than three
i
years. Under the Islamic penal system the matter of 
determining the "operational period" is left entirely 
to the judge’s discretion. Another difference between 
the two systems is that under English law a court has no 
power to suspend a sentence other than that of imprison­
ment, whereas traditional Islamic law grants the judge
the authority to suspend any sentence whether of impris-
32
onment or anything else.
III. 1+. Boycott "al-Ha.1r"
Boycott as a "ta’zir" punishment is recommended by 
the Qur’an (IV, 3*+) 5 and it was practiced by the Prophet 
in the case of the men who did not attend the army in the
32. Cross and Jones, Introduction to Criminal Law, p.35^; 
The Sentence of the Court, a Handbook for Courts 
on the Treatment of Offenders, H.M.S.O., London,
1970.
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battle of Tabuk. It was also inflicted by fQJmar upon 
a man who used to ask about, and discuss, difficult words
_  _  3b
in the Qur!an in order to confuse peoples1 minds.
According to some writers, boycott as a punishment 
is not practical in our time because it was based on a 
powerful religious feeling among the people which no 
longer exists. The defendants of this punishment may 
argue that it csn be inflicted by preventing the offender 
from communicating with other people, but then it would
35
be a sort of imprisonment rather than the intended boycott.
III. 5. Public Disclosure "al-Tashhir":-
Public disclosure has been known as a punishment 
since the earliest Islamic era. The Prophet sent a man 
to collect alms 1 zakat'1 and when he came back to al- 
Madina he gave some of what he had collected to the Prophet, 
and kept the rest, claiming that it had been given to him 
as a present. Then the Prophet addressed the people:- 
111 appointed one of you to do some public services; 
afterwards he divided what he had collected into two
33. See above, and Muslim, op.cit. vol.VIII, p.106-13. 
Ibn-Taymiyya, al-Siyasa* al-Sharriya!, Cairo, 1951>
p.120-21.
3^. Ibn Farhun, Tabsirat al-Hukkam, ibid., p.202.
* . •
35. *Amer, up.cit. p.375*
portions: one for the public treasury and the other for 
himself; if the appointed man had stayed in his father.1 s 
or his mother1s home would anyone have given him a present
v ;36
or not^
According to Ghurayh, a well-known judge who served 
'Omar and f'Ali, the false witness must be nublicly ident-
37
ified so as to warn people not to trust him. On this
38
point all the schools of Islamic law ,^ re agreed. The 
means of public disclosure was usually the taking of 
the offender, by some of the judge's representatives, -to 
every part of the city and telling the people that he 
had committed an offence for which he had received a 
"ta’zir11 punishment. The purpose of this punishment was 
to call the public's attention to the fact that this
39
offender was not to be trusted.
Public disclosure in our days cannot be made in the 
same way. As the media of public information have develop­
ed enormously it may be done by publishing the court 
judgement in the newspapers, or by broadcasting it on the 
radio and the television, or by any other means which 
will tell people about the offence.
36. Mishkat, al-Masabih, vol.I. p.560.
37. Sarakhsi, Mabsut, vol.l6 , Cairo, p.lk-5.
38. Sarakhsi, ibid, Bahuti, Kashshaf al-Qina1, vol.VI, 
Riyad (n.d,), p.125. Shirbini, Mughni al-Muhtaj, 
vol.IV, p. 178. Ibn Farhun, ibid. p.21k-.
39. Ibid.
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According to the jurists, this punishment is rele­
vant for offences where the trustworthiness of the off­
ender is questionable. But it may be used for any other 
crime where the judge thinks it suitable.
Finally, it must be noted that it is an additional 
punishment. The jurists usually prescribe other punish­
ments such as imprisonment or beating for offences tohere
b-0
they also advise public disclosure.
III. 6. Fines and Seizure of Property flal-Gharamah Wal- 
Musdarah11:-_         , ________________ ___ _
It has been said before that the Prophet imposed and
ordered financial punishments as "ta'zir1 punishments.
But the jurists are divided into three groups as to its
legality: according to some it is illegal to punish by
fine or by seizure of property, the second group regards
it as legal, and the third group regards it as legal
only if the offender doesn't repent.
The first view is held by the Hanafi school and some
of the Shafi'i school. According to Malik, Ahmad b.
Hanbal, Vou Yusuf (the famous Hanafi jurist), and some
. •   . .  _
h-0. BahutI, op^cit. .pp.127-128. Sarakhsi, op.cit. pp.lb-5
et seq. 'Amer, op.cit. PP„388-b-19.
b-1. IbnJNTujaym, ~l-3ahr al-Ha'iq, vol.V, p«lib-._lbn al-
Humam, Fath al-Qadir, vol.IV, p^212. ShubramulsI,
his commentary on Sharh al-Minhaj of al-Rarali, vol. 
VII, Cairo, 1292 k.E ., ’p. 17b-.
of the Sha.fi1 is1, financial punishments are allowed as
k2
"ta'zir" punishments. The Hanafi commentators explained 
that the view of Abu Yusuf means that the judge or the 
ruler does not take the offender's money for the public 
treasury, but in order to keep it away from him until he 
has repented. They support this view by saying that no­
body is allowed to take another's money without legal 
reason (bisabab shar'i). If it seeras, afterwards, that 
the offender will not repent then the ruler may order
b-3
the money to be spent on public requirements. The
reason they give for this explanation is that to allow
the judge or the ruler to take the offender's money for
the public treasury straight away, would be open to abuse
1+1+
by unjust judges or rulers.
On the other hand, the jurists who deny financial 
punishment as a legal "ta'zir" punishment claim that it 
was legalized in the beginning of Islam but abrogated 
afterwards. The first jurist who expressed this view 
is the Hanafi jurist Tahawi in his famous book 'Sharh
b-2. Ibid. Ibn 'Abdin, voUIV, p.6l. Ibn Farhun, p.203. 
Ibn al-Qayyim,_al-Turuq al-Hukmiyya, Csiro, 1961, 
p.286-290. Bahuti,’vol.VI, p.125. Compare Fath al- 
Qadir, ibid.
b-3. Ibn Nujaym, ibid., vol.IV, p.blf. Ibn 'Abdin, vol. 
IV, p.61. SaJ^di Jelbl, his commentary on al-'Inaya 
.Sharh al-Hi day a, in the margin of Fath al-Qadir, 
vol.IV, p.212,
kk. Ibid.
itions). This abrogation claim was strongly rejected
by Ibn Taymiyya and his successor Ibn al-Qayyim on evid­
ence taken mainly from the Prophet's practices and from
*+6
some of his companions' decisions. Ibn al-Qayyim added
"these are well-known cases which have been truly related.
Those wTho claim th ■ t financial punishment was abrogated
are wrong. Their view may be refuted by the cases ascribed
to great companions of the Prophet. Neither the Qur'an
nor the uunna can help them in supporting their claim,
nor is there any consensus about it. Even jf there was
a consensus, it would have no power to abrogate the Sunna.
The only thing they may say is: in our schools' view it
is not allowed; that means they take their own view as a
k7
standard of what is accepted and what is not." Other 
Kanbali, Hanafi and Maliki commentators hold this view, 
and defend it mainly in Ibn al-Qayyim*s words. According 
to Ibn al-Qayyim*s evidence, both parts of the financial
Sa'di Jelbi, ibid. Ibn Nujaym, ibid. p.¥+. Ibn 'Abdin, 
ibid.
*+6. Ibn Taymiyya, al-Hisba fi'l-Islam, Cairo, (ti.d.), p.*+3. 
Ibn_al-Qayyim, al-Turuq al-Hufamiyya, op.cit. pp.286-90. 
Ighathat al-LahfanJ vol.Ij. pp.231-3. A detailed dis­
cussion may be found in 'Amer, al-Ta'zir, pp.331-6.
*+7. al-Turuq al-Hukmiyya, p.287-8.
*+8. Ibn-Farhuna Tabjsirah, vol.II^ p.202-3. Bahuti, op.cit. 
p.125. Tarabulsi, Mu'in al-Hukkam, Cairo, A.H. p.190.
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punishment (i.e. fine and seizure of property) are 
allowed in Islamic law. In some cases its amount was 
determined by the Prophet, e.g. in the cases of theft 
which does not amount to the minimum value required 
for inflicting the "hadd1 punishment, refusing payment 
of alms, etc. But in other cases it is not so determined 
and it is left to the judge to decide how much the cul­
prit should be fined. Indeed, there is nothing to stop 
the lawmaker of any Muslim country from listing crimes 
and their fines as he requires them to be applied by 
the courts.
Therefore, the statement that: "there are no fines
b-9
in Islamic lav/" is incorrect. The most which can be 
claimed is that fines, or rather, financial punishments 
are a subject of controversy, but it cannot be 
justifiably said that the Islamic penal system does 
not know this sort of punishment.
III. 7* Imprisonment t!al-Kabsn :-
Imprisonment in Islamic law is of two kinds: im­
prisonment for a definite term and imprisonment for/an 
indefinite term. Imprisonment for a definite term can 
be inflicted for minor offences, as the jurists prefer
b-9. J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, p.176, 
and compare Shaltut, al-Islam, op.cit. p.31*+»
21$.
flogging as the punishment for major or dangerous "ta’zir" 
50
offences. The minimum period for imprisonment is one
51
day* But the schools hold different views about the
maximum period. The Maliki, Hanafi and HanbalT schools
• •
do not fix a maximum period for the "ta'zir" imprison­
ment as it varies for each offence and from one individual
52 _
to another. According to the Shafi'i school, the 
maximum period of imprisonment is one month for invest­
igation and six months as punishment, and in any case it
must last for less than a year. This view is based on
o/ —  yi,rx
an analogy "qiyas" rrcmx the punishment for adultery
/
committed by an unmarried person. Banishment for adult­
ery is for one year, so the "ta'zir" punishment, if it 
is to be imprisonment, must not be longer than that of
an unmarried adulterer, which is a "hadd" punishment,
_ _ .
according to the Shafi'i jursits. However, among the
Shafi'i jurists there is another view which is similar
5b
to that of the three schools. Therefore, one may say
50. 'Tfda, vol.I, p.69*f.
51. Mu^hnl, vol.X, Manar Ed. Cairo, p.3^7-8. Ibn Farhun, 
op.cit. p.225*
& -  -  -
52. Ibn Farljun. ibid. Abu Yaila, al-Aljkam al-Sultaniya, 
Cairo, 1938, p.263. al-Durr al-Mukhtar, in the 
margin of Iiashiyat Ibn 'Abdin, vol.IV, Cairo, 1966,
p.62.
53. Tabsirat al-Hukkam, op.cit. p.225* 'Uda, op.cit. 
pp.$9^-5* 'Amer, op.cit. pp.309-10.
5b. This view was ascribed to MawardT and Kamli, see the 
references cited above.
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that the majority view is that the judge is free to 
determine the maximum period for a definite term of 
imprisonment, as he sees fit for the criminal and his 
crime. It is allowed, according to all the schools 
of Islamic law, to inflict imorisnnment as an additional
55
punishment if the circumstances so require.
As for imprisonment for an uhlimited term it is 
imposed on habitual crimingIs who, in the judges1 view, 
cannot be reformed by ordinary punishments. All the 
schools of Islamic law authorised this punishment to 
last either till the criminals1 repentance or his
56
death in the case of a dangerous criminal. This sort 
of imprisonment is similar to that of the "hadd" punish- 
ment for armed robbery "hirabah" where one of the pun- 
ishments prescribed is banishment, interpreted as im­
prisonment, to be inflicted till the achievement of the 
criminal's repentance, or until his death. However, 
there is an important condition for the infliction of 
this punishment as "ta'zir", i.e. it can only be in­
flicted so long as the reform of the offender by any
55. Fath al-Qadir, vol.IV, p.2l6. Abu^Ya'la^ op.cit,.
p.2o7. Ibn Fs.rhun, p.225-6. Ansari, Asna al-Matalib 
Shqrh Rawd al-Talib, vol.IV, Cairo (n.d.), p.199*
56. Ibn_'Abdin, op.cit. p.67A Ibn Farfcun, p.227. _
Bahutti, Kashshaf al-Qina*, vol.VI, p.126. Ramli, 
Nihayat al-Muhtaj, vol.VIII, Cairo, (n.d.) p.272.
218.
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other punishment is impossible. It is on this condition 
only, that unlimited imprisonment is justified.
Another "ta'zir" punishment, with which the modern 
writers on the subject have dealt separately, is banish­
ment "al-nafy"• "Nafy" was referred to when we dealt with 
the punishment for adultery. We said that the Hanafi 
school consider this punishment as an additional "ta'zir" 
punishment for the unmarried adulterer, while other
schools consider it as "hadd", regarding the "hadd"
• • 
punishment for the unmarried person as two-fold, i.e.
58
one hundred lashes and one year's banishment. Apart 
from adultery, banishment is considered as a "ta'zir" 
punishment for those who may encourage other people to
59
imitate their conduct.
Banishment may last either for the period mentioned
in the sentence, or until the offender's behaviour is
60
believed to have improved. However, banishment nowadays ryf
cannot be anything but imprisonment. Banishment may be 
from one place, e.g. from one city to another in the same 
country, or from the criminal's country of origin (or
57* Bee ibid.
58. See above, the chapter on "hadd" punishment.
59. Abu Ya'la, op.cit. p.263. Ibn Farhun, op.cit. p.225.
.
60. 'Uda, op.cit. p.609-700.
residence) to a foreign country. The first does not 
serve the purpose of banishment which is to prevent 
the offender from encouraging others to imitate him. 
The second is not possible today, because no country
It was common in many European countries during colonial 
times to banish offenders to a colony, but this cannot 
be done any longer. Therefore, I see banishment nowadays 
as imprisonment.
law. It has already been referred to as a "hadd" pun­
ishment for the crime of "qadhf" (80 lashes), and for
As a "ta'zir1 punishment, it was mentioned when we dealt 
with the crime of wine-drinking. The point which will . 
be discussed here is the maximum number of lashes allowed 
in "ta'zir" cases. The problem, for Muslim jurists, 
is known as the possibility of exceeding the "hadd"
The most liberal view in this context is the 
Malik! one. According to Malik, the "ta'zir" punishment
offenders from other countries (as immigrants)
Mlogging is a common punishment in Islamic, penal
adultery#,committed by an unmarried person (100 lashes).
punishment in cases of "ta'zir" "hal yutajawaz bil-ta'zir 
miqdar al-hadd".
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may exceed the MhaddM punishment as long as the judge
61
or the ruler thinks the circumstances require it.
The opposite view is held by the ZahirT and Zaydi schools,
and part of the Eanbali school, who believe that flogging
• 62 
as a " t a ^ i r ” punishment cannot exceed ten lashes.
Intermediate views are held by the Hanafi and Shaft1"!
schools and some Hanbali scholars. There is no unan-
imity ?bowt the maximum number of lashes among the
holders of this view; according to some it is 7? lashes,
others hold it to bo 99> - - some fix it at 395 and
63
others do not allow more than 20,
This controversy is based on two Prophetic reports.
The first,in which the Prophet forbade more than ten
lashes to be inflicted exceut in cases of "hadd" punish-
-  -  6 1 f  *
rnent, was related by Muslim and Bukhari. The second 
was related by Bayhaqi; in this report the Prophet 
labelled those who exceed the limits of the "hadd" 
punishment, in a "non-hadd" crime, as transgressors,
61. Ibn Farhun, op.cit, pp.20k-2-5. Zurqani, his comment­
ary on Mukhtasar Khalil, vol.VIII, Cairo, (M.d.) p.lk-3*
62. Muhalla, vol.XI, p.kOk. al-Rawd al-Hadir, vol.IV. 
p.i78, Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Turuq’al-Hukmivya op.cit. 
p. 116. ■,There he mentioned’some Hanbali scholars 
who hold this view,
63. *Uda, op.cit, pp.690-3. Ibn al-Qayyim, ibid. Muhalla, 
op.cit. p.k01-k-2.
6k. Ilishkat al-Masabih, vol.II, p.310. Zubaydi, al-Tajrid
al-Sarih, vol.’ll,’Beirut (n.d.), p.l5l* Mundhiri, ___
Mukhtasar Sabi^i Muslim, with the'commentary of Albani, 
Kuwait,’ 1389 A.H. vol.II, p.39*
221.
-  -  65
1 mu* tadunM.
The dominant view about the first report is that 
it was abrogated; this is deduced from the fact that 
the companions of the Prophet did not act in accordance 
with it. It is related that T0raar and.'Ali inflicted 
more than ten lashes in cases of "ta'zir1 with no 
objections from the other companions, so the report,
66
according to the majority view, must have been abrogated.
Another interpretation of this report was given 
by Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim. They saw this report 
as relevant to the relations between father and son, 
husband and wife, and master and servant, i.e. relation­
ships in which one may need to use some means of punish­
ment for disciplinary reasons. In such cases if the 
proper means is beating, it must not exceed 10 lashes.
But this report has nothing to do with the relationship 
between the individual and the state, and the amount of 
"ta'zir11 punishment, if it happens to be by flogging,
67
is left to the authority concerned. According to this
65. Bayhaqi, al-Sunan al-Kubra, vol.VIII, p.327.
66. Fath al-Qadir, vol.IV, p.215, !Uda, vol.I, p.692. 
Ibn*Farhun, vol.II, p.20b.
6 7. Ibn Taymiyya, al-Siyasa al-Shar1iya. p.125. Ibn al- 
Qayyim, I'lam al-Muwaqq1 in, vol.Ill pA29-_30. This 
view is also held by Ibn al-Shat, a Maliki scholar, 
see his commentary on Qarafi's Furuq, vol.IV, p.177*
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view there is no need for the abrogation claim as
the report is not relevant to the case in question.
However, the jurists who do not accept the abrogation
theory, or the interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya and his
companion, hold the view that a l,ta,zirlf punishment bv
68
flogging should not exceed 10 lashes.
The second report, although incompletely trans-
_  69 _
raitted Hmursaln , was accepted by all the Sunni schools 
except the Maliki. Those who accepted this report in­
terpreted it in different ways, therefore they hold 
varying views about the maximum "tcdzir1’ punishment.
The first interpretation is that this report forbade 
"ta^ir11 punishment to exceed the lesser "hadd11 punish- 
ment. Yet, they vary as to what the lesser fthadd,! pun-
ishment is: some consider it to be 80 lashes (the "hadd1
«
punishment for slander or nqadhfM), and others consider
68. e.g. Shawkani, Nayl al-Awtar, vol.VII, Cairo, 1357 
A.H. p.150-1.
6 9. i.e. a Prophetic report resting on a chain of author­
ities that goes no further back than the second, gen­
eration after the Prophet. The validity of this kind 
of report to establish a legal obligation is contro­
versial. See: Shafi! i * al-Risala, p.k-65. Ibn Kathir, 
Mukhtasar 1Ulum al-Hadith, with the commentary of 
Ahmad Shakir, Cairo*£n.d.pp.37-^1• Ibn Hazm, al- 
Ihkam fi’Usul al-Ahkam, Shakir Ed. Cairo, Vol.II,
pp.2-6. UaysaburT,*Ma*rifat ‘Ulum al-Hadith, with
the commentary of Dr. Muzzam Husain, Beirut, (n.d.), 
pp.25-27.
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it to bs the slave's "hadd" punishment which is 1+0 lashes
(i.e. half of the freeman1 s "hadd11 punishment.) The
second interpretation is that the report forbade "ta’zir”
to equal the "hadd" punishment in cases of incomplete
crimes for which, if they were completed, a ’’hadd1
punishment would be prescribed. That is to say a crime
of theft, for which the "hadd" cannot be inflicted, may
result in "ta’zir" of one hundred lashes as the original
punishment is the computation of the offender’s hand.
A sexual relationship (which has not involved intercourse),
may be punished by more than one hundred lashes if the
culprit was a "muhsan" or married; but it should not
•.
reach 100 lashes if he was unmarried because his original
"hadd" punishment is 100 lashes. Other interpretations 
»
are also available, but they are less important than these 
70
two.
The minimum number of lashes allowed as "ta’zir" 
was also discussed: some jurists fixed it at 3? but the 
majority does not agree with this view as it contradicts 
the main feature of "ta’zir”, i.e. Its variation from one 
crime to another according to the offender’s character
71
and other circumstances.
70. ’Uda, vol.I, pp.692-3* where he briefly discussed 
the various interpretations of this report.
71. Fath al-Qadir, op.cit. p.215. Ibn ’Abdin, vol.IV,
p. 60.
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However, the view expressed by Ibn Taymiyya and 
his companion is I think, the most relevant view both 
practically and logically. In practice they allow any 
suitable punishment and -void the strict limitation 
imposed on the ruler's power to Inflict "ta'zir" punish­
ment. From the logical point of view they limit the 
Prophetic report about the number of lashes allowed for 
,Tnon-hadd,r punishment to a particular province and are, 
therefore, not forced to use the abrogation claim as 
other scholars do. This, too, is in harmony with a prin­
ciple of Islamic law, recommending the application of
every legal verdict rather than its neglect ,Ti'mal al- 
_ _ 72
kalam khayrun min ihmalihi!t.
III. 9* The Death Penalty "al-Ta'zir bil-Qg.tl"
"Ta'zir" punishment is the part of the Islamic penal 
system which deals with the less serious offences. The 
death penalty is usually imposed for the most serious 
crimes. In Islamic law it is the punishment of two !,hadd!t 
offences and, as a retaliation, for homicide. The jurists, 
accordingly, are normally against its being inflicted as a
73
T,ta'ziru punishment , but exceptional cases in which
72. Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashbah wal-Naza1ir, vol.I, Cairo, 1290, 
A.H. op.168 et seq.
73* Ibn Farhun, vol.II, p.205* Kinani^ al-'Iqd al-Munazzam, 
in the margin of Tabsirat al-Hukkam, vol.II, p.266. 
BahuttT, op.cit. volIVI, p.l2^ +. Ibn 'Jbdin, vol. IV,
p. 63.
"ta1 zir" by the death penalty is allowed are mentioned 
in the texts of almost every school. Examples of people 
who can receive the death penalty are given in the Hanafi 
texts; the habitual homosexual, the murderer on whom 
"qisas1 cannot be imposed because of the means used in 
the crime, "al-qatl bil-muthqil", the habitual thief who 
attacks a man's house, and who cannot be nrevented from
7*+
doing harm by other punishments. For the Maliki school, 
"the principle that the ta'zir punishment should fit 
the crime, the criminal, and the victim is of absolute 
application. Thus the death penalty is permissible in 
certain cases, where either the offence itself is of a 
very serious nature, such as spying for the enemy or pro­
pagating heretical doctrines or practices which split 
the community, or the criminal is a habitual offender
75 _
whose wickedness can only be so stopped." The Shafi'i
and Hanbali schools all&w the death penalty to be inflicted
in the same cases for which it is allowed in the view of
76the MalikT school.
However, it must be remembered that there are some
7*K Ibn HAbdin, ibid. pp.27, 62-1+. Ibn Nujaym, al-Bahr 
al-Ra'iq, vol.V, p. *+5.
75. Quoted .fromProf. Coulson's article: The State and the
individuai in Islamic Law, International and Compara­
tive Law Quarterly, January 1957> vol.VI, p.5*+. See 
also Ibn Farhun, vol.II, pp.200 et seq.
76. Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Turuq al-Hukmiyya, p.286. Bahutti, 
op.cit. p.126. Matalib Uli al-Nuha, vol.VI, p.22W.
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Prophetic reports which allow the death penalty as a 
Mta’zirM punishment. Therefore the different relevant 
views must be justified in the light of these reports.
Some of these reports have been mentioned before. Here 
a reference can be made to the case of spying for the 
enemy in which the Prophet ordered the offender to be
77
sentenced to death.
At the same tine, the death penalty as a ,!ta!zirM
punishment is an exception. Go, it must be applied in
the minimum possible number of cases, i.e. only when made
necessary either by the criminal’s character or by the
nature of the offence. Therefore one should support
the view expressed by some contemporary writers, that
the ruler of legislator in each country must restrict
its application only to the cases where it is necessary
for the above reasons. Such a supreme penalty should
not be left to the discretion of the judge, but applied
only according to legislation made by the authority con- 
78
cerned. It may be said that there is no harm in leaving 
the death penalty to the judge1s discretion, as the 
jurists have defined the cases in which it may be inflicted.
77. See above, Chanter II, and Ibn al-Qayyim, Sad al- 
Ma'ad, vol.II, Cairo, 1379 A.H., p.68.
78. 'Uda, vol.I, p.688.
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But that makes no difference, because the jurists1 
decisions are only taken, and can only be taken, as simple
79
i1lustrations and guides.
I I I .  10. 11 Tn * o l r n as an id. 1.11 ono 1 Pun 1 shmen t: —
Islamic lam, generally speaking, imposes one pun­
ishment for one crime. This is trkcn from the Qur'an,
80
where a related rule is expressed in many chapters.
But exceptions to this principle wore permitted by the 
jurists with regard to some crimes.
The Hanafi school allows "ta'zir" punishment to be 
inflicted in addition, to any nhadd!I punishment where the 
circumstances so justified.lt is on this basic principle 
that they interpret the punishment of one year’s ban­
ishment for the unmarried adulterer, as has been mentioned 
before. Ibn Taymiyya declared that the Hanafi school 
permits the "hsdd" punishment to be exceeded if the 
authority concerned, i.e. the Imam, thinks that this is 
necessary in certain cases. They even allow the death 
penalty to be inflicted for repeated crimes, any one of 
which does not deserve this punishment, and call it
$9* Coulson, ibid. p.53*
80. e.g. Surah XLII, verse kO, Surah VI, verse_l60,
Surah XL, verse kO, SUrah X, verse 27 and Surah V, 
verse 95*
81. ,^1-Sarim al-Maslul, op.cit. p.12. It was quoted by 
some Hanafi authorities describing their own school’s 
view,’e.g. Ibn 'Abdin, vol.IV, pp.62-3, 21k-5, where 
he confirmed that what Ibn Taymiyya said is the 
Hanafi school's view.
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Mal-qatl siyasctan" i.e. the death penalty justified
82
cn the basis of public interest* The punishment which 
may be added to the MhaddM can be nothing but a " t a ^ i r1 
punishment.
According to the Malikis ,ttalzir1 punishment may
be inflicted in cases of wounds or injury, even when
MqisasM is applicable, and has actually been inflicted.
• •
They consider this punishment to be an effective de­
terrent for the criminal himself, as well as for other
33
potential criminals.
From these examples, it is clear that ntafzirn may
be either the original punishment for crimes which have
no fixed punishment or an additional punishment for
crimes which deserve Mhaddn or "qisas" punishment. It
is worth mentioning that under the doctrine of "ta^ir"
the Islamic penal system allows the judge to pass more
severe sentences against a recidivist offender. The
above mentioned examples are usuallv quoted as evidence 
81*
for this.
8 2. For the doctrine of "Siyasa11 see Coulson, The State and
the Individual, pp.51-2. A History of Islamic Law, Edin­
burgh, 1971, pp.l32-W, 18k— 5, and Conflicts and Tensions 
in Islamic Jurisprudence, Chicago U.P. 19&9? pp.68-9. 
cf.# Dr. Bassiouni, Islam Concept, Law and World Habeas 
Corpus, Camden Law Journal, vol.7, No.2, 1969.
8 3. Ibn Farhun,_vol.II, p.1^9• llawahib al-Galil, a comm­
entary on Mukhtasar Khalil, op.cit. vol.VI, p.2k7«
8k. !Amer, al-Ta!zir, pp.2k3-8.
To summarise what has been said in this section,
it may be stated that ,!ta*zirn punishments range from a
simple reprimand to imprisonment, and from flogging to
the death penalty. Fines and seizure of property may
also be inflicted. There is no restriction, as far as
the Islamic law manuals are concerned, on the judges1
authority to choose the punishment he considers suitable
for the crime, the criminal*s character and the victim
where applicable. It has been suggested that “talsir1
punishments must be listed in accordance with the various
crimes for which they may be inflicted, and particularly
that restriction must be put on the cases where capital
punishment is applicable. MTa!zir" is not always applied
as the only punishment, but it may also be applied in
addition to bther punishments if necessary.
IV. The Judge1s Discretionary Power:-
The most common notion about !*ta*zirn is that the
ruler or the judge is completely free in the determination
of the offences and their sanctions. The extensive scope
of the ruler*s or judge*s discretion outside the field of
*!hadd,! and "qisas” offences is indeed intolerable to modern 
• • *
lawyers* minds, and is contrary to the accepted constit­
utional principles of today. It was described by a con­
temporary Shari*a scholar as !lextensive powers at the 
ruler*s disposal, to discipline any one, for anything, 
with any punishment, (yu addibu man/sJia*' *ala ma sha* hi ma
sha* ) . 11 Such a. wide scope of discretionary power is 
entirely contrary to the universally accepted constit­
utional principle "Nulla Poena Sine Lege1*. This section 
will he devoted to illustrating how far this common 
notion about the judge*s discretionary power reflects 
reality. It is important that jurists have shown some 
evidence of a desire to make "ta’zir*1 offences and their 
sanctions more specific. But this will not be dealt with
here as it can only be understood as "simple illustrations 
86
and guides11. However, the judge must do his best to 
choose the proper punishment in each case of "te * zir11,
_ 87
by way of conscientious reasoning "ijtihad**. Thus he 
"must not pronounce penalties at his mere whim or pleasure 
or turn from one to the other in an arbitrary fashion: for
this would be injustice *'fusuq!* and contrary to consensus
88
11 ijma*". Therefore the judges* discretionary power 
in relation to the punishment must be interpreted as 
his duty to pronounce the best penalty to fit the case 
in question, i.e. to correct the offender’s behaviour 
and safeguard the public interest by preventing further 
offences.
85. Shaltut, al-Islam Aqida wa Shari*a, p.31k.
86. Coulson, The State and the Individual, op.cit. p.53*
87. al-Qarafi, Furuq, vol.Ill, pp.16-20.
88. Furuq, vol.IV, p.182, translated in Prof. Coulson’s 
article, ibid.
231.
The ruler’s (or judge’s) authority in the determin­
ation of I,ta,zirM offences is our main concern in this 
section. nTa!zir,! offences may be either of the same 
essential nature as the "hadd” offences but of a less
89
serious degree or may qualify simply as "transgressions."
In both cases the determination of the punishment is at
the judges1 discretion in the way mentioned above. But
in the case of a 1 transgression'1 it is usually said that
the ruler or judge has to determine the offence as well.
To see how much of the truth this idea contains we must
refer to the definition of nta’zirM as a punishment to
be delivered for transgression against God, or against
an individual, for which there is neither "hadd" punish-
ment nor "kaffara". The right to determine what is a
transgression and what is not is reserved in Islamic
law for Allah only, as the Muslims believe that Islamic
90
law is the final will of God. God’s will is expressed
in the Qur’an and the tvujly related Prophetic reports,
"al-Ahadith al-Sahihah" which are known as the Sunna.
1 • • •
• • •
The Qur’an and the Sunna contain many statements which
forbid some types of human activity and classify them as
sins "m’asi". For these forbidden things the ruler’s or
8 9. Ibid.
90. ShalabI, al-Fiqh_al-Islami, op.cit. p.k2. !Uda, vol.I, 
pp.223-37. The Qur’an stressed this principle in various 
chapters, e.g. Surah XII, verses kO & 67^ Surah VI, 
verses 57 & o2. Surah XVIII, verse 26. Surah V, verse k8. 
and Surah LXII, verse 21.
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judge!s task will be merely to choose the punishment 
applicable in each case, but he has nothing to do with 
the determination of the offence as it has already been 
determined by the Qur’an or the Sunna. Examples of such 
cases are innumerable but it will help to give some of 
the most important ones.
IV. 1. Usury ”r1-R1bn":-
The Qur’an forbade usury in five verses in Surahs 
II, III, and LIX. One of the verses runs ”0 believers, 
fear you God; and give up the usury that is outstanding 
if you are believers. But if you do not, then take notice 
that God shall war with you ..." Another verse says:
"God has permitted trafficking, end forbidden usury1 •
Usury therefore is a prohibited activity; its doer de­
serves punishment which has not been fixed in the Qur’an 
or Sunna. The duty of the judge is to choose the proper 
punishment for it. But he does not determine the crime.
The jurists are not unanimous about what may be consid­
ered usury and what may not. Therefore the ruler or the 
judge has to determine this question. But some may argue 
that this is not the determination of the offence, it is 
simplv the determination of whether the offender’s act
i. v
constitute prohibited conduct or not. Such is the role 
of any court in relation to any sort of crime: to est­
ablish, in the light of the evidence provided, the offender’s 
guilt, after which the penalty can be pronounced. Even
233.
v/hen one disagrees with such an explanation, ho cannot 
but agree that the prohibition of usury is the will of 
God.
IV. 2, 1s c Te s t i ™ony M She hadt el-Fur" :-
False testimony was condemned in the Our*an and 
believers were recommended to state the truth when asked 
to do so. One verse says "0 believers, be you securers 
of justice, witnesses for God, even though it be against 
yourselves, or your parents and kinsmen11. Another verse 
describes believers as "those who witness no falsehood".
A third verse orders the believers to "shun the rbornin-
91
ation of idols, and shun the speaking of falsehood."
The jurists have said quite a lot about the punishment 
of a false witness, but the crime was defined by the 
Qur*an and what the jurists said applies to the stage 
of choosing the punishment for the crime rather than its 
determination.
IV. 3* Breach of Trusts "Khivanat al-Amanah":-
The Qur'an stated "God commands you to deliver trusts 
back to their owners". In another verse it is said "0 
believers, betray not God and the Messenger, and betray
91. Surah IV, verse 135. Surah XXV, verse 72. and Surah 
XXII, verse 30.
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not your trusts." There are many other Qur'anic verses 
concerned with breach of trusts, but these two are 
enough to indicate that these offences were formulated 
in the Qur'an.
IV- Insults "al-Sabb":-
To insult a human being, according to the Qur'an, 
is forbidden oven if the insulted person is an infidel, 
or as the Qur'an says "Abuse not those who pray apart 
from God". As for the Muslims among themselves, the 
Qur'anic command says "0 believers, let not any people 
scoff at another people who may be better than they; 
neither let women scoff at women who may be better than 
themselves. And find not fault with one another, neither 
revile one another by nicknames. An evil name is
93
ungodliness after belief." According to these verses 
and other similar ones, the jurists classified insults 
as a "ta'zir" offence.
92. Qur'an, Surah IV, verse 58, and Surah VIII, verse 27* 
To prove the offensive nature of breach of trusts, 
some writers referred to verse 72, Surah XXXIII. But 
this verse is irrelevant to this subject. The word 
(ananah) there means the religious duties while in 
the verses quoted it means financial trust, cf. 'Uda 
vol.I, p.139.
93. Qur'an, Surah VI, verse 108. and XLIX, verse 11.
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IV* 5* Bribery ,!al-Rishwatr:-
As the Qur'an forbade usury and considered it an 
unlawful way of making money, all means of making money 
by dishonesty are forbidden* About bribery the Qur!an 
says MConsume not your property between you in vanity, 
neither proffer it to the judge, that vou may sinfully
9b-
consume a portion of other men's property, intentionally.1 
According to the prohibition of bribery stated in this 
verse, it is considered as a ’’ta'zir" offence for which 
the authority concerned (the ruler or the judge) may 
impose a punishment*
For all the examples above many Prophetic reports 
were related, sometimes to explain what was meant by a 
Qur'anic verse, and sometimes to illustrate how hated and 
wrong is the forbidden behaviour in the sight of God and
95
his Messenger. These five examples are enough to prove 
that "ta'zir" offences are mainly determined in the Qur!an.
It is not claimed, by saying this, that the ruler has no 
right, outside the province of the Qur'an or the Sunna, 
to establish offences and their punishments. But the 
right to do so is limited to what is necessary for the 
achievement of the aims and. ends approved by Islamic law.
9*+. Qur'an, Surah II, verse 188.
95. For other examples and for Prophetic reports conderned 
with the five given above, see 'Uda, op.cit. pp.l38-lb-3.
236.
The Determination of Offences Under the "Ta'zir11
Doctrine:-
The final end of Islamic law 11 Shari' a" is the pro­
tection of religion, life, lineage, mind and property.
This is agreed by all Muslim jurists, although it has not 
been mentioned in the Qur'an or the Sunna in these exact 
words. This agreement was achieved by way of induction
96
from all the legal verdicts in Islamic legal sources.
For the achievement of these ends all tho legal obliga­
tions and prohibitions of Islamic law were ordered. The 
ruler, therefore, must act to serve the public interest 
in terms of these five objects. Any transgression of one 
or more of them should be considered unlawful, and if 
necessary,punishable. Dome of the possible transgressions 
have been mentioned in terms of prohibition, "tahrim", in 
Qur'an and the Sunna, but there are many others which 
have not been mentioned there. Here, the ruler's power 
to create or consider these transgressions as offences 
and to determine their sanctions, may be considered. Some 
Muslim jurists refer to this power, when they add, to the 
above five objects, the object of the elimination of any
97
"transgression". The ruler's power must be exercised 
on the basis of the general principles of the law, and
96. Bhatibi, Muwafaqat, vol.I, p.38 and vol.II, p.10.
97. Ibn Farhun, vol.II, p.106. See also: Coulson, ibid., 
p.51.
with the intention of protecting their ends which 
shape the public interest. Moreover, the ruler's 
power to determine such offences and their punishments 
is not based only on juristic reasoning "ijtihad" but 
also on the general commands which prohibit trans­
gressions and corruption. These commands are exuressed
_ _ 98
in more than one Qur'anic verse and Prophetic report.
Many of these Qur'anic verses command the Muslim comm­
unity to "enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong." 
The right and the wrong are not listed in one place in 
the Qur'an or the Sunna, but they can be known by in-, 
vestigation of the whole text of the Qur'an, and the 
collection of Prophetic reports. Even so, they cannot 
be known in detail, but in general terms, according to
99
which each individual act can be classified. In this 
province, the ruler can exercise his legislative power 
to enforce the "right" and prohibit the "wrong", even 
when what he enforces or prohibits is not mentioned 
specifically, in either the Qur'an or the Sunna.
This legislative power of the ruler may be seen 
to contradict what was said above about the Muslim's
98. e.g. Surah II, verse 190, XXII, verse bl, III, verses 
10b, 110 and 11b.
99. ShatibI, Muwafaqat, vol.II, pp.7-l*+. Shalabi, al- 
Fiqfi al-Islami, op.cit. pp.110-112.
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belief that the right to determine right and wrong is 
reserved to God* 3ut the fact is that there is no 
contradiction in this context. God's legislative 
right was exercised in the Qur'an and the Sunna, but 
neither the Qur'an nor the Sunna has given, or is expect­
ed to give, detailed laws to control every aspect of 
human life. It is only the general principles which 
may be found therein* The details are left to the dis­
cretion of the community "Umma" which must decide what 
is suitable and productive according to the circumstances. 
Indeed the legislation passed by the ruler must not con­
tradict the general principles laid down by the Qur'an 
and the Sunna, and when this condition is considered,
the ruler or rather the "Umma" is completely free to
100
pass whatever legislation is needed. This legislat­
ive right is known as "siyasa shari'iya", or governmental 
authority. The only condition on which this "siyasa" is 
legitimate is that it does not contradict what is said 
in the Qur'an or the Sunna. According to Ibn al-Qayyim
any means which establishes justice and prevents injust-
101
ice is "legitimate siyasa".
1001. Qarafi, Ihkam, Damascus, Ed. pp.26-31.
101. al-Turuq al-Hukraiyya,_j?p.lb-20. The same view was 
supported by*Ibn-Farhun, op.cit. p*10b, and Tara- 
bulsT's Mu'in rl-hukftam, op.cit. p.l6b.
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From this review it can be said that this dis­
cretionary power (which may be the main objection to 
the law of'ta'zir" when expressed in words like those 
quoted in the beginning of this section), is evidence 
of the flexibility of the Islamic penal system. Without 
the law of "ta'zir" the Islamic penal system would cert­
ainly have been inadequate after tho first Islamic era. 
Within the law of "ta'zir" the Muslim state's legislative
authority, or, in the language of the texts, the ruler,
c/
is given the necessary power to safeguard the public 
interest by making harmful and disturbing behaviour 
unlawful, and prescribing punishments for it. The 
jurists dealing with the subject imply that for the sake 
of public interest tho ruler need not do that in advance. 
That is to say that he may punish any conduct he con­
siders harmful to the public interest without declaring
to the public that this conduct will be considered crim- 
102
inal. This is a clear exception to the application 
of the general principle that no punishment can be in­
flicted except for an offence which has been so defined 
in advance. This exception allows the ruler or the judge 
a very wide authority to punish harmful acts and omissions 
which may threaten the public interest in the widest senseP
102, 'Uda, vol.I, p.150-152.
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Some authorities have tried to deny that the classifi­
cation of this discretionary power is an exception to 
the rule MNulla Poena sine lege”. The argument for this 
view is that tho ’’lege1 exists in the general principles
which command the Muslin community and the Muslim ruler
103
to protect the public good. But the fact is that
these general principles are very flexible, and their
interpretation controversial. Therefore, one cannot
agree with the above view.
It was this discretionary power which led another
contemporary author to urge that "taf2ir" offences and
punishments should, if the Islamic penal system is to
10b
be adopted, be codified. If this view is approved, 
it may be through legislation that the discretionary 
power for punishing acts which threaten or harm the 
public interest can be used.
However, the ruler1s authority, in this context, is 
related to the Ourfanic command to tho Muslim community
105
to "enjoin what is right, and forbid what is wrong."
At the same time, the clear order of the Qur*an "obey 
God, His Prophet and those in authority (in charge of
103. Ibid. pp.l52-l5b,
10b. tAmer, al-Ta'zir, pp.b0b-8.
105. Ibn 1Abdin, Minhat al-Khaliq, a commentary on al- 
Bahr ol-Ra*iq of Ibn Nuja^m, vol.VI,_op.cit. p.b5«
Ibn Nujaym, Risalah fi Ioamat s.l-Qadi al-Ta*zir, 
supplemented to his Ashhllh wa-Naza'ir, vol.II, pp.b6-8.
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your affairs)11. (Qur'an, IV, 59), justifies, and was used 
to justify, the discretionary authority in the context 
of 1 tad sir" *
It is interesting to draw attention to the simil­
arity between the law of ”ta!zirM as was explained, and 
the part of the English criminal law which originated 
in and is governed by the rules of the common law. Here 
crimes and their punishments are contained in the common 
lax/, i.e. Mthe port of English law which originated in
common custom ; nd was unified and developed bv the decis-
106
ions and rulings of the judges.’1 Although in modern 
times statutes have played an increasingly important part 
in criminal law, there are still several crimes which 
exist in common lax/ only. This means that their defin­
itions and punishments cannot be found in an Act of
107
Parliament, but in the rulings of the judges. However,
several statutes prescribe specific punishments for certain
common law crimes. A clear example of this is the case
of murder, which remains as a common law crime, but its
108
punishment is governed by statute. However, the question 
of common law offences raises the discussion about the 
proper sphere of the criminal law, one aspect of which is
106. Cross and Jones, Introduction to Criminal Lax/, p.l6.
107. Ibid. p.17.
108. Up to 1965 it was the death penalty, but the 1965 Abol­
ition of Death Penalty Act abolished it for murder.
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whether it is right or wrong to grant the judges a
109
residual power to add to the criminal lax/.
VI. A Survey of the Law of "Ta'zir"
The ultimate object of "ta'zir1 is to punish wrong 
deeds which may disturb the society, or the rights of 
an individual. In the first place it is a deterrent 
punishment intended to prevent the commission of crimes.
At the same time it is a reformatory punishment, which 
is intended to correct the offender. Moreover, it is 
the means by x/hich a Muslim society may enforce the 
moral standard recommended by Islamic law. It is this 
last aspect, thet of the enforcement of morality, which 
will concern us here as we have said enough about deterr­
ence in previous shapters.
Islamic lax/ is essentially a code of moral standards 
which are expected to be observed in a Muslim society.
The function of the different rules and duties in Islamic 
law is to enforce this moral standard, even by punishment. 
Of the four "hadd1 punishments, two are concerned with 
sexual immorality in terms of "zina,f or adultery, and 
"qadhf1 or false accusation of unchastity. The Qur'an
109. See Cross and Jones, ibid. pp.18-21. The question 
x/as recently discussed after the House of Lord's 
decision in the case of Shaw v. Director of Public 
Prosecution (1961), to x/hich we will shortly refer.
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prescribed the severest punishment known to Islamic lav/,
110
in order to enforce sexual morality. But outside 
the field of the "hadd" punishment, the moral values of 
Islam are enforceable by means of "ta'zir" punishment. 
Examples are found in tho texts of acts which were con­
sidered immoral and their sanctions, according to the 
jurists* views. But what we will concentrate on here 
is the basic issue: is it the function of the penal lav/
to enforce the standard of conventional morality by
111
punishing deviation from it?
Tho problem of law and morality, particularly sexual 
morality, was the subject of lively discussion among 
lawyers and philosophers in England. It follows the 
famous decision of the House of Lords in the case of Shaw 
v. the Director of Public prosecutions, in 1961. Mr.
Shaw had published a magazine entitled "Ehe Ladies* 
Directory” , which listed the names and addresses of 
prostitutes and included some photographs and indications f 
of their particular sexual practices. The House of Lords^ 
dismissed Mr. Shaw's appeal against conviction for three 
offences, one of which was "conspiring to corrupt public 
morals". The formulation, or re-formulation, of this
110. See above, Chapter I.
111. A discussion of the subject is found in: Coulson, 
Conflicts and Tensions, op.cit. pp.77 et seq.
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offence by the English law Lords, stimulated the debate
112
about the problem of law and morality. It is inter­
esting that the debate about law and morality is expected 
to attract lawyers and philosophers again after two recent 
cases. The first is the case of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions v. Richard Neville and others. This is the 
case known as the "OZ" case. Mr. Neville and two of his 
colleagues published number (28) of the n0ZM magazine 
called "School Kids 0Z,f. They were convicted at the 
Central Criminal Court on July 28, 1971? end sentenced 
on August 5? 1971 (Judge Argyle, Q.C.). The three men 
were sentenced to 15, 12 and 9 months imprisonment. The 
Court of Appeal suspended the sentences on November 5*
1971* In this case the conviction was made according to 
the Obscene Publications Act 1959; and the Post Office 
Act 1953* But the three men were acquitted of conspiracy 
to corrupt public morals. The second case is that of 
the Director of Public Prosecution v. Stage I (publishing 
company). The publishing company published a book entitled 
"The Little Red School-Book". It aimed at informing 
school-boys and girls about almost everything in life.
112. See H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality, London, 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1969? pp.6-12. Coulson, ibid., 
p.77. B. Mitchell, Law, Morality and Religion in a 
Secular Society, O.U.P. 1970, pp.12, 6l. for a gen­
eral discussion on the subject, see Lord Patrick 
Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals, O.U.P. 1969*
(3rd Ed.).
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The section on sex (26 pages) was declared obscene by 
The Magistrate Mr, John Denis Purcell, on July 1, 1971. 
The court based its verdict on grounds that this section 
i\?as likely to "deprave and corrupt" young people. Un­
like in the "OZ" case the appeal made against the court
113
decision has not yet been heard.
However, among British Lawyers there are two views 
about the role of law in the enforcement of morals.
The first view was held by the English Lords, expressed 
in their decision in Shaw*s case, and defended by some
nt*
writers afterwards. According to this view criminal 
law must enforce public morality or the accepted stan­
dard of morals. It is admitted, according to some, that 
the morality which the law presupposes is not beyond 
criticism, and ought to be open to informed discussion
115
and debate. This view was criticized by those who
hold that the law must not interfere with private
morality, and the criticism is from both moral and legal
116
points of view.
113. i.e. up to 26.11.71. see for both cases: The Times, 
August 6 and 9? July 2, and November 6, 1971*
114-. e.g. A. L. Goodhart, LawQ.R., vol.77? P.5&7? 1961. 
B. Mitchell, op.cit. pp.13^-135*
115. B. Mitchell, ibid. p.13*+.
116. H.L.A. Hart, op.cit. The Morality of the Criminal
Law, London, O.U.P. 1965. See also the references
he cited in p.12-13 of Law, Liberty and Morality!
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Islamic law, on the other hand, presents a view
according to which no distinction may be made between
private and public morality. It is true that the
standard of proof required to establish the offence of
adultery, for example, would certainly mean that the
offender, where the offence is proved by testimony,
h ‘: d committed an offence of public indecency, even under 
117
English law. But the offender is required to repent
when he commits such an offence in private and is not
brought before a court. This doctrine of repentance
"tawbah", means that an immoral sexual act, even in
private, amounts to an offence from which the offender
must repent, or he will be nunished in the world here- 
118
after. Such a doctrine is the result of the religious
nature of Islamic law, which the court has nothing to
do with, end it is irrelevant to secular law. But
examples may be easily found, in the texts, of acts
which would be considered merely immoral in a secular
state, while they are considered offences of " t a ^ i r1
under Islamic law. Although there is no clear distinction
in the Qur!an between moral and legal rules, as Qur*anic
oreceots merely indicate the standards of conduct which
119
are acceptable or not acceptable to God, every
117. Coulson, ibid. p.78.
118. Coulson, ibid. p.80.
119. Shalabi, al-Fiqh al-Islami, op.cit. pp.2h-32. 
S&altut, op.cit. p.h59*
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unacceptable act is "ma'siya" or "corruption" for 
which a f?ta*sirM punishment may bo inflicted. When 
tho transgression is committed in circumstances which 
cannot justify the court*s intervention,the offender is 
always obliged to repent in order to escape the punish­
ment in the next world. This doctrine of repentance is, 
by nature, a self-reformatory way which is assumed to 
serve the same purpose as the ,!ta* zirn punishment. There­
fore it can be said that among the purposes of the ’*ta * zirM 
punishment is the enforcement of the standard of morals 
approved by Islamic law, in terms of punishing immoral 
or morally disapproved conduct.
**Ta*zir*' punishment, therefore, must differ in each 
case, as has been said, as to the offender, the crime 
and the victim where applicable. For this reason some 
jurists classified offenders, or rather citizens, into 
four distinct classes: a) the most distinguished of the
upper classes, i.e. officials and officers of the highest 
rank: for them a personal communication from the judge 
through a confidential messenger would be sufficient as 
a punishment, b) the upper classes, i.e. intellectual 
elite and scholars of "Shari*a"; they may be summoned 
before the judge and admonished by him. c) the middle 
classes, i.e. the merchants; they should be punished by
2k8.
imprisonment, d) the lower strata of the peoule; they
120
should be punished with imprisonment or flogging.
But other jurists, however, reject this external class­
ification according to social status and lay stress on
the inner worth of the individual, his attitude to re-
121
ligicn and his mode of life.
A final question which may be asked about ,lta,zirM
being a reformatory punishment, is how it can be so
considered when it punishes with the death penalty or
flogging, which are mainly deterrent punishments, as has
been previously observed. Here it must bo noted that
the reformatory function appears in the deterrence value
of these punishments which is supposed to result in the
prevention of further similar crimes. It was necessary,
too, to allow such punishments as ,!tafzirn , as, to use
Lord Simond’s words, "no one can foresee every way in
which the wickedness of man may disrupt the order of 
122
society1.'
Now, to conclude, one can say that the law of ,?ta!zirM 
provides Muslim states in modern times with the principles 
according to which they can formulate, outside the limited
120. Kasahr, Badai1 al-Sanai1, vol.VII, p.6k. Encyclop­
aedia of Islam, vol.IV, p.710.
121. Ibn 1Abdin, Hashiya, op.cit. p.62. Encyclopaedia 
of Islam, ibid.
122. Quoted in Hart; Law, Liberty and Morality, p.9.
area of the Mhaddn punishment, modern penal codes to 
be applied by the courts adopting modern law systems.
The variety of punishments allowed as ’’ta'zir*1 can save 
the modern Muslim states from borrowing their penal laws 
from Mestern models as has happened in most of the Arab 
countries. At the same time, for those who demand the 
application of Islamic criminal law there is no better 
course than to concentrate on illustrating the law of 
,Tta!zirn as the best proof for their claim that the 
Islamic theory of punishment is valid and can be 
adopted in modern times.
2^0
CHAPTER V
THE LAW 0? EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES
I* Introductory:-
The relation between the infliction of punishment 
and the evidence required to prove crimes is a very 
clear one. I/here the court is not absolutely certain 
of the accused1s guilt the punishment cannot be inflicted. 
Methods of proof in any penal system reflect the legis­
lators desire to widen or limit the number of cases in 
which a particular punishment may or may not be inflicted. 
Therefore, a brief account of the law of evidence in 
criminal cases under the Islamic penal system will help 
us to form a more precise image of the theory of punish­
ment in Islamic law.
The aim of the law of evidence In Islamic legal theory^,/ 
in general, was rightly described as "the establishment ^ 
of the truth of claims with a high degree of certainty".
Thus the normal evidence is the oral testimony of two 
adult Muslims who must be known to the judge as having the 
highest degree of moral and religious probity "*adala".
This normal standard of proof should be, as a general rule, 
fulfilled in all criminal and civil cases. But there are
1. Coulson: A History of Islamic Law, p.126.
some recognized alternatives to it in both civil and
criminal cases. The alternative methods of proof in
criminal cases which will be dealt with here are: the
criminal* s admission or confession "iqrar11, the judge* s
personal observation 111 ilm al-Qadi1* and the circumstant-
ial evidence **al-Qara* in** • The pre-Islamic method of
proof in cases of homicide known as oath "qasamah** will
not be dealt with in this context as I do not see it
2
as a recognized system under Islamic law. The most 
important exception to the normal standard of proof in 
criminal cases is that of requiring four male witnesses 
to prove the offence of adultery "zina1', so this will 
be treated separately.
II. Testimony "Shahada”
Most criminal charges are to be proved by the oral 
testimony of two adult male Muslims. Of the "hadd** 
crimes this rule applies to the crimes of "qadhf1*, and 
"hirabah**, and it also anplies to the most serious” ta* zir1*
3
offences, i.e. wine-drinking and apostasy. "Qisas” for
• •
the crimes of homicide cannot be inflicted unless the 
crime is proved in the same way. The Maliki school
2. See for details, Ahmad Ibrahim, al-Qisas, pp.228-353 
where he expressed a similar view. * •
3. Ibn Farhun, Tabsirah, vol.I, p.212-3.
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only differentiates between "qisas" for homicide and
• •
for injuries, and relax the rule of the two male wit- 
nesses for the latter by allowing it to be proved by 
the testimony of one witness and the oath of the victim,
b
or one male and two female witnesses. It is clear, 
then, that the jurists pay a good deal of attention to 
the witnesses1 evidence and when it can be accepted.
The most important part of their discussion is the one 
concerned with the witnesses1 character, or the condition 
of 111 adala" •
The origin of this condition of " 1adala" is its 
mention in the Qur*an. The Qur!an says "and-call to
5
witness two just men..." . Differences among the schools 
of Islamic law about what is meant by 111 adala" are gen­
erally of no importance. Nevertheless, some are worth 
mentioning. The Hanafi, Maliki and Shafi1i schools con-
sider a Muslim "1 adl" if he usually does what is required
6
of him, and avoids doing what is forbidden. The Hanbali 
jurists add to this what they call "isti!mal al-murua", 
or the sense of honour. It was explained by a Hanbali 
jurist as the avoidance of what makes a person not
*+. Ibid. p.21^. !Uda, vol.II, p.316. Baji, Muntaqa, 
vol.V, p.215.
5. Surah LXV, verse 2.
6. Mabsut, vol.XVI, p.121. Muntaqa, vol.V, p.195* 
3ajirmi, Tuhfat al-Habib 1ala Sharh al-Khatib, 
vol.IV, p.339 et seq.
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respectable, and the upholding of what makes him res- 
7
pectable.
The Zahiri school hold that a person is "*adl" if
he is not known to have committed any serious crime,
or grave offence "kabira", and has not openly committed
8
a venal sin "saghira"» By "kabira" they mean what the 
Prophet called "kabira", and that for which there is the
_ _ 9
threat of punishment in the Qur’an or the Sunna. Ibn
Hazm supported this view by quoting the Qur’anic verse 
•
"if you avoid the great sins which are forbidden, we
10
will remit from you your evil deeds..." . Hq says that
according to this verse, everything is remissible as
long as a Muslim does not commit any great sin "kabira".
What is remissible in the judgement of God, Ibn Hazm
/
continued, cannot incur blame or reprimand for its per­
petrator. At the same time, anyone who commits "kabira"
and afterwards repents should be considered "’adl", as
11
though he had never committed it.
It is interesting to note that the schools of Islamic 
law* are divided on the question of whether a Muslim should
7. Kaj.awi, Mat& al-Iqna*, published with Bahutti, Kash-
shaf al-Qina* , volVI, n.b-22. Gee also Mujghni, vol.X,
p.V+9.
8. Muhalla, vol;IX, p.393 et seq.
9. Ibid. See also Qarafi, Furuq, vol.IV, pp.66-70*
10. Surah, IV, verse 31.
11. Muhalla, ibid.
be considered 111 adl,! unless proved not to be, or whether
he should not be considered 1,1 adl1* until his 111 adala1*
is proved. The first view is held by the Sahirl end
Henafi schools, while the second is held by the Maliki,. _ _ 12
Shafi1i , Iianbali and Zaydi schools.
Finally, it is noteworthy that Ibn al-Qayyim and his
teacher, Ibn Taymiyya, hold that call criminal and civil
claims can be proved by the testimony of one witness if
the judge is satisfied that he is telling the truth.
The only exception to this is in the case of crimes for
which there are fTheddM punishments; these crimes are to
«
be testified by two male witnesses exceot in the case
13
of 1 zina1* where four are required.
11. 1. Testimony in Cases of Adultery;-
The evidence required in cases of adultery is the
oral testimony of four adult male Muslins who have seen
the very act of sexual intercourse. This is derived from
the Qur*ahic verse nAs for those of your women who are
guilty of lewdness, call to witness against them four 
lb-
of you.1’ All jurists agree on the number of witnesses 
and their sex. V/omen’s testimony is not accepted in
12. Muhalla, op.cit. Baji, o rue it. p.193* !Uda, vol.II,
p . i + o W - 5 .
13. Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Turuq al-Hukmiyya, Cairo, 19*51, 
p.73, 77, 82 and 176-8.
lb. Qurlan, Surah IV, verse 15*
cases of adultery, or any MhaddM offence. The witnesses
•
must be able to state where end when the offence took
place, and must be able to identify the other partner.
Testimony, moreover, must be delivered before the court
at one tine "fi-naglisin wahidn.
•
The punishment for nqrdhfn is inflicted on the 
witnesses if they arc less than four. So if four people 
saw the offence but only three of them ere prenared to 
give witness before the court, they can be convicted of 
the offence of ’'qadhf1 and 'unished accordingly, disregard­
ing the reasons which prevented the fourth from giving
17
his testimony.
These requirements indicate the difficulty, if not 
the impossibility, of inflicting the "hadd" punishment 
for adultery. Some jurists expressed the view that the 
deterrent effect of punishment in Islamic law is indicated 
by the fact that these punishments are theoretically pre­
scribed, but not actually inflicted. This is as true for
18
the rest of the !,hadd,! punishments, as for adultery.
  •  _
15* Mughni, vol.IX, pp.69-70.
16. Ibid. p.71. KasanT, Badai*, vol.VII, p.1+8. Ibn-Farhunp 
Tabsirah, vol.I, p.212. This last_condition is not 
necessary according to the 5hafi1i school.
17* Mujghni, ibid.—p.72. Kasani,_ibid. Mudawwanah, vol.IV,
p.399* Kaytami, Tnhfat al-Muhtaj, vol.IX, p.115*
18. See above Chapter I, and ShalabT, al-Fiqh al-Islami,
25$.
The severity of punishment in Islamic law indicates 
the law-meker!s desire to threaten the people and pre­
vent them from committing the offences in question.
But the obvious difficulty of proving the offence, re­
flects his desire to regard the existence of these pun­
ishments as a mere threet. The fact that we can cite 
no case where guilt of adultery was established through 
testimony throughout Islamic history is very significant.
It must be noted, however, that it is not only the number 
of witnesses required which makes it difficult to prove 
adultery, but also the threat of being punished for l!cadhfM 
if they failed to agree on every minute detail. Pract­
ically speaking, no one would risk giving testimony when 
he could expect to be punished if one of the witnesses, 
for any reason, did not testify, or if the statements of 
the four differed in any way.
III. Confession >TIqrarn :-
An alternative method of proof in criminal cases 
which will occupy us in this section is the establish­
ment of proof by the criminal1 s confession 11 iqrar,f.
It Is agreed that the criminal1s confession is 
sufficient for the establishment of his guilt, and that 
on his confession the appropriate punishment can be in­
flicted, One confession is enough in all criminal cases
257.
other than adultery, where the question of the necessary
number of confessions is disputed. According to the
Hanafi, Hanbali and Zaydi schools, the confession of 
• #
"zina1 must be repeated four times, as the minimum
number of witnesses in such a case is four, and because
J , _
liV" the case of Ma'iz who confessed adultery four times
/
before the Prophet* It was only after the fourth con­
fession that the Prophet started his inquiry into the
reality of his confession, his state of mind and his
19
knowledge of the punishable act*
The Kaliki, Ghafi1! and Zahiri schools disagree with 
this view and consider that one confession is sufficient 
to establish the confessor1s guilt* They see a differ­
ence between testimony and confession: the former rests 
on the mere assumption that the witnesses are telling the 
truth, so a large number of witnesses are necessary in 
order to avoid any possibility of false testimony* The 
latter rests on the confessor*s mere volition, where 
there cannot be any shadow of doubt as to its credibility. 
Moreover, they auote another Prophetic report in which
20
the Prophet did not require the confession to be repeated.
19. KasanI, Badai', vol.VII, p.!?0. Mughni, vol.IX, p.6V.
al-Bawd al-lladir, vol.IV, p.^70 et seq.
• • *
20. ZurqanI, his commentary on Mukhtasar Khalil, vol* 
VIII, p.99-100. Bajirmi, op.cit. p.139. Muhalla, 
vol.XI, p.176-181.
A
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The Zaydis, on the other side, think that the point
of requiring the confession to be repeated four times
is to give the confessor an opportunity to withdraw his
confession and escape the "hadd" punishment by repentance,
21
which is a recommended practice.
Apart from this dispute about "zina" between differ­
ent schools, another dispute exists within the Kanafi 
school.In cases of "qadhf", theft and wine-drinking,
Abu Yusuf, the second founder of the school, holds that 
a. confession must be repeated twice. But the Imam, 
i.e. Abu Eanifa, did not require the repetition of the 
confession. Abu Yusuf based his view on the fact that
the punishment of these crimes is the right of God l!haqq
•
Allah", so it must be inflicted after the taking of all
possible precautions "ihtiyat". But Abu Hanifa consid-
• • • 
ered that confession is the communication of a piece of
news "ikhbar" which cannot be strengthened by repetition.
The difference between these crimes and adultery is that
the four confessions for the latter derive from the
Prophet*s practice, where nothing similar is available
22
for any of the other "hadd" crimes. Analogy "qiyas",
a Hanafi jurist stated,cannot help Abu Yusuf to prove his
23
view, because it is not applicable in such cases.
21. al-Rawd al-Nadir, op.cit. p.*+73.
• •
22. Kasani, ibid.
23. Jassas, Ahkam al—Qur*cin,vol.II, p.b"2^,see a. Iso p p A 27-8.
259.
Confession should be made in detail, showing that
the confessor is aware of what he has done and provixlg
that it was really the crime for which a punishment is
prescribed. For if it was accepted that a summarized
confession might be made, someone might confess that he
had committed !lzinan, for example, while he really had
not. Then such a person might be unjustly punished. To
avoid this possibility a detailed confession is required
and it is the judge*s duty to ask the confessor about
2k
the minute details of his offence. Associated with 
this rule is the rule that a confession must be in clear 
explicit words, as an indirect confession, i.e. by way
25
of ,!kinayan, is not accepted as proof in criminal cases.
Accordingly, the Hanafi school did not accept the con-
«
fession of a mute person, even if he made it in writing,
because they consider writing as indirect declaration,
whereas the other Sunni schools disagree with this view
and accept his confession as long as his signs or his
26
writing are comprehensible.
A confession in criminal cases, but not in civil 
cases, can always be withdrawn even after sentence has
2k. Mughni, vol.IX, p.65. Kasani, ibid. p.k9-50. *Uda,
volTlI, pplk33-5* al-Rawd al-Nadir. op.cit. p.k73-^*. .
25. Kasani, ibid. !Uda, ibid. p.k36.
26. Kss’anft, ibid. Mughni, op.cit. p.67. *Uda, op.cit.
P.k36.
been passed, or during the execution. In cases of its
withdrawal after the sentence, a nhaddM punishment should
#
no longer be carried out, but a uta*zirM punishment may 
be carried out even after the withdrawal of the confession 
The difference is that the withdrawal of the confession 
causes doubt ,TshubhaM and so the nhaddM punishment cannot 
be carried out, but this rule is not applicable to Mta*zir 
Moreover, it is recommended to the judge that when some­
one confesses to having committed a crime considered as
"haqcKAllah”, he should be given a chance to withdraw 
*
his confession. This recommendation is based on the
fact that in such cases the criminal*s repentance is
28
better than his punishment.
In all cases the confession only applies to the 
confessor. Therefore when a man confesses that he and 
another man have been drinking, but the alleged part­
icipant denies it, only the confessor can be punished.
If the crime cannot have been committed by a single 
person, e.g. in the case of adultery, the schools of 
Islamic law are divided as to the authority of one 
partner’s confession when the other partner mentioned
27, Kasani, p.52. Ibn Kujaym, al-Ashbah wal-Nazal*r? 
vol.II, £.16*k  Khalil, Mukhtafar^ with the cormnqnt- 
ary of Zurqani, op.cit. p.IOC. Mughni. op.cit.
pp.68-9•
28. ShTM rani, Mizan, vol.II, p.137* MughnT, opcit. p.80. 
Shalabi, al-Fiqh al-Islami, pp.206-210.
denies the alleged crime. The Hanbali and 3hafi*i
#
schools hold that the confessor should be punished 
according to his confession regardless of the other 
person* s denial, and the same view is held by Abu Yusuf 
and Muhammad b. al-Hassan (the taro comoan ions of Abu
9Q• ‘- 7  *________________ __
Aanifa). According to Abu Hanifa, if the alleged
• «
partner in such a crime denies the allegation, neither 
of the two partners can be punished. He says that such 
a crime cannot be committed except by two people and if 
the act of one of them is not proved, the other*s rolo 
is not definitely established, so we could neither pun­
ish the confessor and leave the other, nor punish then 
both. Logically, this view seems more acceptable than 
the forfner since the partner* s denial sheds doubt on the 
correctness of the confessor*s statement, and, as we saw,
”haddM punishments are not to be inflicted when there:'is
30
any sort of doubt, however small.
With these conditions required for a valid confess­
ion, and with the possibility of its withdrawal at any 
stage even after the beginning of the carrying out of 
the sentence, one can sav that confession in criminal cases7 o
has a very limited role as a method of proof. This is 
true esueciallv when we consider the severity of the **haddt!
29. MUghnl, vol. IX, p. 65. Shafir1 , TJmm, vol.VII, p. 1^1. 
Hath al-Qadir, vol.IV, pp.158-9.
30. Fath al-Qadir, ibid.
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punishments, which might prevent even the most pious man 
from confessing’his guilt. Evidence of this view is 
that since the Saudi Arabian Kingdom revived the appli­
cation of the Islamic punishments more than 52 years ■ ■ 
ago, only one case of adultery is known to have been
jj-
proved by confession.
IV. The Judge * s, -Personal Observe tion ” *ilm al-Qadi” : -
*
The Zahiri school is the only school which allows a
judge to make judgements according to his own observation
in all criminal cases. Ibn Hazm in his famous text nal
•
Kuhnlla” , stated: ”It is the judge* s duty (ford) to give 
• • 
judgements according to his personal observation in all
civil and criminal cases ... the fairest judgement is
that which is based on the judge*s personal observation^ ^
I
then on the defendant's confession, then on testimony”.
Ibn Hazm defended this view by relating the judiciary*s
job to the duty of **enjoining what is right and forbidding
what is wrong”. It is every Muslim*s duty to do so, and
32
the judge is no exception to this rule.
31. It was during the time of the *Hajj* in 1957 when 
two Muhsans committed adultery and afterwards con­
fessed* it. They were stoned to death after the day 
of " *Arafa”. This case was brought to my knowledge 
by many eye-witnesses who were there for the ”hajj” , 
but no official records are available. •
32. Muhall, vol. IX, p. 1*26-29.
The Ilan/fi, Maliki and Hanbali schools forbid the 
• •
judge to give judgement according to his personal ob­
servation in all criminal cases (with the exception of 
!!ta*zir! cases, according to some)* The;/ hold that the 
judge cannot act except according to the evidence delivered 
before him. His own observations are no more valuable 
than those of any single witness. At the same time the 
judge is not allowed to add his own testimony to that 
of other witnesses in order to complete the number of 
witnesses required in a given case, because it is im-
33
possible to be a judge and a witness at the same time.
The two views are said to be held by the Shafi1i school,
— _  3^
but the majority of the Shafi1i scholars hold the latter* 
The majority view was defended by Ibn al-Qayyim who 
supported it bv quoting some Prophetic reports and views
35
attributed to the companions of the Prophet.
The Zaydi school makes a distinction between cases
of MqisasM and "qadhf11, wherd the judge is allowed to act 
* •
on his own knowledge, and other criminal cases, where he 
is not allowed to do so. Such a distinction is u n k n o m
33. 3adai! al-Sanai1, vol.VII, p.52* Baji, Muntaqa, vol.V, 
p.186. Mughni, vol.IX, p.78-9*
3*+. Mtfghn±, ibid. Muntaqa:, ibid. •TJda, vol.II, p.U-31* 
where he quoted Muhadhdhab, vol.II, p.320.
35* al-Turuq al-Hukmiya, op.cit. pp.210-217.
I
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; to other schools who either allow it in all cases or
i
j
I in none. Also one cannot find any logic in it, or any
3o
i  sound argument for its validity.
One can say then that the Zahiri view seems to con­
tradict the principles laid down in the Qur!an and the 
Sunna in relation to the methods of proof. Where the 
Qurfan requires four adult male witnesses to establish 
guilt in cases of Mzina,!, the Zahiris allow it to be 
established with only one witness if he happened to be 
the judge. Thus the relation between the Qurfanic command 
to enjoin the right and forbid the wrong and the judge1s 
duty may be interpreted in an entirely different way.
That is to say that it is "wrong11 to pass judgements 
without the evidence required by the law.
Therefore, the mj&ority view is the most convincing 
one, as^/either the Zahiris nor the Zaydis view is valid.
f
V. Circumstantial Evidence "al-Qara* in1
The generally accepted view is that circumstantial 
evidence "qara’in1 is not one of the methods of proof 
recognized under Islamic law. At the same time some 
jurists consider circumstantial evidence as a proper 
means of proof in the absence of others. Ibn al-Qayyim
36. 1 Uda, op.cit, pp.h-31-2, where he quoted Sharh al-
Azhar, vol.IV, p.320.
and the Maliki scholar, Ibn Farhun, are the two main
representatives of this view.
Circumstantial evidence is a valid way of proof,
according to the above authorities, in all civil and
criminal cases except "hadd" offences, though the offence
+
of adultery may be nroved against an unmarried woman if
37
she is pregnant. There arc other examples of criminal 
cases for which circumstantial evidence may be sufficient 
proof. Wine-drinking, for instance, may be proved by the 
smell of the breath of the accused or if a man vomits 
wine, a rule which is associated with 'Omar and Ibn Masu'd,
38
the companions of the Prophet. In cases of "qisas"
• •
circumstantial evidence is sufficient when a man runs 
out of a house with a knife in his hand, a man bleeding 
to death is immediately found there, and there is no 
sign of any other oossible assailant. In such a case
39
the running man is obviously the killer. In a similar
case, the Chief Alkali of Bida, Northern Nigeria, comment-
kO
ed that this evidence was "better than testimony".
The procedure of "qasama", in the context of "qisas"
• *
also, is a good example of circumstantial evidence being
37* Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Turuq al-Hukmiyya, op.cit. p.7* Ibn 
Farhun, Tabsirah, op.cit. vol.II, p.97*
38. Ibid.
39* Ibn Farhun, p.97«
kO. Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, London, 195*+? p.19^*
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considered a justification for swearing the oaths and
ifi
inflicting the "qisas", or enacting the "diya".
• •
The Ibadi school, usually referred to as a pert of 
the Khari.ji sect , consider that "qara'in" is proper 
evidence in cases of homicide. This view is based on a 
Prophetic report according to which the Prophet gave 
the loot of a murdered man, after the battle of Badr, 
to a member of the Muslim a r m y  because of circumstantial 
evidence that he had killed the enemv. To this view 
some contemporary scholars give a good deal of credence.
However, this view has not traditionally been 
supported, as the Sunni schools generally stick to the 
testimony of two male witnesses.
The arguments put forward by Ibn al-Qayyim and Ibn 
Farhun, may, at least, disprove the idea that Islamic 
law does not recognize circumstantial evidence in its
Hi. Ibn Farhun, ibid, p.96. Ibn al-Qayyim, I1lam al- 
Muwaqq'in, op.cit. vol.Ill, p.20-21.
k2. a we11-authorised view that it is not is_expressed, in 
'The Ibadis fi Mawkib al-Tarikh1 by gjail^ h 'Ali Yahya 
Mu'ammar’, vol.I, Cairo, 196H, pp. 19-35• A more ad­
vanced discussion of this topic is to be found in 
Studies in Ibadism, by Dr. *Amr Khalifa Ennami,
Unpub. Cambridge Univ. Thesis, 1971? PP.9-H3.
H3 . Atfayyish, M.B. Yusuf, Sharh al-IIil, vol.VII, Cairo, 
PP.5HB et sea.
UH. Ibrahim, al-Qises, ppA225-7? where he quoted the 
famous Egyptian §anafi jurist Shikh Ahmad Ibrahim 
in his book, Tnruq al-Ithbat al-Shar'iya, Cairo, 19H.
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H5
formulation of the law of evidence. But where circumstant­
ial evidence is the only method of proof available, the court
must take all possible precautions to avoid injustice or 
Hb
misjudgement. Mhen definite evidence is almost impossible,
writes one lianafi jurist, the nearest to it must be accepted.
It is interesting that according to Qarafi, the famous
lialiki jurist, circumstantial evidence may be considered
only by the court of "wali al-Jarn1 imfl or the official in
charge of crimes. But another Maliki authority, Ibn
Farhun, considers that the ordinary Sh,~ri1 a court or the
nqadin mav also take circumstantial evidence into consid- 
H&
eration. Here, it seems that the latter authority was
influenced by the very strong argument of Ibn al-Qayyim
and by his conclusion that the final purpose of the law
of God is to establish justice among neonle, therefore
hq
whatever means may be used for this is legitimate.
Intentially in this chapter, I have avoided any com-
rarison between Islamic law and/modern renal system, because
such a comparison in this particular context may not add any
significant contribution to the subject, let alone/any
h
practical importance.
by
H5. Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Turuq al-Eukmiyya, p.13.
Ho. Ibrahim, al-Qisas, p.226-7.
H7. Ibid.
HB. Ibn Farhun, ibid. p.111-2, where he quoted Qarafi in
Dh.akhira, his unpub. work on Maliki law. cf. Coulson
A History of Islamic Law, p.127-8.
H9. Ibn al-Qayyim, ibid. p.15*
CONCLUSION 
THE ISLAMIC ~EHAL SYSTEM
AND
PRESENT MUSLIM SOCIETIES 
So for, we have lsr.lt with the theory of punishment 
in Islamic law in an attempt to illustrate Its main 
characteristics and underlying philosophy. The- findings 
of this research nay bo summarized by saying that Islamic 
law has its unique philosophy of punishment; a philosophy 
which in part cares very little for the criminal and his 
reform, end concentrates on preventing the commission 
of offences. This is the part of the? penal system in 
Islamic law known as the Mhadd,? punishments. Here, 
nothing was left to the legislator in Muslim society; 
he could not add anything to, omit anything from, or 
alter any of the rules laid down in the Qur'an and the 
Sunna relating to these punishments. Equally noteworthy 
is the Islamic way of dealing with the crime of homicide, 
with its dualistic notion of-punishment for a crime, and 
compensation for a tort. Thus, the concept of "ta'zir11, 
or discretionary punishments, with the wide authority 
given to the ruler or legislator to create crimes and
their punishments, and with its direct concern with public 
morality, presents an everlasting basis on which the needs 
and requirements of Muslim society can be met.
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On the other hand the restrictions on inflicting
the punishments, especially "hadd" punishments, in terms
»
of difficulty of proof, recommendation of forgiveness 
and the possibility of repentance, greatly limit the 
number of cases in which these punishments can be in­
flicted*
It can be generally said, that punishment in Islamic 
law is mainly based on deterrent and retributive phil­
osophy, but scope is available for reformative elements 
particularly within the provisions of "tn'zir".
However, in connection with the theory of punishment, 
the most controversial aspect discussed in contemporary 
Islamic circles is the possibility of applying the Islamic 
penal system in modern societies. Those who are involved 
in the dispute comprise two groups, one of which may be 
called 1 the advocates" of the application of the Islamic 
penal system, and the other may be called "the opponents". 
The discussion has not always been objective, for the 
opponents often accuse the advocates of being backward, 
narrow-minded, reactionary and even barbarous. At the 
same time, the advocates are not less aggressive than 
their attackers; their list of accusations contains: 
ignorance, being under foreign, particularly Western, 
influence and lack of faith.
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Apart from this exchange of accusations, both part­
ies present a considerable variety of arguments for and 
against the case. The advocates, to defend their view, 
adduce many arguments of which the two most important 
are: that the Islamic penal system is a part of the law 
of God which must be obeyed and enforced, and that the 
appliCc?tion of this system has proved successful in the 
past, as well as in modern times. Here they usualljr
quote the example of Saudi Arabia to which we have al-
1
ready referred. As a matter of fact both these argu­
ments are right, but the question is whether or not they 
justify* the application of the Islamic penal system in 
present Muslin societies.
On the other hand, the most important arguments 
against the case are: that the penal system known to 
Islamic law is not, like other Islamic legal rules, of_
(_sW=:
any use to present-day society, because of its antiquity 
and lack of sophistication; and that the Islamic penal 
system in particular, cannot be applied today as it is
1. Another example, which may be referred to, is that 
of Kuwait. The Islamic penal system, including Mhaddn 
punishments was theoretically enforced there up to 
i960 when the first penal code was formed. The only 
exception to that was the "hadd" punishment for theft 
which was postponed by an order of the late Shikh 
Jabir al-Ahmad in 1931. The order was made according 
to a "fatwa" (formal legal opinion) issued by the 
(then) Mufti of Kuwait. This information was given 
to me in a letter of reply from Major General A. F. 
Thuaini, the Under Secretary of State for the Interior 
of Kuwait, to whom I am grateful.
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very severe, inhuman, and barbarous. Ho doubt the 
punishments recognized in Islamic lav/ are very severe, 
but all the other allegations were adequately replied 
to by the other side. However, it is not my intention 
here to go through all the details of this discussion, 
but to state briefly its main points in order to approach 
the problem.
The starting point, in dealing with the application 
of the Islamic penal system, is the understanding of its 
place within the Islamic legal theory as a whole, or 
rather within Islam itself. It is well-known that Islam 
provides a complete scheme for running and supervising 
every aspect of human life. The rules end regulations, 
injunctions and prohibitions, laid down by the Qur'an and 
the Sunna, or derived from them, produce an entire image 
of the Muslim community from which no part can be removed 
without the rest being damaged. Equally, no isolated 
part of this scheme can make any sense, or be of any use.
The philosophy of punishment, in any legal system, 
is an integral part of this system, and cannot be under­
stood or applied except within its principles, to protect 
the values recognized by it. If this is true, and it is 
perfectly true, it must be completely wrong to borrow the 
penal philosophy of one legal system and adapt it to an­
other, of different principles and values or to apply
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the philosophy of punishment laid down by Islamic law
to a community in which any part of the Islamic scheme
of life is lacking.
To turn to the contemporary Muslim societies one
can hardly say that the Islamic way of life is adopted,
or even well-understood. There is no exception to this
statement even the widely-used example of Saudi Arabia.
Again it is not worth going into details, but anyone
who has even a modest knowledge of Muslin societies
would agree with this.
Therefore, it is nonsense to say that wo have to
apply the Islamic penal system to present-day Muslim
societies, in their present circumstances. It is nonsense
to amputate the thief* s hand when he has no means of
support but stealing. It is nonsense to punish at all
for adultery, let alone to stone to death, in a community
where everything invites and encourages unlawful sexual
2
relationships. Above.all it is nonsense to say that 
the penal code now in operation in a country like Egypt 
is almost legitimate under the doctrine of "ts’zir1 
recognized in Islamic law. Such a code simply has no 
connection with Islamic law, and does not seek its legality
2. A similar view was expressed by Abul A*la Mawdudi, 
in his book Islamic Law and Constitution, 3rd Ed. 
Lahore, 19&7? pp.53-59*
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in the recognition of it, but in its suitability to
3
the present circumstances there. Those who try to 
justify some of the current systems in Muslim countries 
only prove their lack of understanding of the Islamic 
image of life as laid down in the Cur*an, the Cunna and 
the scholars* teaching.
Trom this point of view, i.e. the inpossibility of 
the isolation of one part, or more, of the Islamic scheme 
of life’, one can say that the application of the Islamic 
penal system in the present circumstances would not 
lead to tho achievement of the ends recommended by this 
system. This leads us to consider two points made by 
the advocates of its application. The first is that the 
Islamic penal system proved to be successful in the past 
and the present, in preventing crimes, or at least in 
minimising the crime rate. As for the past, one of the 
great advocates claims that ’’the Islamic penal code was 
in vogue up to the beginning of the nineteenth century.** 
This claim can hardly be proved. Abu Yusuf, the second 
founder of the Hanafi school tells us in his famous text 
**al-Khnra.i!l about the extent of the application of the
3. Compare, for example, Abu Zahra, al-Jarimah wal
*Uquba, Cairo, p.126-8.
h . Mawdud i, op.cit. p.6 5.
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Islamic penal system during the era of Harun a1-Hashid, 
the Abbasid Caliph, His statement leaves the reader 
definitely sure that, by this time, the Islamic penal
5 _ ___
system was far from being enforced, Abu Yusuf died 
in the year 182 A,H. Co it mas after less than two 
centuries that the circumstances made it necessary to 
relax the enforcement of the Islamic penal system. This 
was due to the fact that the society for which this 
system was framed no longer existed after the widespread 
expansion of Islam among people of totally different 
values. It is the very same consideration, i.e, the 
non-existence of the society visualized by Islam, which 
led us to say that tho application of the Islamic penal 
system nowadays would not achieve its ends. The well- 
known example of its successful apnlication in Saudi
7
Arabia can only be used as evidence for this view.
The second point one may consider is the claim that 
the Islamic penal system is preferable to any counterpart, 
because Islam, and the Iluslim jurists, discovered and 
legalised all modern theories known to penal codes and 
legislations. This early advancement, say the advocates,
is a point in favour of the application of this penal 
system. This point has often inspired articles, speeches,
5. Sec, al-Kharaj , Cairo Ad. 1352 A.II, pp,lb-9-l52.
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and even text books. To ne it has no relevance to the 
application of the penal system of Islamic law. It may 
be of great valrc in research concerned with legal or 
social history, but certainly it has nothing to do with 
the application of a legal system. The only justification 
for operating one legal system and not another is that 
the enforced one provides the community with all poss­
ible "good" and protects it from all possible "bad".
The "good" and the "bad" are to be measured in accord­
ance with the majority's needs and requirements, or, in 
other words, the majority's approval. Ho doubt, the 
Islamic legal system had such qualifications in the past, 
when the circumstances were appropriate for its enforce­
ment. Also, there is no doubt, at least to the Muslims, 
that the will of God as revealed in the Qur'an and the 
trustworthy Sunna, has an everlasting value and the 
ability to safeguard the community's interest. But first, 
and before we can demand the enforcement of the Islamic 
penal system, it must be proved, beyond the slightest 
shadow of doubt, that the Muslim community visualized 
in the Qur'an and the Sunna had became an existent fact.
Moreover, it must be remembered that Islamic law 
is an ideal legal system, i.e. it is not a customary law 
which grew up within the society in which it was applied;
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it is a legal system which was formulated in order to 
realize an ideal society, i.e. the Islamic society.
This Idealism is clear enough from the Qur'anic injunc­
tions and prohibitions concerned with the social life 
of Muslims. Nevertheless, it is even clearer in the 
jurists' work, not only on social but also on legal 
and even political topics. Islamic law measures the 
realities in society according to Islamic standards and 
approves or disapproves them. This is not because of 
what people do or abstain from doing, but because things 
are "good" or "bad" in the abstract. Apart from the
rules of public interest "maslaha", necessity "darorah"
, » * .
misuse of right "isaat isti'mal al-haqq" and other sim-
ilar rules, this emphasis on ideal concepts is the gen­
eral tendency in Islamic law. Therefore, one can say 
that when that ideal society does not exist, Islamic law 
as expressed in the jurists' manuals cannot be applied.
Even historically this was so, as for instance in the 
establishment of the court of the official in charge of 
the crimes "wali al-Jara'im" to deal with criminal cases
on a different basis, both in matters of procedure and
— _  6
substance, than that of the usual court of the "qadi".
.
6. For further details, see, Shalabi, al-Fiqh al-Islami bayn 
al-Mithaliya wal-l/aqi1 ya, pp.6-19, and Coulson, Conflicts 
and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence, pp.58-7o. each 
one of these two writers has approached the subject in 
a different way, but they both contribute to it.
Me conclude, therefore, that the Islamic penal 
system, or rather Islamic law, is to be applied only 
within the above-mentioned Islamic society. Whenever
i „
this society exists ,5 Islamic legal system will be able
r y j  y
to operate x^ithout any need to''" "the advocates" and in
/
spite of all the objections of "the opponents". Whether 
or not this society will come into being is a matter 
beyond my own judgement.
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